THE BATTLE OF MALAYA: THE JAPANESE INVASION OF MALAYA AS A CASE STUDY FOR THE RE-EVALUATION OF IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY INTELLIGENCE EFFECTIVENESS DURING WORLD WAR II A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts By DANIEL J. LAURO B.A., Wright State University, 2015 2018 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL April 20, 2018 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Daniel J. Lauro ENTITLED: The Battle of Malaya: The Japanese Invasion Of Malaya as a Case Study for the Re-Evaluation of Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence Effectiveness During World War II BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of the Arts. ___________________________ Kathryn Meyer , Ph.D. Thesis Director ___________________________ Jonathan Reed Winkler, Ph.D. Chair, Department of History Committee on Final Examination ___________________________ Kathryn Meyer, Ph.D. ___________________________ Jonathan Reed Winkler, Ph.D. ___________________________ Paul Lockhart, Ph.D. ___________________________ Barry Milligan, Ph.D. Interim Dean of the Graduate School ABSTRACT Lauro, Daniel J. M.A. Department of History, Wright State University, 2018. The Battle of Malaya: The Japanese Invasion of Malaya as a Case Study for the Re-Evaluation of Imperial Japanese Army Intelligence Effectiveness During World War II. The present assessment of Japanese intelligence operations during World War II is based almost entirely upon the work of Western researchers. The view presented is one of complete incompetence by the West. Little attention has been paid to any successes the Japanese intelligence organizations achieved. In fact, the majority of Anglo-American historians have instead focused on the errors and unpreparedness of the Allies as the cause of their early failures. This view is completely dismissive of Japanese intelligence efforts. The majority of the research does not take into account the extensive preparations and training the Japanese intelligence organizations and military undertook in the lead up to World War II. This information calls into question the assertion that Allied failures were the primary provenance of the early Japanese successes. This study focuses on the Japanese intelligence efforts from 1930 to 1942. It will analyze the events leading up to and the Invasion of Malaya. This was a pivotal event at the opening of World War II, and was a decisive Japanese victory. Previously, the success of Japanese forces during this, and other, event has been credited to failures in Allied intelligence and preparedness. Western sources at large have claimed that Japanese intelligence as a whole was faulty. This project will argue that in fact Japanese iii intelligence units were highly skilled and contributed greatly to Japanese successes. It was as a result of severe organizational deficiencies and failures that appeared in the latter half of the war that Japan eventually would fall behind in the intelligence war. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS. PROLOGUE . .. .1 CHAPTER 1 Thesis . 9 Exploration of Thesis . 11 Review of Literature/Historiography . 17 CHAPTER 2 Historical Background: Japan’s Rise to Imperial Power . 34 Japanese Intelligence Development (1868-1941) . .38 First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) . 44 Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) . 50 Japanese Intelligence and the Russo-Japanese War . 55 Outcomes . 63 CHAPTER 3 British Malaya . .66 Pre-World War II Malaya . .68 Commercial and Diplomatic Intelligence . .72 The Shinozaki Case . .76 Japanese Naval Intelligence . 80 Japanese Army Intelligence Efforts in Malaya and Southeast Asia . .82 v CHAPTER 4 The Battle of Malaya . 87 Fujiwara Iwaichi and F Kikan . 89 “The Odd Man Out” – Patrick Stanley Vaughn Heenan . 101 CHAPTER 5 IJA Intelligence Collection Activities . .111 Refining the IJA Intelligence System . .120 Analysis and Exploitation . 123 Where was the failure? . .125 CONCLUSION The Scrutable Westerners and Japanese Intelligence in WW II . .134 BIBLIOGRAPHY . .140 vi Dedication First and foremost, to my father who always believed in me and always pushed me to excel and to pursue those things that made me happy in life. I love you Dad and I am sorry that you never got to see me complete this work. To Debb my partner who has endured my long hours of absence in the effort to complete this project and has gone above and beyond to motivate me and keep me going. To Josh, Hall, and Carl, in no particular order, who were there for my B.A. and who have persevered as friends through my journey for my M.A. To the History department at WSU, whose tough love and guidance have helped me to get this far. Finally, to Dr. Christopher Beck, almost seven years ago you gave a longhaired, bearded, Rob Zombie T-Shirt wearing undergrad a chance in your Travels and Trade class. I