Table of Contents Foreword 2 About the Authors 3 Acknowledgements 4 Introduction 5 Chapter One Pathogen Research Networks in China: Origins and Steady Development 8 Chapter Two Chinese Biosafety Level 4 Laboratories and Their Key International Linkages 21 Chapter Three Critical Assistance from Virology Networks Abroad 26 Chapter Four The Future of Chinese Virology Laboratories: China as “Number One”? 37 Appendix Graphs of Transnational Networks: China, the West and the Rest 42 Bibliography 51 NTS-Asia Monograph 1 Foreword The importance of paying close attention to health security has become more urgent than ever as the world continues to deal with the devastating impact of COVID-19 pandemic. Since its outbreak in 2020, the pandemic caused by a novel coronavirus SARS-Cov-2 has already resulted in millions of lives lost and inflicted untold human misery and suffering to people globally. The Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, is one of the leading centres in Asia that highlights the critical linkages between non-traditional security challenges, like climate change and health security, to national and global security. As we have seen, the COVID-19 pandemic is more than a public health emergency of international concern. Its severe impacts cut across economic security, food security, environmental security and personal security, among others. As the international community continues to grapple with the consequential impact of COVID-19, it is sobering to note that other pandemics are expected to emerge. Thus, the need to advance the global agenda of pandemic preparedness and response cannot be overstated given the evolving nature of emerging infectious diseases. In this regard, knowledge building and sharing of information are among the key pillars in understanding and preparing to respond effectively to global public health crises and promoting global health governance. Since Asia’s experience of the SARS pandemic in 2003, the Centre for NTS Studies has helped to promote the building and sharing of knowledge through its publication of research papers and policy reports written by scholars within and outside Asia. This monograph on Coronavirus Research in China, written by Ryan Clarke and Lam Peng Er, is part of our continuing efforts to advance the building and sharing of knowledge to help our academic and policy communities better understand the complex nature of emerging infectious diseases. We hope that this monograph will not only contribute to better pandemic preparedness and response, but also underscore the imperative of putting health security ate th core of national, regional and global security agendas. Mely Caballero-Anthony Professor and Head of NTS Centre RSIS, Singapore. NTS-Asia Monograph 2 About the Authors Ryan CLARKE is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He has held leadership positions in defence and intelligence technology companies (full spectrum), investment banking, biodefense, strategic think tanks, emergency response organisations, and specialised law enforcement units. He is the author of three books and over 70 journal articles. He holds a PhD from the University of Cambridge where he was awarded the Salje Medal for the most innovative research. He can be contacted at [email protected]. LAM Peng Er is a Principal Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. He obtained his PhD from Columbia University. Lam is the editor of three academic journals: International Relations of the Asia-Pacific: A Journal of the Japan Association of International Relations (Oxford University Press), Asian Journal of Peacebuilding (Seoul National University) and East Asian Policy: An International Quarterly (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore). NTS-Asia Monograph 3 Acknowledgements The authors are deeply appreciative of Bert Hofman, Professor and Director of the East Asian Institute (EAI), Li Yao, (Research Fellow, EAI), Kwa Chong Guan (Senior Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies [RSIS]) and Mely-Caballero-Anthony (Professor of International Relations and Head of the Centre for Non- Traditional Security Studies at RSIS) for their kind assistance to have this manuscript published. All errors of facts and interpretation are the authors alone. NTS-Asia Monograph 4 Introduction Arguably, the greatest human security threat on a global scale since the end of World War II is the COVID-19 pandemic. By May 2021, more than 3.4 million lives were lost, and global travel, trade and supply chains were severely disrupted. Millions of jobs were also lost and many people were reduced to penury. Instead of being drawn closer to mitigate this unprecedented human security crisis since the 1918-20 Spanish flu pandemic, the US and Chinese superpowers were in an acrimonious debate over the origins of COVID-19. The Trump administration alleged that the COVID-19 virus might have leaked from the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), China’s first BSL4 (biosafety level 4) laboratory.1 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chungying rejected these allegations and rebuked the United States: “[It] should open the biological lab at Fort Detrick, show more transparency to issues like its 200 plus-overseas bio-labs, invite experts to conduct origin-tracing in the United States …”.2 Our research, based on open-sourced material in English and Chinese, avoids a speculation on the unknown origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. Its focus is on the dense international links of Chinese civilian virology labs. We note that China and the United States and its allies have cooperated on high-risk viral research for decades. Indeed, the United States and its Canadian, European, Australian and Japanese allies have trained cohorts of Chinese scientists and students on virology research including risky Gain of Function (GoF) research for decades (controversial transnational GoF research will be explained in chapter two). The outline of the monograph is as follows. In chapter one, we explain why the United States and its allies trained many Chinese virologists in the context of the bi-polar Cold War in the face of a common enemy, the Soviet superpower. While the Founding Fathers of the WIV were trained in the West before the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, what triggered a subsequent huge wave of Chinese virology students in the West was the rejection of Maoist autarky by Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping who adopted the road to reform in 1978 including the opening to the West and Japan for science, technology, trade and investments to transform, modernise and strengthen China. This transnational cooperation in pathogen research continued in the post-Cold War era. The 2003 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak was another catalyst to virology research cooperation between China and the West. The next chapter presents two case studies of the most advanced civilian BSL4 labs in China --- the WIV and the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute (HVRI). There are more than 800 civilian virology labs of varying capability and importance in the Chinese mainland but there are only two BSL4 labs at the apex of the Chinese virology research at the time of writing. The WIV is famous for its bat coronavirus research (amid other types 1 “Coronavirus: Trump stands by China lab origin theory for virus”, BBC, 1 May 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada- 52496098 2 “US Fort Detrick biolab becomes hot topic on Chinese social media”, Global Times, 22 January 2021. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213588.shtml NTS-Asia Monograph 5 of viral expertise) and the HVRI has a comparative advantage in avian and swine flu research. This chapter explains the drivers of international partnerships in risky viral research. Their transnational cooperation includes the training of Chinese virology experts, physical design and construction of the WIV lab, collaboration in GoF research and experiments, and even the direct transfer of research funds from the United States to Chinese labs such as the WIV. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that the United States and China were “in it together” conducting risky GoF research. Chapter three empirically maps the dense transnational networks between Western and Chinese virology labs. This includes the USAID PREDICT and EcoHealth Alliance’s funding and “sub-contracting” of viral research to the WIV. A major section of this chapter explains how the French Institut Pasteur and Institut Merieux helped to design the WIV but their French experts had been subsequently marginalised from this BSL4 after it was established. Another section explains the Japan Initiative for Global Research Network on Infectious Diseases (J-GRID) and the HVRI to collaborate on avian flu research in Harbin. This chapter reveals that China today has acquired significant expertise in virology research thanks to its collaboration with the Western and Japanese scientific communities. Indeed, China has acquired sufficient capabilities over the past few decades to even conduct its own autonomous pathogen research and training of the next cohort of Chinese virologists. The Chinese student of yore in virology is now a master but international collaboration is still useful and necessary given the global nature of pandemics. In the final chapter, we discuss the future of Chinese virology labs and their transnational links.