China’s Incomplete Military Transformation Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz C O R P O R A T I O N NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION China’s Incomplete Military Transformation Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 108-7. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. February 2015 Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska, Samuel K. Berkowitz Sponsored by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR893 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-8830-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2015 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Chinese airborne troops parachute in an amphibious landing drill during the third phase of the Sino-Russian “Peace Mission 2005” joint military exercise, held in China's Shandong Peninsula in 2005 (AP Photo /Xinhua, Zha Chunming). 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Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface Since the mid-1990s, the People’s Republic of China has invested enor- mous resources in developing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a modern force that can secure various national interests both at home and now increasingly abroad. The stunning U.S. victory in Opera- tion Desert Storm (Iraq) in 1991; U.S. involvement in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis; and U.S. military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, during which the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, motivated Chinese leaders to invest considerable resources in the transformation of the PLA into a more modern, profes- sional, and operationally capable fighting force. These conflicts bluntly demonstrated to the People’s Republic of China that it lacked a mili- tary that could effectively fight and win wars against modern oppo- nents, especially adversaries who could effectively harness the infor- mation revolution and successfully conduct joint operations. Although the modernization drive is now over two decades old and has yielded impressive results, numerous weaknesses persist. This report assesses many of the weaknesses in the PLA’s human capital and organizational realms, in the PLA’s combat capabilities across various domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic), and in China’s defense research and industrial complex. It does so by examining how these weaknesses affect the PLA’s performance of missions Beijing tasks or may task the force to carry out and by reviewing Chinese assessments of the PLA’s shortcomings and their potential implications. This study should be of interest to military analysts, policymakers, lawmakers, or iii iv China’s Incomplete Military Transformation anyone interested in Chinese military affairs and their security impli- cations for the United States and its allies and partners. This research was sponsored by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), which Congress established in 2000 to monitor and report on the economic and national security dimensions of U.S. trade and economic ties with the People’s Republic of China. This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and founda- tions and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Executive Summary ............................................................. ix Acknowledgments ...............................................................xv CHAPTER ONE Introduction: The Importance of Understanding the People’s Liberation Army’s Weaknesses ............................................ 1 Defining Weakness ................................................................ 2 Sources and Methodology ........................................................ 3 Limitations of Sources and Knowledge Gaps ................................... 7 Organization of This Report .....................................................11 CHAPTER TWO People’s Liberation Army Modernization: Mid‑1990s to 2025 .........13 People’s Liberation Army Modernization Since the 1990s ...................13 Likely Trajectory of People’s Liberation Army Modernization Through 2025 ............................................................................19 Factors That Could Change the Direction of People’s Liberation Army Modernization ................................................................21 CHAPTER THREE Missions of the People’s Liberation Army ...................................25 The People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Objectives ..........................25 People’s Liberation Army Mission Sets, Relevant Campaigns, and Intended Campaign Effects ................................................ 27 v vi China’s Incomplete Military Transformation People’s Liberation Army’s Capabilities to Conduct Missions Through 2025 ............................................................................39 CHAPTER FOUR Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army Organization and Human Capital ............................................................. 43 Potential Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army Organization and Human Capital .............................................................. 44 Impact on the People’s Liberation Army’s Ability to Achieve Its Missions ...................................................................... 60 How the People’s Liberation Army Is Attempting to Address These Weaknesses ....................................................................61 CHAPTER FIVE Weaknesses of People’s Liberation Army Combat Capabilities .........69 The Two Incompatibles and the Two Gaps ....................................69 The Land Domain ................................................................74 The Sea Domain .................................................................. 87 The Air Domain ................................................................. 101 The Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains .......................... 114 Nuclear Deterrence ............................................................. 119 CHAPTER SIX Weaknesses in China’s Defense Industry ................................. 125 China’s Improving Defense Industry Capabilities .......................... 125 Weaknesses of China’s Defense Industry ..................................... 126 Potential Impact of Weaknesses in China’s Defense Industry ............. 133 CHAPTER SEVEN Conclusion: People’s Liberation Army Weaknesses and Their Implications ................................................................ 135 APPENDIX Critical Assumptions .......................................................... 139 Abbreviations ................................................................... 147 References ....................................................................... 151 Index ............................................................................. 173 Figures and Tables Figures 4.1. PLA Manpower, 1990–2014 ...................................... 54 5.1. Numbers of PLA Main Battle Tanks, by Generation, 1990–2014 ............................................................78