Islam - Washington's New Dilemma :: Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma Islam - Washington's New Dilemma by Benjamin Gordon Middle East Quarterly March 1996, pp. 43-52 http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma Benjamin Gordon is a consultant at Corporate Decisions, Inc., Boston, and a recent graduate of Yale College. Does the U.S. government have a coherent policy toward fundamentalist Islam? Fundamentalists themselves are convinced not only that Washington has a policy but that it is a consistent and aggressive one. Iran's former ambassador to the United Nations, Said Raja'i Khourasani, asserts that the American position "has not changed" over the years: "The language is always the same -- it is threatened or it is threatening."1 On the other side, scholars and diplomats tend to see incoherence in policy toward fundamentalists as they do about foreign policy in general. Richard Haass speaks for many when he holds that "public statements by administration officials about the purposes of U.S. foreign policy have been inconsistent or simply ambiguous.2 In fact, neither side is entirely correct. While there has been a coherent policy, it has changed over time. Since 1979, when Iranian fundamentalist Muslims overthrew Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and stormed the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Washington has undergone a series of subtle shifts in its policy toward fundamentalist Islam. From Presidents Reagan to Bush to Clinton, the U.S. government has migrated from rhetorical confrontation to timid outreach to outright accommodation. The following analysis focuses on official U.S. statements about fundamentalist Islam.3 The statements deal with four main issues: the root cause of fundamentalist Islam; its role in democratization; the question of "moderate" versus "extremist" fundamentalists; and U.S. policy. By examining these statements, we can trace the evolution of official U.S. thinking; explain these changes, noting areas of consistency and inconsistency; and conclude with policy recommendations. THE REAGAN AND BUSH FOUNDATIONS Reagan administration. U.S. policy toward fundamentalist Islam incubated during the Reagan administration, which began a year after the 1979 revolution in Iran and ended just before a wave of fundamentalist electoral victories took place in the Middle East. Consequently, the Reagan administration had little need to develop a comprehensive policy on this subject. At a time when fundamentalist Islam wore a revolutionary face and sought power through acts of violence, an aggressive policy of containment against the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iranian-sponsored terrorist organizations sufficed. 1 of 13 26.9.2014 23:37 Islam - Washington's New Dilemma :: Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma Accordingly, administration officials alluded to fundamentalist Islam in simple and consistently hostile terms.4 Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy discussed fundamentalist Islam's "revolutionary and sometimes violent nature," as well as its "ideology of an extreme nature."5 Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost labeled the Islamic Republic of Iran a "messianic, radical state."6 Secretary of State George Shultz referred to fundamentalist Islam as a form of "radical extremism."7 President Reagan suggested using the Arab-Israeli peace process to engage Arab moderates against a rising tide of anti-Western fundamentalists.8 These allusions suggested a growing awareness of the challenge but they did not coalesce into a comprehensive policy. Bush administration. The face of fundamentalism began to change in the late 1980s. Fundamentalist electoral victories in Turkey, Jordan, and Kuwait came to a head in December 1991 in Algeria, when the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut--FIS) swept the first round of Algeria's parliamentary elections and appeared to poised to gain power in the second round. Seeking power through the ballot, not the bullet, these fundamentalists created a set of quandaries for American policymakers that remain in place today. When military rulers cancelled the elections in January 1992, the U.S. government was confronted with a dilemma: Should it insist on elections, even though they would likely bring the anti-Western (and probably nondemocratic) FIS to power? Or should it side with the less anti-Western but certainly nondemocratic military government? The Bush administration initially hedged its response. Asked how to define U.S. policy toward political fundamentalist Muslims in Algeria and elsewhere, Secretary of State James Baker avoided the topic: "I think we'd have to look at it on a case-by-case basis."9 Prodded by the events in Algeria, a policy began to emerge. On June 2, 1992, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian delivered a speech at the Meridian House in Washington.10 As the first major U.S. government statement on fundamentalist Islam, it merits special attention. Shifting away from the simple confrontational approach of the Reagan administration, Djerejian offered something more ambiguous and pragmatic. He highlighted the "diversity" and "complexity" of "this renewed Islamic emphasis" and described fundamentalist Islam in cautiously optimistic terms, portraying the groups involved as "seeking to reform their societies in keeping with Islamic ideals." He emphasized that the movement was driven by "believers," adding, "We detect no monolithic or coordinated international effort behind these movements." As for fundamentalists' gaining power through elections, Djerejian equivocated. Yes, he encouraged democratization as an alternative to authoritarian rule: Those who are prepared to take specific steps toward free elections, creating independent judiciaries, promoting the rule of law, reducing restrictions on the press, respecting the rights of minorities, and guaranteeing individual rights will find us ready to recognize and support their efforts, just as those moving in the opposite direction will find us ready to speak candidly and act accordingly. 2 of 13 26.9.2014 23:37 Islam - Washington's New Dilemma :: Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma But Djerejian also tempered his commitment to free elections: "We are suspect of those who would use the democratic process to come to power, only to destroy that very process in order to retain power and political dominance." In a line much quoted in subsequent years, he added an implicit reference to Algeria: "While we believe in the principle of `one person, one vote,' we do not support `one person, one vote, one time.'" On the fundamental choices -- between fundamentalist Islam and autocratic rule, and between democratic principles and status-quo pragmatism -- Djerejian did not take a clear stand. In contrast to the Reagan administration, which equated fundamentalists and extremists, Djerejian indicated that all of the one are not necessarily the other. "Our quarrel," he stated, "is with extremism and the violence, denial, intolerance, intimidation, coercion and terror which too often accompany it." This curious list included three characteristics associated with military-terrorist groups (violence, coercion, and terror) and three with political groups (denial, intolerance, and intimidation). Djerejian then elaborated on the characteristics of extremist groups: Those who are insensitive to the need for political pluralism; those who cloak their message in another brand of authoritarianism; those who substitute religious and political confrontation for constructive engagement with the rest of the world; those who do not share our commitment to peaceful resolution of conflict, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict; and those who would pursue their goals through repression or violence. Specific as they were, these guidelines failed to address the key question: At what point does a fundamentalist group become extremist? Is, for example, the FIS extremist? Djerejian's oblique definition permitted the Bush administration great flexibility. As for U.S. policy, Djerejian rejected the cold war paradigm ("The Cold War is not being replaced by a new competition between Islam and the West") and dismissed the notion that fundamentalist Islam had replaced communism: "The United States Government does not view Islam as the next `ism' confronting the West or threatening world peace." He advocated a response to extremism rooted in material improvements of socioeconomic conditions, citing "the pursuit of viable economic and social development programs, privatization, and adequate educational and vocational training opportunities." The Meridian address codified a clear Bush administration stance on some issues: fundamentalist Muslims were not influenced by Iran but homegrown and independent; their political actions were primarily reformist in nature; and they did not necessarily threaten the United States. In sum, the speech suggested an ambiguous accommodation of fundamentalism. A CLINTON DOCTRINE? The Clinton administration inherited the Meridian House approach and sought to refine it as fundamentalist Islam gained in strength from Algeria to Egypt to Jordan; and as the Israel-PLO 3 of 13 26.9.2014 23:37 Islam - Washington's New Dilemma :: Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/289/islam-washingtons-new-dilemma Declaration of Principles spurred new fundamentalist violence. A first signal of the Clinton doctrine came during the April 1993 congressional testimony of Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism