THE GORDIAN KNOT: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONCERNING THE CYPRUS ISSUE: 1952-1974 Michael M. Carver A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of The requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May 2006 Committee: Dr. Douglas J. Forsyth, Advisor Dr. Gary R. Hess ii ABSTRACT Douglas J. Forsyth, Advisor This study examines the role of both the United States and Great Britain during a series of crises that plagued Cyprus from the mid 1950s until the 1974 invasion by Turkey that led to the takeover of approximately one-third of the island and its partition. Initially an ancient Greek colony, Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the late 16th century, which allowed the native peoples to take part in the island’s governance. But the idea of Cyprus’ reunification with the Greek mainland, known as enosis, remained a significant tenet to most Greek-Cypriots. The movement to make enosis a reality gained strength following the island’s occupation in 1878 by Great Britain. Cyprus was integrated into the British imperialist agenda until the end of the Second World War when American and Soviet hegemony supplanted European colonialism. Beginning in 1955, Cyprus became a battleground between British officials and terrorists of the pro-enosis EOKA group until 1959 when the independence of Cyprus was negotiated between Britain and the governments of Greece and Turkey. The United States remained largely absent during this period, but during the 1960s and 1970s came to play an increasingly assertive role whenever intercommunal fighting between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot populations threatened to spill over into Greece and Turkey, and endanger the southeastern flank of NATO. The American policy in Cyprus was primarily to avert such a war from taking place, and not to broker a long lasting, an approach that frequently put the U.S. in conflict with Great Britain, which still retained iii two military bases on the island. Research for this study has relied heavily on recently declassified documents from both the U.S. and British governments and secondary materials that analyze the ongoing Cyprus issue from a number of different perspectives. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have brought the sort of good-natured intentions to this endeavor as only an amateur can. Thankfully, it has been my good fortune to be surrounded by so many capable scholars who helped to guide me along a road frequently serpentine and poorly lit. Firstly I must recognize the contributions of my advisor, Dr. Douglas J. Forsyth, who has shepherded a frequently bewildered student through this process while being generous with his time, patience and insight. Sincere thanks are also due to Dr. Gary Hess who exhibited enough faith in my project to join my committee without being acquainted with my scholarly work. I also must thank Dr. Walter Grunden for supporting what has been frequently labeled an unconventional writing style and Dr. Don K. Rowney for revealing new vistas in the discipline of history to me. My sincerest thanks go to Luke Nichter for demonstrating what it means to be an academic both by his advice and his example; to Kyle Smith for sharing this journey with me in all its inherent joys and absurdities; and to Peter Kuebeck who faithfully endured many a rant and complaint with good humor. Additional appreciation goes to Jennifer Potocnak and Erin McKenna. Finally, I must acknowledge the unfailing support of my family. To my father who gave me the first up close and personal look at a scholar, to my mother whose concerns for me frequently lay outside the academic, to my understanding sisters, Laura and Jane, my brother-in-law (though more like a brother) James for his advice and encouragement, and my niece, Maria Rose: I love you all. v TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION: ENTERING THE LABYRINTH…………………………….1-13 CHAPTER ONE: PLATINING THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT…………………..14-35 CHAPTER TWO: MANAGING THE “CYPRESS” SITUATION………………36-54 CHAPTER THREE: ANOTHER BRICK IN THE WALL……………………….55-76 CHAPTER FOUR: “POISONED FRUIT”………………………………………77-101 CHAPTER FIVE: BY WHAT WE HAVE LEFT UNDONE………………….102-125 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………126-129 BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………130-139 1 INTRODUCTION: ENTERING THE LABRYNITH The island nation of Cyprus has long been denied a substantial role in the shaping of its own destiny. Rather, it has been claimed and reclaimed by a succession of emergent powers and frequently exchanged like a token on the gaming table of the Mediterranean. Cursed by its crucial geographical location on the crossroads of Northern Africa and the Middle East, Cyprus has, since the dawn of Western civilization, been the site of power struggles between competing empires whose concerns for regional dominance and expansion region have generally outweighed any regard for the well being of the native Cypriot people. The 