Notes Introduction 1 The book disaggregates temporality according to the three categories outlined by Schedler and Santiso (1998): temporal location (when reform takes place); sequence (in what order reform is enacted) and pace (the speed at which reform takes place). 2 See Barnathan (2006); Howorth (2007); Hunter and Farley (2002); Jones (2007); Hyde-Price (2007); Meyer (2006); Posen (2004, 2006); Riecker (2005) and Sloan (2005). 3 See also Riecker (2005) on the Europeanisation of Security Identities in Nordic States; Miskimmon (2007) on the Europeanisation of German Foreign and Security Policy and Dover (2007) on the Europeanisation of British Defence Policy. 4 On ‘international structure’ and ESDP, see also the valuable contributions of Barry Posen (2004) and (2006) and Barnathan (2006). It is important to recog- nise the excellent empirical contributions made by the edited volumes of Gänzle and Sens (2007) and Howorth and Keeler (2003), the works of Hunter and Farley (2002), Salmon and Shepherd (2003), and Sloan (2005) to understanding the development of ESDP and its relationship to the Atlantic Alliance, but which do not adopt a fixed theoretical position. 5 There are several important texts analysing the processes and outcomes of national military reform processes, but no book that systematically and rigorously compares and contrasts reforms in the three major European NATO/EU states (Britain, France and Germany) since 1990. The majority of studies on Germany focus on the Federal Republic as a testing ground for cultural and historical institutionalist (path dependency) approaches to military change. These include Berger (1998); Dalgaard- Nielsen (2006); Duffield (1998) and Longhurst (2004). Whilst Utley (2000) and Gregory (2000) provide important empirical analyses of French military reforms, Rynning (2001) highlights the utility of neoclassical realism in understanding mil- itary change in France from 1958–2000, emphasising the important intervening role played by instances of policy leadership in managing processes of policy change. This study does not deny that the quality of leadership can be an impor- tant variable, however, it builds upon Rynning’s argument by demonstrating the centrality of ‘executive autonomy’ in conditioning the ability and willingness of policy-makers within the core executive to provide strategic leadership on behalf of systemic power shifts. The work also builds upon work of Adams and Ben-Ari (2006) who provide a detailed account of the capability gaps within the Atlantic Alliance. The book does so by analysing the contributions of neorealist, neoclassical realist and cultural approaches to understanding the process of European military reforms and their selective emulation of the US-led RMA. 6 On the decline of realist analyses in British and European IR scholarship see Mears- heimer (2005): 139. On neoclassical realism see (Rose, 1998). See also Charles Glasner (1994–5) on the potential for the construction of multilevel analyses guided by structural realist theory. 7 For more on neoclassical realism and executive autonomy please see Chapter 3. 244 Notes 245 8 J. Glenn et al (eds) (2004) test the explanatory power of neorealism and strategic culture in understanding military change across a global range of contemporary (post-Cold War) case studies, whilst Farrell and Terriff (2002) test the utility of cul- tural and neorealist approaches by analysing a set of case studies from a variety of historical periods. Forster (2006) also provides important empirical account of the transformations that have taken place in European militaries since the end of the Cold War, but does not test cultural and realist accounts in a systematic manner or seek to develop a theory of military convergence, innovation and emulation, focus- ing instead on issues of armed forces-society relations. This book will also critically engage with the work of Elizabeth Kier (1997), who emphasises the role of organ- isational culture as an intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine in her study of interwar British and French military reforms. 9 See Table 2.6. 10 A policy subsystem refers to a ‘group of people and or organisations interacting regularly over periods of a decade or more to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy area/domain’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 135). 