hope that the years of guidance and mentorship have not been a complete waste or disappointment. Thank you for giving me the chance I needed to prove to myself that I belonged in this field. vii Prologue December 5th 1941, the Japanese First Air Fleet, designated Kido Butai or Mobile Unit/Force, refueled for the final time on their approach to Pearl Harbor. December 6th brought with it more, last minute, intelligence. Japanese submarines reported that the American fleet was not using its alternate anchorage. In the evening, the command staff had a final meeting during which they reviewed the operational plan one final time and assessed the latest intelligence reports to have been received. The last of the reports from their spy in Pearl Harbor arrived that night. The information that the operative sent was posted on the ready room boards for all the pilots to see in the morning. At noon of that same day, the Kido Butai had already adjusted its course due South and increased to full speed. Grand crews had already lined the aircraft up on the decks and readied them for combat while mechanics performed final inspections. By 6:15 a.m. approximately one hundred and eighty Japanese fighters, bombers, and torpedo planes had formed up. By 7:00 a.m., using a radio direction finder tuned to a Honolulu station for guidance, Commander Fuchida Mitsuo (1902-1976) estimated his attacking aircraft were an hour out from their target. At 7:49 a.m. Admiral Nagumo Chuichi (1887-1944) received the infamous “TORA…TORA…TORA” radio message signaling that the attack on Pearl Harbor had commenced. Admiral Yamamoto also received that message, due to favorable atmospheric conditions, on his flagship near Hashirajima in Japanese imperial waters. 1 The first bombs began to fall on the US fleet at 7:55 a.m. The first torpedo, loosed by Lt. Goto Inichi, struck the USS Oklahoma shortly after the first bombs were released. Chaos reigned as the unprepared American seamen attempted to discern at first whether it was an attack or insubordinate pilots barn storming the ships. Once the explosions began American servicemen struggled to get their ships under way, attend to damage control, and mount a defense. They categorically failed in all their efforts. The lone exception was the USS Nevada. The Nevada was the only battleship to get underway. The ship and its crew made a desperate dash for the open ocean but after taking several bomb hits and a torpedo strike they were forced to beach to prevent blocking the harbor entrance. Approximately one hour behind the first wave was the Japanese attack’s second wave. Arriving from several directions at once, they attacked Ford Island, Hickam Field and other vital aircraft facilities. The attack was over ninety minutes after the first bombs dropped. Pearl Harbor was devastated. The United States Pacific Fleet lie shattered on the harbor bottom. In the first fifteen minutes of the attack, the battleships USS Arizona and Oklahoma had been sunk while the USS California and West Virginia had been severely crippled. Five total battleships were sunk outright. The remaining battleships all received substantial damage and it would be three months before the least damaged of them returned to service. The Japanese had seemingly scored a decisive and demoralizing victory against the Americans.1 In early 1941 top Japanese military commanders believed for a myriad of reasons that war with the United States was inevitable. As early as the 1920s America and Britain had been aware of the potential as Japan increased its imperial presence in the Pacific 1 John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II, (New York: Random House, 1995), 184-189. 2 region. Tensions between East and West escalated after Japan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Japan spent much of the 1930s after the invasion attempting to isolate China from any Western help. Japan also began a more earnest attempt at becoming independent of the West for resources. This attempt led them to begin looking at the resource rich area of Southeast Asia that included possessions of the British Empire. In 1937, the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Nanking Massacre began to sway Western opinion against the Japanese. Great Britain, occupied with events in Europe, had little time or the resources to deal with the potential Japanese threat in the Pacific region. Likewise, America was in no position to resist the Japanese directly at this point. Americans in general were also opposed to entering another costly conflict, preferring to let the Europeans deal with their own mess. As a result, the Western powers supplied the Chinese with money for their war supplies, hoping to stem the Japanese advance. In 1940, the Japanese invaded French Indochina. Their goals were to stop the influx of war supplies to China and to take control of the natural resources of the region.