INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENCE EDUCATION 2016, VOL. 11, NO. 18, 12919-12935 OPEN ACCESS Towards Communication Theory of Homesteading Pavel Slutskiy Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, THAILAND. ABSTRACT This paper addresses the question of what types of acts constitute, or are sufficient for homesteading, or initial appropriation from the state of the unowned; in other words, what "counts" as "sufficient" homesteading. In the tradition of Locke, Rothbard, Hoppe and Kinsella, it has long been argued that homesteading (or original appropriation) by decree does not suffice, and an intending actor who wants to homestead a previously unowned resource needs to create “an objective link” between himself and the resource by transforming it, or by starting to control it, according to its nature. In contrast to this concept, this paper argues that since ownership and property rights are not physical, but purely social concepts, they therefore have very little to do with physical control and physical transformation. Initial appropriation represents a social act of communicating a property right claim, and should be examined as such, hence homesteading by verbal decree should suffice. KEYWORDS ARTICLE HISTORY Ownership, Property Rights, Received 2 September 2016 Homesteading, Appropriation, Revised 4 December 2016 Property Rights Ethics. Accepted 17 December 2016 Introduction This paper addresses the question of what types of acts constitute or are sufficient for homesteading; what type of "labor" must be "mixed with" a thing for initial appropriation from the state of the unowned; in other words, what counts as "sufficient" homesteading. I will argue with the tradition of Locke, Rothbard, Hoppe and Kinsella, who seem to think that homesteading (or original appropriation) by decree does not suffice, and an intending actor who wants to homestead a previously unowned resource needs to create “an objective link” between himself and the resource by transforming it or by starting to control it according to its nature. In contrast to this concept, I will propose an idea that since ownership and property rights are not physical, but purely social concepts, and since they have very little to do with both physical control and physical transformation, thus, I will argue, initial appropriation represents a social act of communicating a property right claim, and should be examined as such, hence homesteading by verbal decree should suffice. To support this proposition, I will turn to communication philosophy, which can be used to explain the role of communication in human interactions regarding property rights. CORRESPONDENCE Pavel Slutskiy [email protected] © 2016 P. Slutskiy Open Access terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License apply. The license permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, on the condition that users give exact credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if they made any changes. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL & SCIENCE EDUCATION 12920 In the first section I shall give an overview of the importance of property rights origins for libertarianism; in section two I give a brief account of the theory of transformation and objective link creation as the necessary requirement for initial appropriation and offer the first critique of it; I shall then proceed by questioning the necessity of transformation in section three. Section four deals with possible objections to the theory of appropriation by declaration and section five examines the problem through the lens of communication theory. I conclude in section six. Background Property rights play a crucial role in every political and legal theory. Each theory has some view on who should own what, as well as how property rights over various instances should be allocated. The question of property rights is important because there are situations when the actions of one person can interfere with another person’s control over a resource, thus causing potential conflicts. “Conflicting values invariably involve incompatible—mutually exclusive—views of at least two actors concerning the use of some scarce resources. Obviously then, not both of these parties can decide what these tradeoffs should be…, but only one or the other”. (Hoppe, 1998, p. xxxi). This situation is described as scarcity - that is, the impossibility for several actors to control the same object: “…the term scarcity refers to the possible existence of conflict over the possession of a finite thing. It means that a condition of contestable control exists for anything that cannot be simultaneously owned: my ownership and control excludes your control” (Kinsella & Tucker 2010). Scarce resources may include both tangible objects, such as human bodies, land or other physical things (like apples or oranges), and intangible resources that are scarce - such as energy, or radio wave spectrums. The latter are not material objects in the traditional sense. Scarcity does not necessarily refer to tangibility only, or to the ability to physically manipulate the thing, or to the ability to perceive something with the senses. It only refers to the exclusivity of control (impossibility of exclusive control by multiple actors). Thus, for instance, information and knowledge are not scarce - they can be used simultaneously by multiple persons without restricting the actions of each other, hence the concept of ownership is not applicable to them. Property rights determine a sphere of authority within which individuals may do as they please, without external interference; but they may not cross beyond their own boundary and engage in actions within someone else's sphere of authority (except with that person's permission) (See Long 1993). The most important key points of libertarian views on property rights have been summarised by S. N. Kinsella. His explanation, which follows the tradition of Locke, Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe, runs roughly as follows: when resources are scarce people may dispute who should control them. In this case, it boils down to the question of who among the claimants has the right to control it (property rights). In other words, who the legitimate owner is. Libertarian theory presupposes that the legitimate owner is the one whose claim to possession comes either from original taking into possession from the state of the unowned, or from the consent to transfer the resource from the previous legitimate owner. Kinsella writes: 12921 P. SLUTSKIY … libertarianism is the only theory of rights that… advocates assigning ownership by means of objective links between the owner and the property. This link, of course, is first use, or original appropriation… There is clearly an objective link between the person who first begins to use something, and emborders it, and all others in the world. Everyone can see this. No goods are ever subject to conflict unless they are first acquired by someone. (Kinsella 2007) Why do libertarians believe that initial appropriation is a just form of ownership origination? The logic here is rather simple: if no one possesses a particular scarce resource, then appropriating it does not interfere with anyone else’s control: There is simply no reason not to allow a person to appropriate unowned property. For who could object, if not another, prior owner? To be entitled to object is to be able to "exclude" the claimant, but the right to exclude is an incident of ownership, and the property is by presumption unowned. No one can validly object to my appropriating unowned property, then, because, assuming feasible actions are free, any objection itself must claim a right, and this itself raises a type of ownership claim. (Ibid). From this Kinsella further concludes that the proposition that all possessions were originally founded on theft does not stand up to criticism - theft is taking something from someone, but taking into original possession is quite different - it is not taking it from someone, it is taking it from the state of unowned. No goods are ever subject to conflict unless they are first acquired by someone: …the first user and possessor of a good is either its owner or he is not. If he is not, then who is? The person who takes it from him by force? If forcefully taking possession from a prior owner entitles the new possessor to the thing, then there is no such thing as ownership, but only mere possession. But such a rule — that a later user may acquire something by taking it from the previous owner — does not avoid conflicts, it rather authorizes them (Ibid). In political philosophy this is also referred to as prior-later distinction, clearly expressed by H.-H. Hoppe (1989, 142-43): “What is wrong with this idea of dropping the prior-later distinction as morally irrelevant? First, if the late-comers, i.e., those who did not in fact do something with some scarce goods, had indeed as much of a right to them as the first-comers, i.e., those who did do something with the scarce goods, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything, as one would have to have all of the late-comers' consent prior to doing whatever one wanted to do. Indeed, as posterity would include one's children's children—people, that is, who come so late that one could never possibly ask them—advocating a legal system that does not make use of the prior-later distinction … is simply absurd in that it implies advocating death but must presuppose life to advocate anything. Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do, or will survive and say or argue anything if one were to follow this rule. In order for any person—past, present, or future—to argue anything it must be possible to survive now. Nobody can wait and suspend acting until everyone of an indeterminate class of late-comers happens to appear and agree to what one wants to do.