Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files Series: Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files Folder: Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo, 6/77 Container: 34a Folder Citation: Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Foreign Policy/Domestic Politics Memo, HJ Memo, 6/77, Container 34a Subject Terms: Foreign Policy Jimmy Carter Library 441 Freedom Parkway Atlanta GA 30307-1 ARCHIVAL NOTE~ The pages of this memo were originally unnumbered, then became out of order. The correct order and page numbers were then determined by comparison with an early photocopy of the document which retained the original correct order. The pencilled in numbers in brackets at the bottom of the pages represents the correct original order. During the time the pages were out of order, the page numbers were off by as much as 10 pages. The correct order was restored in September, 2008 ADN A Presidential Library Administered by the National Arcbtves and Records Administmtion ." ~#f" ! i~,". \ .. rI~,' Ill; ~f'f~ /? »7 1~l J~ i'· iit );'! ~j,:. ~£t~ <:O.?:FIDEWFIAL,LEYESONLY ~hi· ~t~' i f~ ~.:i- ~: i•.i.. H t. i· ~~: .TO: PRESIDENT CARTER ,~ t~ FROM: HAMILTON JORDAN~)( ·p"'·.··.··· f."r,.;.. L t·~ ~:;, F I have attempted in this memorandum to measure the ft -~ ~. domestic political implications of your foreign policy .~ t~•l~:.. I) and outline a comprehensive approach for winning public :kl~ ~~ and Congressional support for specific foreign policy ~t~.; :.¥ initiatives •... ~!~ ~ .I!-i ;~ 'r'n As this is highly sensitive subject matter, I typed ltit~. (.,~. this memorandum myself and the one other copy is in ;;i r~f.~ my office safe. t~ f.m~ l~: lfi f{': tl".!''·,·~: t f.,~ rJ~CtASSIFIED t ~. E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b) ~ W'iITE ~lINES , FEB. 24,.l,Iq- ~l::-'t BY NARS, D,/\T£~~ o p. 8) i. 'J ti, rFi~' ~~; i1- . H ~r:~~~~~~E~~~~'N~m\%1~~~~~~·1 · [ ( ,I \ 1 I --Js J ,I I SJI.LI'IOd JI.LS3:HOa GNV AJI'IOd K:)I3:tIOd: ·1 I I - I POLITICS ~ND FOREIGN POLICY '"i..~. Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives The Need for a Political Plan A. Consultation with Congress on Foreign Policy \~ Initiatives r·· B. The Role of the American Jewish Community in ~ - Ii it, the Middle East {i - Introduction ~ Voting History L t, ~ - Political Contributions ; . - The Jewish Lobby t.. - The Pres.ent Situation with the Jewish Community t: •;- - Taking the Initiative with the American Jewish I Community i '!.£-~ [' - Appendix L 1 r'I__1I i ~ 1~~< 1- ! r SU~~~RY OF RECO~~ENDATIONS !, ~ - rpS] Iei f't~ ~T~~~.~~~J-~~~~~~(~~E.~~~1~1~:::¥.r~:~~-~~'::'7 IdMJ22! b= L .' ~ ~ IiI - flii ~: iI REVlm.q OF FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES Iif! lk Because you have chosen to be active in many areas il of foreign policy during your first year in office, '; there will evolve in the near future a number of t~ critical decisions that will have to be made. And "f! g,P, each of these decisions will be difficult politically and will have domestic implications. that will require t~-~ ~ ~ ~. the support and understanding of the American people and the Congress. The most significant of these decisions relate to specific countries and/or areas of the world. As best I can determine, those decisions which will require i action on our part and/or the political support of the I people and Congress are: i -The Middle East I -SAL'l;'II t - L -AFRICA ---- f I.. f ~ r.l- - r,~J r f", ~~~~~'''~!'~'!IJt~.l.~~''''~~-!!l'''''P;:...•."7.~~.::.~.- .~. ~: ..'_~,:,..•.,..,.,...,;.~••.•..•.~ ......~•.-.:,:.. •.•~::~~- ..-,~• : ...,;.:<~. __ -.. ...:;.'4= •••...,..:..~ .~-., ..••••••.·.'l7~,~,~~""'~'5s*+-!,(id~mM.lIt{~~Hl?4¥&c..':&N'-,...-.;;.•...:••:~:..•~.".....:.,..,~.••.T~.•.:.,;-.,..••... ',~._.~~ •."-'..•...._'""•.._"...,..·v·" ••.•.••• ,.-.;..• ,_,.~_J..~,~ ......J.. 9 - -Normalization of relations with Cuba-- and Vietnam -Treaty with Panama------ -Withdrawal of tr~ops from Korea .........--- It is my own contention that this confluence of foreign poI~cy initiatives and decisions will require a comprehensive and well coordinated domestic political strategy if our policies are to gain the understanding and support of the American people and the Congress. " It is important that we understand the political I dimensions of the challenges we face on these specific I '- issues: 1. There is a limited public understanding of most foreign policy issues. This is certainly the case with SALT II and the Middle East. This is not altogether bad as it provides us an opportunity to present these issues to the public in an politcally advantageous way. At the same time, most of these issues assume a simplistic political coloration. If you favor norm- I ! 11"' ilization of relations with Cuba or Vietnam, you are II I '-, I~ '«"~ .' ~ : "", • .;. " ~I ".t,: ." ~ ," • ., . ~"., . f· :•.; - ••• iIIlII!B_ .~;\ ..•..~; ". y,f,.,.-\. f.,i', .~t.:•.•.'t ~~j••.~-.:. 