11 According to Dalgaard-Nielsen (2006: 13) central beliefs are ‘abstract beliefs and basic assumptions about the international system…rarely questioned and stable’; ‘operational beliefs’ relate to the ‘efficacy of different policy instruments and strategies’, whilst ‘peripheral beliefs’ are ‘more transient and concern concrete issues and objects’. Longhurst (2004: 17) terms the three layers of beliefs of which strategic culture are composed ‘foundational elements’, ‘security policy stand- points’ and ‘regulatory practices’, whilst Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 133) also argues that advocacy coalitions are structured by three layers of beliefs: ‘deep core’, ‘policy core’ and ‘secondary aspects’. 12 Barry Posen (2006: 156) classifies Britain, France and Germany as second-rank, ‘consequential’ states, of similar relative material power, that combined with their similar geographical location leads to a comparable level of ‘external vulnerability’ (Taliaferro, 2006: 467). 13 This approach contrasts to Innenpolitik perspectives, which attach causal weight to domestic politics in driving foreign and defence policy (Hobson, 1938; Kehr, 1973; Snyder, 1991; Zakaria, 1991: 180–1). 14 Peter Hall defines three levels of policy change: ‘first-order change’ in which the set- tings of policy instruments are changed, while the overall goals and instruments of policy remain constant; ‘second-order change’ in which both the instruments and settings of policy are altered, while the goals of policy remain unchanged and finally ‘third-order change’, in which all three components of policy (settings, instruments and the hierarchy of goals) are transformed (Hall, 1993: 278–9). 15 Although, as the analysis will demonstrate, the opacity of systemic imperatives emerges as an important additional factor determining the initial short-term temporal lag between systemic power shifts and military reform in states with high levels of executive autonomy (Morgenthau, 1966: 154; Rose, 1998: 153). Chapter 1 1 As Waltz (1979: 124) recognises, military convergence will not ‘proceed to the point where competitors become identical’. 2 It is important to note that despite French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military commands the Ailleret-Lemnitzer and Valentin-Feber Accords of 246 Notes 1966–7 outlined far-reaching French cooperation with NATO states in the context of European conflict (Gregory, 2000a: 15; Menon, 1995: 19). 3 On the core post-Cold War security threats identified by EU and NATO member states, see ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December 2003, 1–5; ‘Riga Summit: A Reader’s Guide’, Brussels: NATO, 6 July 2007 4; see also Cottey (2008: 73) and Hyde-Price (2007: 112). Although as discussed in Chapter 3, the objectivity of these security threats is challenged by the literatures on securitisation and strategic culture. On securit- isation, see Balzacq (2005): 171–205; Buzan et al (1998); Stritzel (2007: 357–83). On strategic culture and the subjective and nationally-specific normative and discursive processes which determine whether issues are identified as security threats, national defence policy objectives, appropriate policy instruments, and capability investment, see Dalgaard-Nielsen (2006), Johnston (1995) and Longhurst (2004). 4 A frequently-cited definition of the RMA is provided by Krepinevic (1994: 30) ‘It is what occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organisational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase – often an order of magnitude or greater – in the combat potential or military effective- ness of armed forces.’ For further definitions see Cohen (2004: 395). 5 As Boot (2006: 325–7) recognises, the Vietnam War spurred the development of a range of new technologies including radiation-seeking missiles, electronic jamming equipment, thermal and electro-optical sensors and satellite naviga- tion. The Vietnam conflict also witnessed the deployment of the first laser- guided bomb (the Paveway) by the US. 6 The idea of revolutionary changes in military affairs has been invoked on sev- eral occasions throughout history, for example upon the advent of gunpowder and professional standing armies in Europe during the 16–18th centuries; dur- ing the industrialisation of warfare in the early mid-20th century and following the development of nuclear weapons at the end of WW2. 7 Marshall enjoyed a close relationship with Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2000–06) and other prominent figures within the administration of George W. Bush, such as Vice-President Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz. 8 A ‘stand-off’ advantage is one that allows the projection of military force without the threat of being targeted by an opponent’s defence system. 9 Admiral William Owens argued that the RMA coheres around three major tech- nological developments: Intelligence Collection, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence Analysis