Hans-Georg Gadamer translated by John W. Stanley with an introduction by Dennis J. Schmidt HEIDEGGER'S WAYS H e id e g g e r ’s w a ys Hans-Georg Gadamer Translated by John W. Stanley State University of New York Press Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 1994 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information, address State University of New York Press, State University Plaza, Albany, N Y , 12246 Production by Marilyn P Semerad Marketing by Dana E. Yanulavich Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gadamer, Hans Georg, 1900- [Heideggers Wege. English] Heidegger’s ways / Hans-Georg Gadamer ; translated by John W Stanley ; with an introduction by Dennis J. Schmidt. p. cm. — (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy) Translation of: Heideggers Wege. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-1737-9 (HC : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-7914-1738-7 (PB : alk. paper) 1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. I. Title. II. Series. B3279.H49G24613 1993 193—dc20 93-24934 CIP 10 987654321 Contents Preface vii Translator’s Preface ix Introduction by Dennis J. Schmidt xv Existentialism and the Philosophy of Existence 1 Martin Heidegger—75 Years 15 The Marburg Theology 29 “What Is Metaphysics?” 45 Kant and the Hermeneutical Turn 49 The Thinker Martin Heidegger 61 The Language of Metaphysics 69 Plato 81 The Truth of the Work of Art 95 Martin Heidegger—85 Years 111 The Way in the Turn 121 The Greeks 139 VI CONTENTS 13. The History of Philosophy 153 14. The Religious Dimension 167 15. Being Spirit God 181 Notes 197 Glossary 203 Index 207 Preface I he Heidegger Studies presented here are a collection of essays, lectures, and speeches written in the course of the last twenty- five years, the majority of which have already been published. The fact that these are all relatively recent works should not be taken to mean that my engagement with Heidegger is recent as well. Rather, I received impetuses for thinking from Heidegger very early on, and I attempted from the very beginning to follow such impetuses within the limits of my capabilities and to the extent that I could concur. It set a standard that I had to learn to meet. However, as is always the case when one is attempting to find one's own position, some dis­ tance was needed before I was able to present Heidegger's ways of thinking as his; I first had to distinguish my own search for my ways and paths from my companionship with Heidegger and his ways. This process had its beginning with Heidegger's request that I write the introduction to the Reclam edition of his ‘Artwork” essay. Basically, this collection of works is only a continuation of what I first undertook in 1960 with that introduction. I was actually in my own element, for I took it as encouragement and confirmation of my own efforts when Heidegger introduced the work of art into his own thinking in the 1930s. Thus, my relationship to this short introduc­ tion to the “Artwork” essay of 1960 was not so much that of one “commissioned” to -write it, rather I recognized in Heidegger's thought some of the very questions I had voiced in Truth and Method. All of v ii v iii HANS-GEORG GADAMER my later Heidegger essays are an effort—although one framed by my own assumptions and capabilities—-to offer a view of the task for thinking that confronted Heidegger; they attempt to show that espe­ cially the Heidegger who had made this “turn” [Kehre] after Being and Time was in truth continuing down the same path when he encountered questions probing the underpinnings of metaphysics and attempted to think an unknown future. All of the works assembled here pursue in essence the same goal-—to introduce the independent, unconventional thought of Martin Heidegger, thought that renounced all previously existing ways of thinking and speaking. Above all, these works are intended to prevent the reader from the error of supposing that a mythology or poetizing gnosis is to be found in Heidegger’s renunciation of the customary. The fact that all of my studies are confined to a single task entails that each one of them contains an occasional element. Varia­ tions on a single theme are what confront the eyewitness who at­ tempts to give an account of the thought of Martin Heidegger. Thus, I must accept the consequently unavoidable repetitions as a part of the terrain. The first essay introduces the situation into which Heidegger entered. The following articles form a continuum as regards content. The memorial address that I gave in Freiburg after Heidegger’s death serves as the conclusion. HGG Translator’s Preface I he approach that I have taken in this translation is in es­ sence a compromise between two conflicting interests. On the one hand, I had a strong interest in rendering a translation that would allow as much of the “otherness” of the German text as possible to shimmer through in the English. Yet, on the other hand, I wanted the translation to mirror the exceptional eloquence of Gadamer’s prose. That these two interests conflict and the way that they conflict may not be readily apparent to one who has not previously worked with translations and, therefore, may warrant a short explanation. My interest in languages, especially my interest in the German language, was transformed into a passion when I first encountered Being and Tune as an undergraduate in 1982. In an effort to better understand Heidegger’s thought, I spent an inordinate amount of time trying to work through what I deemed to be key passages in the Ger­ man text. That experience was exceptionally rewarding, not so much because I was able to gain an understanding of Being and Time, but because, in facing the otherness of the German text, I was forced to begin thinking differently; I had to somehow integrate this otherness into my own thinking, which meant that I myself had to assume some of these ways of thinking as my own—a part of me became “other.” It was always with a sense of loss and some frustration that I returned to IX X JOHN W. STANLEY the translation of Sein und Zeit because the experience of this otherness was necessarily greatly diluted. The frustration is that which brought about the transformation of my interest into a passion for language; I vowed then to try to bring as much of the otherness over into a transla­ tion if I ever had the chance to do one. I interpret Gadamer’s cautious enthusiasm for Heidegger's interpretation of the Greeks as a confirmation of my own perspec­ tive, for Gadamer praised these interpretations precisely because they were able to break through the scholarly overlay and allow one to sense the otherness of Greek thinking (see Chapter 12 of this book). Yet, implicit in both the description of my experience of “otherness” with reference to Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit and in Gadamer’s motto “to think the Greeks more Greeklike” is a certain grievance against translation: The experience of this otherness seems to require that one be intimately proximate to it. Thus, when translation is neces­ sary, then the rendition with the least translating would be the best; that is, the most literal translation possible would be the one most desirable because it remains as close as possible to the original text—■ hence Gadamer’s passing definition of translation as a “word-for- word rendition of an assigned text” (see the end of Chapter 3). Here, the conflict is already beginning to show itself A “word- for-word” translation is really no translation at all, for the text of the translation would be unintelligible to any reader, probably even to the translator. The linguistic structures of the original language that support the words and lend them their meaning cannot be translated without the target language losing its integrity: Frequently the gram­ matical structures that show gender, case, and number simply cannot be translated; and the effort to mirror the syntactical order of the original language in the target language results in babble. Therefore, the translator is forced to do some interpreting, thereby distancing the translation from the original text and, hence, from the otherness embedded in the linguistic structures of the original language. This is where the freedom of the translator that Gadamer often mentions comes into play—and yet, if one translates in accord with this first interest, then the freedom of the translator is exceedingly limited; one can deviate from the original text only enough to make the translation intelligible. My second interest, the one in allowing Gadamer’s eloquence to show through, is not merely motivated by a sense of aesthetics. t r a n s l a t o r ’s p r e f a c e XI Much of the power and force of Gadamer’s thinking is lent by his prose, which often verges on the poetic. Not only does one not have to struggle with Gadamer’s text, but, moreover, it works on the reader like a magnet. To offer a translation of Gadamer’s text that seemed awkward to the English speaker would be to ignore a fundamental element of Gadamer’s thought. Gadamer himself is quite aware of this; he encouraged me in one conversation to take as much freedom as I wanted, going so far as to say, “Herr Stanley, vergessen Sie den Text” (Mr.