0l'<'.' •• •...••.• !.-.~,;'.•::" ~,.,-:.; J~ ••. ~ ~ II.,i Il~, ~. H' Ii - ~~~ a "liberal"; if you oppose normalization with these same countries, you are "conservative". [~ 1m 2. To the extent that the issues we are dealing with ~ have a "liberal" or "conservative" connotation, our K ~.!.1.; position on these particular issues is consistently "~.' "liberal". We must do what we can to present these issues 'ti- ~ to the public in a non-ideological way and not allow them to undermine your own image as a moderate-conserv- I-tI .~ '\~ F~/th "'c~~~~ I ative. /f 'i fo~:r#-CG .~ ~ .. iJ; .~ e 3. Congressional support in some form is needed to ,a r:~ accomplish most of your foreign policy objectives. '.f! ·1 A modest amount of time invested in consultation wi,th key members of Congress will go a long way t.owa rd ~lin- ;'~ ning the support of Congress on many issues. Whereas I members of Congress do not mind - and sometimes relish f,~ "S a confrontation with the President on some local project i!ltf,: or matter of obvious direct benefit to their district 'I or state, very few wish to differ publicly with the ;~ ~. ; President on a foreign policy matter. .~ II t ~ fifj!J C r L~] II J):~ l~ it.tl ~{~Y~~~~~~~F;,~~~rr.:~~~t:~!~"~'~f~~i~~~t~:~r~:q:!~~~~t i&i& _,",','".;.', ", ,~"'., , , '., . , ." I 1& .liMP a ~ ~ ~ Ir !f;:< - it~ 4. We have very little control over the schedule and ~ time-frame in which most of these foreign policy issues if .,~ will be resolved. Consequently, a continuing problem f " and challeng~ will be to attempt to separate out the ,.: key foreign policy issues from domestic programs so the i-' two will not become politically entwined in the Congress. ~ This dictates a continuing focus on the historical I~. bipartisan nature of u.s. foreign policy so the Rep- , ublican members of Congress will be less tempted to dema- I~ ItI~~ ii~ gogue these issues during the 1978 elections. ~ .. III - 5. Conservatives are much better organized than liberals If. !'~; and will generally oppose our foreign pol-i?y initiatives. ,f;. f~ To effectively counter conservative opposition, we will [F-. i L have to take the initiative in providing coordination of l~1 i our'resources and political leadership. Our resources c&it'. f at present are considerable, but they are scattered among ~ a variety of groups and institutions. To the extent our policy goals are being pursued, they are being pursued unilaterally by groups and people and without coordination . •8; C p 1J '.~ .i= ~ if r '.•' •q-')i THE NE2D FOR A POLITICAL PLAN F~ '1 8) ;~ f'~:1~ :I;: t, The very fact that your administration is active simul- L;:::l. taneously in many areas of foreign policy dictates a '". -: ~i~ .. -~ comprehensiv~1 long-range political strategy for ~vin- - n:--t ning the support of the American people and the Congress. ~•....".J To accomplis~, this goal, I would recommend a three step i'! f-' i'l ,·-·I-t process: !"; : ~J rl !"j t~! I.. CONSULTATION. Early corisultat ion vlith Congress H F~.', (~ and interested/affected ~onstituent groups. is r: r critical to the political success of these policies. t: In almost every instances, Senate ratification of a e treaty and/or .m.iLi.t.a.ry and economic support wh i.ch Ii f; requires the support of Congress will be required [' to accomplish these foreign policy objectives. i· Consequently,' it is important that He invest a small I. l amount of time on a continuing basis in con su Lt.atri.on t r~.' f \'lithmembers of Congress and groups/organizations. e: r· ts . r /lk/rt ~ ~/~ ! r { i f: ., p ~_J ~.: -~~E~~~~~ II a~J f ~~ II. PUBLIC EDUCATION. Public understanding of most it of these issues is very limited. To the extent rk~~ \ ~:~ -- ,'.: these iss~es are understood and/or perceived by the !tt; ~ general public, they are viewed in very simplistic I~ terms. This is a mixed blessing. On one hand, iir.: it b:~o~es necessary to explain complex issues to ~tf~.: t[ the American people. On the other hand, because Lt~ these issues are not well understood, a tremendous t~.' ft opportunity exists to educate the public to a cer- f~ t J tain point of vi.ew , In ~he final analysis, I ;i; Jl suspect that we could demonstrate a direct cor- ti~ f'1i'" relation between the trust the American people have ·l..~.; .\' for their President and the degree to which they .~~ \ ,.~,. 8 are willing to trust that President's judgement on complex issues of f'v:'eignpolicy. [I 1! '! ~~ t\ In terms of public education, we have a tremend-:- 'f t t, ous number of resources. They include: 1'I'~;.·. -Fireside chats f ft~ (ii -Town meetings ~'~ ·;:h 1:-••. -Speaking opportunities for President, :~~ Vice-President, First Family, Cabinet, etc. t~ Itt" !I',k -. H;' !:K !it"r, ~ ' ..~ ; p !-':j'"1 ;'i .~ - L.. I ,\., ., Lt ~!!~~!!e!lliBi.I••~~\i 1'-,~' l~ t(It, -Public service media opportunities of ih - +Group.soutside government who support I~ particular policies ~ii -De~ocratic National Committee i!~.