SUMMER 19 5 6 Vol. VIII No. 3 * * The United States Air Force Alfí UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW V olume VIII SUMMER 1956 Number 3 THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE IN MODERN WARFARE ... 3 C ol. J ack D. N ic h o l a s, USAF A FORMULA FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING.........................................21 B rjg. G en. L loyd P. H opwood, USAF T H E VALUE OF T H E P R O ..................................................................... 34 A Q uarterly R eview Report CONCEPT OF THE WEST GERMAN AIR FO R C E .............................46 D r . L ewis J. Edinger LORD TRENCHARD, ARCHITECT OF AIR POWER .... 59 D r . H arry H. Ransom AIR POWER AND WORLD A FFA IR S....................................................68 C ol. W il f r ed J. Smith, USAF IN MY OPINION Allied Air Power Has Outgrown Our M A A G s.............................79 M aj. W il l ia m R. Stewart, J r ., USAF ORGANIZING 15,000,000 AIR P H O T O S .................................................... 89 D r . J osé M. T opete AIR FORCE REVIEW Air Force Headquarters: Its Mission and Organization . 102 C ol. L . F. L oesch, USAF C ol. C. R. L ow, USAF The Challenge of Air-Age Education in A m erica............................ 109 D r . D onald W. Cox BOOKS AND IDEAS The Airman's Language.................................................................................117 D r . W oodford A. H eflin THE CONTRIBUTORS.............................................. 181 Addrew manuscripts to Editor, Air University Quarterly Review, Headquarters, Air University, . ,íw „ Air «‘orce Base, Ala. The prirting of this publication has been approved by the Dircctor rí rhe ^ urcau oí tbe Budget, 3 July 1952. Printed by the Government Printing Office, Washington, MwLJnAti.•viaxweii Air torcep"* * CBase,n Pv’ 5*0»Ala. CCIií*; Properly yca.rly creditcd subscr'Pt'on. quotations J2, from are authorized.Air University USAF Book Periodical Department, 50-2. In the air-atomic age annihilation of an unsuspecting opponent•**, by a shattering initial blow has become the aggressor’s blueprint for victory in total war. The attributes of decisive firepower, speed and contínuity of attack, flexibility, and limit- less access to targets give modem air forces the paramount capability for achieving strategic surprise and largely deny this capability to surface forces. Defense of the United States against the deadly surprise potential of air delivery and nuclear weapons requires the utniost vigilance. Colonel Jack D. Nicholas, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, Armed Forces Staff College, describes how we may advance our guard by studying the pattems in past applications of strategic surprise. Tke Element of Surprise odern Waríare •g Vl-l»im *. ITH thc tremendous upsurge in destructive power and a two- to threefold increase in the speed and range of air- craft, the military theorists’ vision of total victory by means of a single battle has become an actual possibility. Any point on the globe may now be subjected to surprise attack in the hope that the first blow will be decisive. With such advantages accruing to the surpriser, a new major war will probably begin abruptly with a rain of nuclear fire on the intended victim. The probability of surprise attack as the initiation of aggres- sion has special meaning to the United States. Modern techno- logical advances have brought the North American continent un- der the threat of decisive surprise attack for the first time. From an enemy’s standpoint the size, geographical íocation, and great power of the United States conspire to make surprise attack the best chance of victory. In a sense we have encouraged this line of thought by committing ourselves, historically and by official statement, to a policy of placing the initiative in the hands of an enemy. Conceding the initiative in the thermonuclear age is an enor- mous concession. At best it could produce a criticai military 4 AIR UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY REVIEW situation for us. At worst it carries the seeds of a national disaster. If we hope to deter a surprise attack or dull its effects, we must continue our advanced State of military preparedness. But we would be wise to study also the principie of surprise—to learn about its future potentialities and limitations from past appli- cations. The art of war changes, not the rules. Surprise as a principie of war is as old as war itself. The term surprise implies an unex- pected attack or move, producing confusion and disorganization of the attacked nation or force. It may be achieved at all leveis— from the most involved strategic plans to the simplest tactical oper- ation. It may be partial or complete, depending on the degree of preparedness of the attacked nation or force. Secrecy, deception, originality, and speed are the main factors in its success. The terms strategic, tactical, and technical describe the nature of the surprise attained. Strategic surprise furthers