EVIDENTIALS AND RELEVANCE by Ely Ifantidou Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of London 1994 Department of Phonetics and Linguistics University College London (LONDON ABSTRACT Evidentials are expressions used to indicate the source of evidence and strength of speaker commitment to information conveyed. They include sentence adverbials such as 'obviously', parenthetical constructions such as 'I think', and hearsay expressions such as 'allegedly'. This thesis argues against the speech-act and Gricean accounts of evidentials and defends a Relevance-theoretic account Chapter 1 surveys general linguistic work on evidentials, with particular reference to their semantic and pragmatic status, and raises the following issues: for linguistically encoded evidentials, are they truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional, and do they contribute to explicit or implicit communication? For pragmatically inferred evidentials, is there a pragmatic framework in which they can be adequately accounted for? Chapters 2-4 survey the three main semantic/pragmatic frameworks for the study of evidentials. Chapter 2 argues that speech-act theory fails to give an adequate account of pragmatic inference processes. Chapter 3 argues that while Grice's theory of meaning and communication addresses all the central issues raised in the first chapter, evidentials fall outside Grice's basic categories of meaning and communication. Chapter 4 outlines the assumptions of Relevance Theory that bear on the study of evidentials. I sketch an account of pragmatically inferred evidentials, and introduce three central distinctions: between explicit and implicit communication, truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning, and conceptual and procedural meaning. These distinctions are applied to a variety of linguistically encoded evidentials in chapters 5-7. Chapter 5 deals with sentence adverbials, chapter 6 focuses on parenthetical constructions, and chapter 7 looks at hearsay particles. My main concern is with how these expressions pattern with respect to the three 2 distinctions developed in chapter 4. 1 show that although all three types of expression contribute to explicit rather than implicit communication, they exhibit important differences with respect to both the truth- conditional/non-truth-conditional and the conceptual/procedural distinctions. Chapter 8 is a brief conclusion. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 7 Chaoter 1: Introduction Evidentials: their nature and functions 1.1 Defining evidentials 10 1.2 The functions of evidentials 14 1.3 Linguistic properties of evidentials 17 1.3.1 Decoding versus inference 17 1.3.2 Syntax versus morphology 19 1.3.2.1 Morphological criteria 19 1.3.2.2 Syntactic criteria 22 1.3.3 Semantic criteria 24 1.4 The issues 25 1.4.1 Pragmatic inference and evidentials 25 1.4.2 Truth-conditional versus non-truth-conditional semantics 25 1.4.3 Explicit versus implicit communication 26 Chapter 2: Speechact theory 2.1 Speech acts, language and communication 27 2.1.1 Speech-acttheory 27 2.1.2 Speech-act pragmatics 31 2.1.3 Speech-act semantics 33 2.2 Speech acts and pragmatic inference 35 2.3 Speech acts and non-truth-conditional semantics 41 2.4 Speech acts and explicit vs implicit communication 49 Chapter 3: Grice and communication 3.1 Introduction 56 3.1.1 Grice on communication 56 4 3.1.2 TheCPandmaxims 60 3.2 Pragmatic inference and evidentials 67 3.3 Grice and non-truth-conditional semantics 74 3.4 Grice and the explicit/implicit distinction 79 Chaster 4: Relevance Theory 4.1 Introduction 85 4.1.1 Relevance and communication 85 4.1.2 The Principle of Relevance 88 4.2 Pragmatic inference and evidentials 97 4.2.1 Problems with the maxims of Quality 97 4.2.2 Dispensing with the maxims of Quality 101 4.2.3 Inferring degrees of speaker commitment 104 4.3 Relevance and the explicit/implicit distinction 108 4.4 Relevance and non-truth-conditional meaning 115 4.4.1 Conceptual meaning 116 4.4.2 Procedural meaning 119 4.5 Relevance and the descriptive/interpretive distinction 123 4.5.1 Interpretive resemblance 123 4.5.2 Attributive interpretive use 126 4.6 Conclusion to chapter 4 128 Chapter 5: Sentence adverbials 5.1 Introduction 130 5.2 Types of sentence adverbial 130 5.3 Speech-act accounts of sentence adverbials 132 5.4 Testing for truth-conditionality 136 5.5 Relevance theory and sentence adverbials: Possibilities for description 148 5.5.1 Conceptual versus procedural 148 5.5.2 Explicatures versus implicatures 152 5.6 Relevance theory and sentence adverbials: Possibilities for explanation 154 Chapter 6: Parentheticals 6.1 Introduction 156 6.2 Speech-act accounts of parentheticals 157 5 6.3 Testing for truth-conditionality 162 6.4 Relevance theory and parentheticals: Possibffities for description 167 6.5 Relevance theory and parentheticals: Possibilities for explanation 170 6.5.1 Parentheticals and the double-speech-act analysis 171 6.5.2 Parentheticals and scope 177 6.5.3 Parentheticals and truth-conditions 187 6.5.4 Pragmatic interpretation of genuine parentheticals 198 Chanter 7: Evidential particles 7.1 Introduction 204 7.2 'Hearsay' markers as markers of interpretive use 205 7.2.1 Re and interpretive use 206 7.3 'Hearsay' markers: truth-conditional or non-truth-conditional? 