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey and its subsequent partition is the most recent and raw example of this ill-fated legacy. The invasion’s brutality and the seemingly impotent response to it by the United States and Great Britain has led many conspiracy enthusiasts to contend that American and British politicians were both aware of Turkish intents and had been encouraging them to a degree since the mid-1950s. To this end, a number of scholars have allowed the shadow of the 1974 incursion to fall over earlier events to show a clear indication of an American-British cabal that forfeited Cyprus to insure the integrity of NATO’s southeastern flank against the Soviet Union. Rather, it is the lack of communication, rather than a carefully orchestrated international plot, that doomed Cyprus to its current division, a lack of communication both between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, as well as the dominant countries with interests in the Mediterranean. This thesis is an attempt to chart the sinuous course that lead to the partition of Cyprus from approximately 1952 until 1974 primarily from the perspective of the United States and Great Britain. Rather than peer 2 into the darker corners of history, as many previous texts have done, this study attempts to frame the Cyrus issue from the perspective of shifting Cold War concerns with an extensive reliance on recently released government documents from both American and British archives to tell the story. With differing policy agendas and political philosophies, the administrations and cabinets that occupied the White House and 10 Downing Street during the nearly three decades this study covers handled events on Cyprus quite differently. These documents further demonstrate that the governments of both the United States and the United Kingdom were largely off-guard when troubles in Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. President Makarios, Cyprus’ leader, himself voiced bewilderment at his ejection in 1974 soon after his rescue by the British military. As a result, the response by American and British policymakers was one based largely on improvisation rather than deceit. This was due both to distracting circumstances, such as the resignation of Richard Nixon, and the fact that on a global scale, Cyprus simply was not a principal concern except within the context of a potential war between Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, this thesis intends to show that the origins of Cyprus’ partition are rooted in Turkey’s anxiety of encroachment, which began in the nineteenth century due to the combined impact of Greece’s liberation from the weakening Ottoman Empire and Russia’s attempt to exercise greater influence in the East Mediterranean. Such anxiety initially motivated Turkey’s decision to allow Great Britain to occupy Cyprus in 1878 and largely led to Ankara’s decision to ally itself with America in the late 1940s. During the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, the working relationship between the U.S. and Turkey was an amicable one. 3 In 1952, when both Turkey and Greece became critical members in the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the perceived threat of the Soviet Union superseded any preexisting animosity between the two countries. By the time the Cold War began to thaw during the East-West détente of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the situation between Turkey and Greece had changed drastically. The attenuation of the Soviet menace and the presence of military-dominated regimes in Turkey and Greece translated into a more active interest in the local conflict unfolding on Cyprus and an ensuing exacerbation of the situation. Sources of contention between the two countries that had been put aside for the sake of Cold War demands returned to the surface and eventually took precedent over Western containment of the Soviet Union. Fundamental policy changes were also taking place in the United States and Britain. Forfeiting nearly a century of colonial domination, the British oversaw the implementation of a constitutional framework for the Republic of Cyprus in 1959 and 1960, but maintained a role as one of the three guarantors of the new country along with Greece and Turkey. As the glory of the British Empire began to fade, the United States was compelled to fill the vacuum left in the Mediterranean and uphold the two-fold mission of containing Soviet influence and maintaining relative stability in the increasingly volatile Middle East. To this end, upholding the integrity of NATO’s southeastern flank became the keystone of U.S. policy in the east Mediterranean during both the Eisenhower and Johnson administrations. When Turkey and Greece were nearly drawn into a war over Cyprus in the fall of 1964 and again in 1967, the American diplomatic response was swift and incisive in order to hold the NATO alliance intact. But when the events of the summer of 1974 once more began to take on an increasingly 4 bellicose character, the U.S.