the strategy of the aggressor and has a major influence, though not necessarily decisive, on the subsequent course of the war. The greatest oppor- tunity for strategic surprise is at the outset—in the initial blow. Tactical surprise proposes improvement of the aggressor’s tactical situation. It has only a short-term effect, with little or no influence on the course of the war. Technical surprise involves the intro- duction of equipment or weapons of advanced technological de- velopment which the enemy force has no previous knowledge of or effective countermeasure for. The main interest in this article is in strategic surprise. Awareness of a forthcoming attack does not necessarily elim- inate the element of surprise. The degree and effect is directly related to the attacked nation’s State of preparedness. The victim may know important details about the impending attack and still be surprised by its location and timing. On the other hand sur­ prise is not necessarily reserved for the aggressor. Surprise deploy- ments and dispersais are effective defensive measures. No matter how careful the preplanning, the value of surprise depends upon execution of the plan. A planned strategic attack may turn out to be no surprise at all and backfire, as in the case of the French offensive in the initial phase of the Franco-German War of 1870. With effective exploitation and favorable circum- stances, technological surprise may develop into strategic surprise, as was very nearly the case with the German V-2’s during World War II. Tactical surprise too may develop into strategic surprise, as illustrated by Guderian’s surprise at Sedan, May 1940. The Principies of Surprise Deception: German geizure of Non*ay in 1940 capitalized on deception. Supplies and equipment were prepositíoned in in- vasion harbors bv innocent-looking Coastal freighters. Warships then moved troops in swiftly and without detection. The use of the British flag and communi- cation in English confused defendera. ginality: Breaching of the Nazis' ^Fortress Europa” over lightly defended open beaches at Normandy rather than - through heavily defended ports in the Pas e Calais was made possible by ingenious new devices----landing craft, artificial har­ bors, fuel pipeline under the Channel, Speed: Rapidly exploiting a surprise breakthrough of the vaunted Maginot Line at Sedan, Guderian’s panzer divisions swept to the English Channel, cutting Allied armies in two, isolating Belgium, and triggering French military collapse. FRA^C^ Secrecy: The farflung Allied invasion of North África pivoted on secrecy of time place. The Germans first thought then Italy or Malta, was the arma- stination. Conceutration of ship- departure, and the entrance into Mediterranean— all were undetected. The Evolution of Surprise as a P rin cipie o í W ar p rior to 1 9 3 9 The value of surprise as a principie of war has been recog- nized throughout recorded military history. It is emphasized in the oldest known military treatise, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (c. 500 B.C.). Sun Tzu wrote that all warfare should be based on deception: “The general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.’’ The Roman military writer Frontius, popular throughout later antiquity and the Middle Ages, listed in his books a variety of ways to achieve surprise. The military successes of Frederick the Great were due in large part to his skill at achieving “surprises with sudden blows.” Three developments in the nineteenth century altered the traditional conception of surprise as a matter of “sudden blows” by a small, professional standing army. The technological revo- lution made possible the mobilization, supply, deployment, and maneuver of masses of men on an unparalleled scale. European armies grew from easily maneuverable, small professional armies to large conscript forces which could not be raised, trained, or moved in secrecy or with rapidity. By Bismarck’s time the rules of warfare were dictated by certain diplomatic formalities wherein the various powers were careful to avoid the labei of aggressor. As a result military theorists, epitomized by Clausewitz and Jomini, no longer considered surprise as a condition of victory but as a welcome by-product which sometimes facilitated victory. They agreed that surprise might be helpful when associated with the principie of concentration (or mass), i.e., when one force through surprise achieves relative superiority at a decisive point. During most of World War I surprise was almost forgotten as a principie of war. The political maneuvering in 1914 precluded strategic surprise. Although relatively easy to achieve in the early phase of the war, tactical surprise became increasingly difficult as the war became more and more positional. The movements of mass armies, the extensive time needed to prepare for offensives, and the time lag between conception of a plan and its execution gave the enemy enough advance warning so that he could rein- force his position and provide countermeasures.