213 7.4 'Hearsay' markers: explidt or implicit? 214 7.5 'Hearsay' markers: conceptual or procedural? 214 7.6 Some genuine hearsay markers? 218 Chapter 8: Conclusions 222 Bibliography 231 6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis would not come into being in the form and in the time-span it did if it wasn't for my supervisor, Prof. Deirdre Wilson. She has been a unique source of knowledge, of never-failing guidance and encouragement but, most importantly, she has been the source of my inspiration, which was strong enough to sustain me even when in the lowest spirits. I am grateful to her for giving me the opportunity to teach as her assistant in the Department of Linguistics, UCL, an experience I will always cherish. I thank her for stimulating me to present my first conference papers, for making them all such rewarding events, for showing me that academic life is, after all, fun! Her wit, her kindness and generosity made studying in UCL a most enjoyable and exciting experience. Neil Smith and Robyn Carston have generously given me their useful comments and advice whenever I needed it. I have also benefited from suggestions by Misi Brody, Billy Clark, Richard Hudson, Rita Manzini. I thank them all. I am grateful to my tutors in the English Department, University of Athens, for introducing me into the excitement of Linguistics and encouraging me to cany on with postgraduate research. In particular, I would like to thank Prof. S. Marmaridou for guiding me towards UCL, and Asst. Professor M. Sifianou for her support. The topic for this thesis was firstly suggested to me by my supervisor in the Linguistics Department, University of Cambridge, Dr T. Moore, and I thank him for this. I am greatly indebted to the British Council and the A.G. Leventis Foundation for fmancially supporting this research. I would like to especially thank my husband, Elias Troukis, for being the best motivation to complete my research and for unfailingly bearing with me from the other end of Europe, Athens. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my parents, Sophia and Vassilis Ifantides, for supporting me whole-heartedly 7 while carrying out my research, financially and morally; most of all, I want to thank them for instilling in me the endurance to make my aspirations come true. 8 'Th myparents CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION EVIDENTIALS: THEIR NATURE AND FUNCTIONS 1.1 Defming evidentials In A Dictionary of Linguistics & Phonetics (1991), David Crystal defines evidentiality as 'A term used in SEMANTICS for a type of EPISTEMIC MODALITY where PROPOSITIONS are asserted that are open to challenge by the hearer, and require justification. Evidential constructions express a speaker's strength of commitment to a proposition in terms of the available evidence (rather than in terms of possibility or necessity). They add such nuances of meaning to a given sentence as "I saw it happen", "I heard that it happened", "I have seen evidence that it happened" (though I wasn't there), or "I have obtained information that it happened from someone else". ...' (ibid. 127) There are two points worth noticing in Crystal's definition. First, he defines evidentiality as a semantic notion, although in the literature evidentials have been primarily examined in terms of their pragmatic function, e.g. modifying (weakening, or strengthening) the speaker's degree of commitment to the information communicated (Urmson 1963, Palmer 1986, Chafe 1986, Mayer 1990). This raises a fundamental question about the scope of the term 'evidential'. Crystal seems to be suggesting that the term 'evidential' should be exclusively used for constructions which linguistically encode information about the speaker's degree of commitment. This implies that the role of pragmatic inference in the interpretation of 'evidential' utterances can be safely ignored. Second, according to Crystal, the term 'evidential' does not apply to consti-uctions that express possibility or necessity. Thus, modals such as must, may, might, can, could, ought to, shouId, are excluded. This raises the question of where the borderline between evidentiality and other types of epistemic modality is to be drawn. Presumably, adverbials such as possibly and necessarily are to be exdudeth but what about expressions such as perhaps and maybe, or constructions such as 'I think/I suppose/I guess John is in Berlin' and 'Iknow/I tell you that John is in Berlin'? Which 'nuances of meaning' are specifically evidential and which are not? 10 The answers to these questions can not be obtained from Crystal's brief and rather vague definition.