EXTENDED VIRTUES by JOSHUA AUGUST SKORBURG A DISSERTATION Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy December 2017 DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE Student: Joshua August Skorburg Title: Extended Virtues This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Philosophy by: Dr. Mark Johnson Chairperson Dr. Nicolae Morar Core Member Dr. Colin Koopman Core Member Dr. Elliot Berkman Institutional Representative and Sara D. Hodges Interim Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. Degree awarded December 2017 ii © 2017 Joshua August Skorburg iii DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Joshua August Skorburg Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy December 2017 Title: Extended Virtues The central argument of this dissertation is that virtue ethics is overly individualistic. In response, I develop and defend a more relational, ecological account - what I call extended virtues. First, following Andy Clark, Kim Sterelny, and others, I argue that cognition and emotion can be embedded in, scaffolded by, or even extended to include various environmental resources. These arguments undermine default internalism about cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show how recent work in social and personality psychology similarly undermines individualism about the bearers of these cognitive and affective processes. Taken together, these arguments have significant but heretofore underappreciated implications for virtue ethics. After reviewing the literature which attempts to spell out the ethical implications of embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition, I conclude that a more substantive engagement with virtue ethics is needed. I then show how plausible, mainstream theories of virtue assume default internalism and individualism, and are thus subject to charges of empirical inadequacy. Finally, I formulate my account of extended virtues in response to these shortcomings. I begin by making three explicit arguments for why an account of extended virtues is needed. I then develop two further arguments - the process argument and the iv bearer argument - which yield the conclusion that the processes relevant to, and the bearers of, moral and intellectual virtues can be embedded, scaffolded, or extended. After providing examples and filling in details about the hypotheses of embedded, scaffolded, and extended virtue, I propose that virtues are less like dispositions and more like relations. I conclude by suggesting that ecological metaphors such as stewardship are more fitting than traditional views of morality as inner strength. v CURRICULUM VITAE NAME OF AUTHOR: Joshua August Skorburg GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: University of Oregon, Eugene University of Toledo, Toledo Southern Illinois University, Carbondale DEGREES AWARDED: Doctor of Philosophy, Philosophy, 2017, University of Oregon Master of Arts, Philosophy, 2012, University of Toledo Bachelor of Science, Journalism, Philosophy, 2009, Southern Illinois University AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Moral Psychology Applied Ethics PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2013-2017 Teaching Assistant, University of Toledo, 2010-2012 GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: Dissertation Fellowship, “Extended Virtues”, Oregon Humanities Center, 2017 Research Grant, “Beyond the moral self”, The John Templeton Foundation, 2017 Research Grant, “Giving from the heart”, The Templeton Religious Trust, 2015 Philosophy Matters Prize, “Implicit Bias, Epistemic Injustice, and the Epistemology of Ignorance”, University of Oregon Dept. of Philosophy, 2015 Ila and John Mellow Prize, "Beyond Embodiment: John Dewey and the Integrated Mind", Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, 2013 vi PUBLICATIONS: Skorburg, J.A. & Alfano, M. (forthcoming). Implications for virtue epistemology from psychological science: intelligence as an interactionist virtue. In H. Battaly (ed.), Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. New York: Routledge. Alfano, M. & Skorburg, J.A. (forthcoming). Extended knowledge, the recognition heuristic, and epistemic injustice. In D. Pritchard et al. (eds.), Extended Knowledge. Oxford University Press. Skorburg, J.A. (2017). Jane Addams as experimental philosopher. British Journal for the History of Philosophy. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2017.1336985 Skorburg, J.A. (2017). Lessons and new directions for extended cognition from social and personality psychology. Philosophical Psychology. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1282606 Skorburg, J.A. (2017). Chris Abel, “The extended self: Architecture, memes, and minds.” Environmental Philosophy, 14(1), 151-53. Morar, N. & Skorburg, J.A. (2017). Relational Agency: Yes - but how far? American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience, 8(2), 83-85. Skorburg, J.A. (2016). Pragmatism, embodiment, extension. In R. Madzia & M. Jung (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From bodily intersubjectivity to symbolic articulation. 33-54. Berlin: De Gruyter. Morar, N. & Skorburg, J.A. (2016). Toward an ecological bioethics. American Journal of Bioethics, 16(5), 35-37. Alfano, M. & Skorburg, J.A. (2016). The embedded and extended character hypotheses. In J. Kiverstein (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind. 465-478. New York: Routledge. Skorburg, J.A. (2013). Beyond embodiment: John Dewey and the integrated mind. The Pluralist, 8(3), 66-78. vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS From my arrival at the University of Oregon to the completion of this dissertation, Dr. Mark Johnson has been an exemplary mentor, interlocutor, and advisor. His diligence and his commitment to doing meaningful philosophy has provided a model for his students and colleagues. I greatly appreciate his insistence on stating my dissertation’s arguments in strong, confident terms, and also his patience with my overly wide-ranging research interests. Dr. Nicolae Morar has helped me turn half-baked ideas into a research program. I am beyond grateful for his personal and professional mentorship, and for our collaborations and friendship. Dr. Colin Koopman sets a high bar for scholarship and professional comportment. I hope someday my students will speak half as highly of me as his speak of him. My arguments are sharper as a result of what I’ve learned from Dr. Elliot Berkman, who has been a supportive, open-minded, and generous guide for my forays into psychology and neuroscience. Dr. Christina Karns has been a wonderful collaborator, teacher, confidant, and friend. Dr. Anthony Chemero’s work has long inspired my own. Much of the present project has grown out of collaborations with Dr. Mark Alfano, from whom I have learned much. None of this would have been possible, however, without the unwavering and loving support of my partner, Kristen Reinhardt. Ever the optimist, she is also the strongest and kindest person I know. Finally, there is a real, material sense in which the completion of this dissertation on a tight deadline was made possible by the support of the Oregon Humanities Center, which generously awarded me a Dissertation Research Fellowship during Fall term, 2017. The OHC staff have been remarkably accommodating, and they have significantly lessened the burden of transitioning from dissertation to post-doctoral research. viii For my parents, Mary Ann and Jon. ix TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1 I.I Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 I.II Roadmap .......................................................................................................... 3 I.III A note on Terminology and Scope ................................................................. 6 II. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND ...................................................................................... 9 II.I Introduction ...................................................................................................... 9 II.II Historical Backdrop: Pragmatism and Externalism ........................................ 9 II.III. Clark & Chalmers’s “The Extended Mind” and Aftermath ......................... 15 II.III.I. The Embedded Mind Hypothesis................................................... 23 II.III.II. The Scaffolded Mind Hypothesis ................................................. 25 II.III.III. The Extended Cognition Hypothesis........................................... 29 II.IV. Template…………....................................................................................... 34 II.IV.I. Embedding ..................................................................................... 34 II.IV.II. Scaffolding ................................................................................... 36 II.IV.III. Extending .................................................................................... 37 II.V. Recent Developments .................................................................................... 38 II.VI. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 44 x Chapter Page III. SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY ............................................... 45 III.I Introduction ...................................................................................................