Report Understanding trajectories of radicalisation in Agadez Aoife McCullough, Mareike Schomerus and Abdoutan Harouna with Zakari Maikorema, Kabo Abdouramane, Zahra Dingarey, Idi Mamadou Maman Noura, Hamissou Rhissa and Rhaichita Rhissa February 2017 This publication was made possible through support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Overseas Development Institute 203 Blackfriars Road London SE1 8NJ Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300 Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399 E-mail: [email protected] www.odi.org www.odi.org/facebook www.odi.org/twitter Readers are encouraged to reproduce material from ODI Reports for their own publications, as long as they are not being sold commercially. As copyright holder, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the ODI website. The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of ODI. © Overseas Development Institute 2017. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial Licence (CC BY-NC 4.0). Cover photo: Historic city centre in Agadez, Niger © Aoife McCullough, 2016 Contents Executive summary 5 1. Introduction: Questioning the idea of radicalisation as a linear trajectory 8 2. Research methods 10 3. Finding 1: There is no consensus on the meaning of radicalisation or violent extremism 13 4. Finding 2: People’s vision of a ‘just society’ features jobs, access to basic services and law and order 15 5. Finding 3: There is a widespread preference for sharia over a Western system 16 6. Finding 4: Individual factors are not useful for identifying ‘at risk’ groups 18 7. Key actors shaping narratives and counter-narratives 22 8. The influence of the international community 26 9. The influence of social relationships 30 10. How do people perceive change can happen? 33 11. Conclusion 35 References 36 Understanding trajectories of radicalisation in Agadez 3 List of figures and tables Figures Figure 1: Network of influence in village in Agadez, starting with an ex-rebel 30 Figure 2: Network of influence in Agadez quarter, starting with a trader 31 Figure 3: Network of influence in village in Agadez starting with a member of the Tijania movement 32 Tables Table 1: Number of interviews by network 10 Table 2: Number of interviews by location 10 Table 3: Types of interview conducted 11 Table 4: Words used in interviews 12 Acronyms AIN Association Islamique du Niger AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb CVE Countering violent extremism ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant FGD Focus Group Discussion MLF Macina Liberation Front MRJN Mouvement pour la Réconciliation et la Justice du Niger MUJAO Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest NCCI Niger Community Cohesion Initiative OTI Office of Transition Initiatives USAID United States Agency for International Development 4 ODI Report Executive summary This research aimed to examine how trajectories of factors commonly assumed by Countering Violent radicalisation happen in Niger. The Office of Transition Extremism (CVE) programmes in Niger to be associated Initiatives (OTI) of the United States Agency for with vulnerability to radicalisation and violent extremism. International Development (USAID) is implementing the These factors included age (youth), ethnicity, (un) Niger Community Cohesion Initiative (NCCI) in three employment, education level, degree of debt, and degree of areas in Niger: Agadez, Tillaberi and Diffa. An integral exposure to other societies. As this is a qualitative, rather component of this programme involves identifying than a representative study, we can speak only about the and working with youth ‘at risk’ of radicalisation and links or their absence among the people we interviewed. extremism. To identify interviewees, researchers followed networks When thinking about a ‘trajectory of radicalisation’, an of influence in groups that were thought to include assessment of risk commonly plays a prominent part. This people who would be sympathetic to, or support, radical is because the most common image of radicalisation is that causes. Using such a network-based approach is useful in of linear progression. According to this perspective, certain seeking to understand how members of defined networks risk factors make people vulnerable to ever-narrowing and influence what each believes and what type of thinking increasingly extreme beliefs and ideologies, which then is disseminated. The networks were selected based on leads to support for or participation in violent extremism. consultation with CVE actors and researchers in Niger and Scholarship on radicalisation indicates that linearity included Touareg ex-rebels, a Salafist movement (Izala), may not be a useful way to understand trajectories traffickers/transporters of migrants, traders (particularly of radicalisation. The literature shows that following those trading with Libya), youth groups (fadas) with radical ideologies does not necessarily mean that unemployed members, civil society activists and prisoners. someone supports violence. Despite the lack of evidence A Sufist network was also followed to enable comparisons supporting the idea that people who adopt extreme with the Salafist network. We also explored what beliefs and ideologies are more likely to participate in local people understood as ‘radicalisation’ and ‘violent violent extremism, the notion of the inevitable and linear extremism’. progression from certain beliefs to violence remains strong. Scholarship on the link between violence and beliefs is To understand progressions in beliefs, which actions rapidly developing. For example, the perception that one’s actors are prepared to take to support their beliefs, culture is under threat can narrow beliefs towards more and how OTI’s strategy ought to respond, research was extreme viewpoints. In the Sahel, contrasts are often drawn carried out in Agadez in northern Niger in October 2016. between what are seen as Western/secular/democratic and In this study, radicalisation was imagined as a dynamic Islamic systems of government, with many perceiving the process where individual and structural factors interact Western system as dominant. In the Agadez region, we to produce the potential for radicalisation and violent sought to understand different viewpoints in relation to extremism. ‘Structural factors’ are defined as systems of the concept of a ‘just society’, Western governance system socioeconomic stratification (that is, how wealth and in comparison with an Islamic system of governance and power are distributed), and other patterns in the relations whether certain beliefs were associated with more extreme between groups, such as how citizens relate to the state. viewpoints. Relations between large social groups are constantly In the Agadez region, as in any society, there are changing, but narratives about the ‘other’ can establish a movements that challenge the status quo by offering an particular dynamic. For this reason, we examined not only alternative vision of an ideal society. Such movements the relationships between different social groups in the could thus be called radical. Currently, the best-organized Agadez region but also the narratives that are produced and most proactive radical movement in Agadez is the and consumed to understand how these dynamics may Izala religious movement, which seeks to avoid innovation evolve. in the practice of Islam and promotes a vision of society To test the possibility that individual factors can based on sharia. Izala stands for Jama’at Izalat al Bid’a Wa predispose people to adopting radical beliefs and Iqamat al Sunna (the Group for the Removal of Heresy supporting violent extremism, we examined individual and Enforcement of Sunna).1 1. ‘Sunna’ means people who follow the Prophet Mohammed Understanding trajectories of radicalisation in Agadez 5 Radical, however, is a context-specific word. In many There were no clear links found between individual places in the world, support for sharia is not a radical factors and support for the adoption of sharia. position as sharia law is either applied or heavily influences This means that factors such as age or economic status governance values. In Niger, the Izala vision for how cannot be used to predict support for the adoption of society should be governed currently departs from the sharia. While respondents under the age of 35 were more mainstream. In this research, support for the adoption likely to support sharia than older people, ethnicity, a of sharia is thus understood as a ‘radical’ position in the history of having borrowed money, or time spent in Libya sense that it challenges existing systems. While we explore did not predict support for sharia. Local people rarely whether there are links between support for the adoption named individual factors as the causes of radicalisation of sharia and support for violent extremism, we start with and extremism but rather stressed that structural factors the premise that radicalisation in the form of support for such as poverty based on unfair distribution of resources sharia is distinct from violent extremism. and rising materialism are reasons why young people join extremist groups. Key findings Potential trajectories of radicalisation in There is no consensus among authorities and civil Agadez