University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2014 Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Bradley Taylor University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Taylor, Bradley, "Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy" (2014). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 1468. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Human Beings and the Moral Law: Moral Precariousness in Kant's Ethical Philosophy Abstract ABSTRACT HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT'S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Bradley M. Taylor Dr. Paul Guyer This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant's ethics. Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant's moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant's account of human moral agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law. We also may have a vacillating relation to the moral law insofar as we usually find ourselves acting in accordance with the moral law (that is, we often find ourselves committing lawful actions), while also (for many, if not all, human beings) finding ourselves occasionally deviating from the requirements of the moral law (this is a consequence of Kant's doctrine of radical evil). In my dissertation, I argue that this moral precariousness manifests itself as a set of ongoing, perpetual moral crises. That is, there are several crucial points in Kant's moral thinking that provide the occasion for a crisis. In each of these crucial points, Kant's account of human beings as dual-natured (both natural and rational) generate a struggle (or at least the representation of a struggle) that has a variety of moral consequences. This dissertation approaches this moral precariousness through analyses of several key features of Kant's moral philosophy: his concept of humanity, the dignity of human beings, the moral feeling of respect, and experience of sublimity, and Kant's theory of radical evil. Through an examination of each of these topics, I argue that Kant's account of the moral condition of human beings is one of perpetual open-endedness, uncertainty about one's moral worth, and, above all, (at least) potential crisis. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Philosophy First Advisor Paul Guyer Keywords Dignity, Freedom, Humanity, Kant, Respect, Sublime Subject Categories Philosophy This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/1468 HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Bradley M. Taylor A DISSERTATION in Philosophy Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2014 Supervisor of Dissertation ____________________ Paul Guyer, Jonathan Nelson Professor of Humanities and Philosophy, Brown University Graduate Group Chairperson _______________________ Michael Weisberg, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania Dissertation Committee Elisabeth Camp, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University Karen Detlefsen, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Education, University of Pennsylvania HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY COPYRIGHT 2014 Bradley Martin Taylor This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ny-sa/2.0/ This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Martin Joseph Taylor and Patricia Heeran Taylor iii ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to take this space to extend my thanks to all the professors and mentors that have contributed to my development as a student of philosophy. The excellent examples that were set for me by these teachers and scholars provided me with an ideal toward which I aspire in my own teaching and scholarship. I would also like to thank my fellow graduate students and colleagues at the department of philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. I have been both inspired and influenced your own work. In particular, I would like to thank Reed Winegar for all the incredibly insightful conversations and discussions about Kant and Hegel we had over the years, especially during the early years of my time at Penn. I would also like to thank the University of Pennsylvania Critical Writing Program for making me a teaching fellow for the Academic Year 2012-2013. This experience provided invaluable teaching experience while also allowing me to continue work on my dissertation. In particular, I would like to thank Valerie Ross, Patrick Werner, Doug Paletta, and Roger LeGrand. My time as a Critical Writing Teaching Fellow has profoundly impacted my approach to teaching. I will carry the influence of your wonderful program for all my teaching life. I would also like to thank my committee members Paul Guyer, Karen Detlefsen, and Elisabeth Camp for their assistance, advice, and guidance through the dissertation writing process. Finally, I would like to thank Sarah Jane Compton for her constant encouragement, steadfast support, and companionship. iv ABSTRACT HUMAN BEINGS AND THE MORAL LAW: MORAL PRECARIOUSNESS IN KANT’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY Bradley M. Taylor Dr. Paul Guyer This dissertation is an examination of human moral precariousness in Kant’s ethics. Human beings are in a state of moral precariousness insofar as they are ever-capable of transgressing the moral law and are often uncertain of the moral worth of their actions. Put another way, in this dissertation I argue that the basic relationship between human beings and the moral law, in Kant’s moral philosophy, is, most fundamentally, one of tenuousness and vacillation. This relation is the fundamental characteristic of the human moral condition because such a relation is built into Kant’s account of human moral agency. We have a tenuous relation to the moral law because we always have at least the possibility of conflict between our desire for happiness (i.e. the satisfaction of our inclinations) and the requirements of the moral law. We also may have a vacillating relation to the moral law insofar as we usually find ourselves acting in accordance with the moral law (that is, we often find ourselves committing lawful actions), while also (for many, if not all, human beings) finding ourselves occasionally deviating from the requirements of the moral law (this is a consequence of Kant’s doctrine of radical evil). In my dissertation, I argue that this moral precariousness manifests itself as a set of ongoing, perpetual moral crises. That is, there are several crucial points in Kant’s moral v thinking that provide the occasion for a crisis. In each of these crucial points, Kant’s account of human beings as dual-natured (both natural and rational) generate a struggle (or at least the representation of a struggle) that has a variety of moral consequences. This dissertation approaches this moral precariousness through analyses of several key features of Kant’s moral philosophy: his concept of humanity, the dignity of human beings, the moral feeling of respect, and experience of sublimity, and Kant’s theory of radical evil. Through an examination of each of these topics, I argue that Kant’s account of the moral condition of human beings is one of perpetual open-endedness, uncertainty about one’s moral worth, and, above all, (at least) potential crisis. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT ......................................................................................................IV ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................V PREFACE.......................................................................................................................VIII CHAPTER 1 ......................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................46 CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................91 CHAPTER 4 ..................................................................................................................135 CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................166 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................234 vii Preface