THE IMPACT OF DISSENTING OPINIONS UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Andrew Lynch A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Law University of New South Wales March 2005 ABSTRACT This thesis aims to assess the role played by disagreement in the High Court’s constitutional law decisions. It does so firstly by considering the theoretical arguments in favour of allowing expression of dissent and those which urge judicial restraint and observance of precedential values. The tensions between change and conformity, and also the individual and institutional aspects of adjudication, intersect when the Court divides. The complex nature of disagreement on a multimember judicial body is further examined in the context of devising an empirical methodology for the quantification of dissent on the High Court. The thesis selects a period of a little over twenty years for detailed examination. Within that timeframe, it measures the prevalence and nature of disagreement amongst the Justices of the Court, with particular emphasis upon constitutional cases. From these results, various streams of opinion are examined for subsequent significance. In particular, the thesis contrasts the practice of persistent dissent from the Court’s approach to an issue, with those occasions when a minority Justice yields to the demands of stare decisis. The impact of dissent upon the development of the Court’s constitutional interpretation is evaluated. Although the study finds that direct reversals in the law in favour of an earlier dissent occur very rarely, it argues that dissents may still exercise a powerful influence on the Court’s pronouncements. The contribution which minority opinions make to judicial deliberation is to inevitably alter the context of the Court’s decision. Consideration of two specific case studies illustrates that this may result in the law taking a more moderate path or may actually lead to greater efforts by a majority to strengthen the cogency of its approach. In either scenario, dissent plays a far more subtle role than suggested by the myth of a ‘Great Dissenter’ and the dramatic redemption of his or her lone opinions. To only assess the value of dissenting judgments against that standard is to fail to appreciate the true nature of their influence in many cases and their importance to the work of the High Court. ORIGINALITY STATEMENT ‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’ Signed …………………………………… iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am enormously grateful to my supervisor Professor George Williams for his constant support and enthusiasm for this project. His invaluable guidance was given with immense generosity. Thanks are also due to Associate Professor Arthur Glass and Professor George Winterton who provided useful advice as members of my supervisory panel. I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the support given to me by the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, UNSW and the Centre for Comparative Constitutional Studies, University of Melbourne – both of which accommodated me as a visitor in the first half of 2004, allowing a substantial amount of writing to be done under very pleasant conditions. I wish also to thank a number of friends and colleagues for their interest, suggestions and encouragement: Sean Brennan, Brett Bondfield, Jennifer Burn, Penny Crofts, Peter Edmundson, Cassandra Goldie, Devika Hovell, Bryan Mercurio, Peter Radan, Alex Steel, Cameron Stewart and Rob Watt. Additionally, I am grateful to Dan Meagher for stimulating conversations; to Mary Keyes for her unflagging support and wisdom; and to Lawrence McNamara who has been a fellow traveller (in many senses) over the years and who has been a constant source of great advice and empathy. Lastly, I thank my lovely wife Louise for everything – but especially on this occasion, for her patience. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract...........................................................................................................................i Originality Statement................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments.........................................................................................................iv List of Tables ...............................................................................................................vii CHAPTER ONE Introduction....................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER TWO The Functions and Operation of Disagreement in a Final Court I Introduction........................................................................................................9 II Functions of Dissent ........................................................................................11 A Deliberation, Dissent and Democracy .............................................................12 B Dissent and Judicial Process ............................................................................32 C Dissent and the Law’s Development ...............................................................44 D Concurring judgments compared – the acceptable face of disagreement and change? .........................................................................................................52 III Arguments for Restraint – the Hazards of Dissent ..........................................57 A Certainty and Coherence..................................................................................58 B Individualism and the Authority of the Court..................................................65 IV The Relationship between Dissent and Precedent ...........................................71 A Precedent as a means of resolving disagreement in law vs. Judicial choice in courts of last resort........................................................................................72 B Factors in favour of overruling – and the likelihood of dissent.......................77 C Sustained defiance of precedent – the practice of persistent dissent ...............81 V Conclusion .......................................................................................................89 CHAPTER THREE Defining Dissent: A Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia I Introduction......................................................................................................93 II The Value of an Empirical Study of Dissent ...................................................96 A The Benefits of an Empirical Study of Dissent ...............................................96 B The Need for an Empirical Study of Dissent.................................................101 III Fundamental Concepts – Preliminary Classifications ...................................105 A Forms of Disagreement – Dissent and Concurrence......................................105 B The Harvard Rules ........................................................................................107 C Applying the Harvard Rules to the High Court of Australia – Some Necessary Modifications ..............................................................................................111 IV Connection to Notions of Majority and Minority – Dissent as a Relational Concept ..........................................................................................................119 A The Degree of Concurrence...........................................................................123 B Identification of a Majority – Orders, Reasons and Multiple Issues .............132 C Summary........................................................................................................162 V The Value of this Methodology .....................................................................162 v CHAPTER FOUR The Prevalence of Dissent on the High Court, with Emphasis upon Constitutional Law Cases: 1981-2003 I Introduction....................................................................................................167 II Some Specific Statements Concerning Methodology....................................168 A Classification..................................................................................................168 B Data Source....................................................................................................170 C What is a ‘constitutional case’? .....................................................................171 D Period covered – several ‘natural courts’.......................................................173 E The ‘control’ sample......................................................................................176 III The Statistics..................................................................................................177