ON THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIENCE A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy By Anne Marshall Jeffrey, M.A. Washington, DC May 20, 2015 Copyright 2015 by Anne M. Jeffrey All Rights Reserved ii ON THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIENCE Anne M. Jeffrey, M.A. Thesis Advisor : Mark C. Murphy, PhD ABSTRACT Moral reasons are considerations that count in favor of or against actions in light of a moral standard. They can be functionally defined as authoritative guides to morally right action. Embedded in this concept is a deep tension between the two features that account for moral reasons having this unique function: namely, practicality and objectivity. On the one hand, in order for a consideration to be objective, as a conceptual matter, it must be mind independent. On the other hand, in order for a consideration to be practical, as a conceptual matter, it must be mind dependent. Since no consideration can be both mind dependent and mind independent, no consideration could be a moral reason, on the innocent functional analysis. I call this the puzzle about moral reasons. The going solutions to the puzzle require conceptual revision, foregoing the idea that moral reasons are, as a conceptual matter, either practical or objective. This dissertation defends a solution to the puzzle that does not require such conceptual revision. The solution takes its primary inspiration from Thomas Aquinas’s discussions of conscience. On my reading, we see him there putting forward a unique thesis about how moral reasons relate to the minds of those to whom they apply: moral reasons depend on a person’s grasp of general moral principles for their existence and they depend on a person’s practical judgments for what they are reasons to do. On the Thomistic construal of mind dependence, the connection between a person’s psychology and the moral reasons that apply to her does make such moral reasons practical in principle but also leaves intact their objectivity. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I came to Georgetown interested in Aristotelian and Kantian ethics, and so when the late Alfonso Gomez-Lobo agreed to teach a course partly on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , I leapt at the opportunity. There was just one catch: he would be teaching this alongside Aquinas’s action theory. I braced myself to stomach a bit of the stale medieval stuff for a good taste of Aristotle’s ethics. But Alfonso, being the brilliant and passionate teacher he was, presented Aquinas in such a flattering light that my attitude towards him was totally transformed. I owe Alfonso a twofold debt of gratitude: first, for introducing me to the question on conscience, which so puzzled me that I ended up writing the dissertation I did; and second, for his repeatedly admonishing me, “Never trust your translator,” which has led to the rich experience of coming to know Aquinas better by working with the original text. This dissertation would not be and certainly would not be what it is without the gracious support and assistance of many others, whom I cannot thank adequately here. I am especially grateful to my director, Mark Murphy, for the generous gift of his time and energy; he read hundreds of pages of drafts, speedily returning them with discerning comments, and always opened his office door when I needed to hash through an idea, whether it took ten or a hundred minutes. To my mind, he is the philosophical analog of the coach on Friday Night Lights: always challenging me to be more clear-eyed and disciplined in my arguments, committed to my philosophical growth, and going beyond the calls of duty. I am also thankful to Henry Richardson for serving on my committee; his criticisms never fail to get to the heart of the issues. He has encouraged philosophical creativity both by modeling it in his work and by showing faith in discussions of mine. I owe special gratitude to Tobias Hoffmann, who agreed to serve as an outside reader on this committee, from whom I have learned so much about Aquinas and who has been liberal in his time discussing the textual and philosophical issues in the third chapter; whatever of the interpretation of Aquinas I have gotten right is largely due to his guidance. His adroitness in navigating a wide range of philosophical topics has given me a deeper admiration for ambidextrous historians of philosophy like himself. The benefit of being a part of vibrant and engaging philosophical communities at Georgetown and in Saint Louis while writing this cannot be overstated. I am grateful to Wayne Davis and Fr. Theodore Vitali for their support as department chairs. My academic older siblings, Paddy McShane, Kelly Heuer, Travis Rieder and Marcus Hedahl, helped me to navigate the process of dissertation-writing from beginning to end. Huaping Lu-Adler and Karen Stohr provided guidance and encouragement when much needed. In the year I spent in Saint Louis, I was lucky to have philosophical friends with expertise in ethics and Aquinas who gave me feedback on the skeletal draft of chapter 3: Joel Archer, Donald Bungum, Errin Clark, Everett Fulmer, Bob Hartman, Andrew Jones, Corey Katz, Sam Murray, Beth Rath, and Jeremy Skrzypek. I owe gratitude to Julia Driver, for discussions about moral objectivity; Eleonore Stump, for discussions on Aquinas’s moral philosophy; Christopher Shields, who read and commented on the very earliest draft of chapter 2. I owe gratitude also to Alexander Pruss, one of my first teachers, for fruitful conversations and email exchanges about the puzzles about conscience and authority. Special thanks are owed to friends and colleagues at Georgetown who freely gave their time to read, discuss, and comment on various parts of this dissertation at various stages: Michael Barnes, David Bronstein, Jake Earl, Megan Dean, Francisco Gallegos, Trip Glazer, Laura Guidry-Grimes, Colin Hickey, Bryce Huebner, Hailey Huget, Nabina Liebow, Huaping Lu-Adler, Karen Rice, Gordon Shannon, Nancy Sherman, Matthew Shields, and Karen Stohr. It is a humbling but wonderful thing to come to know how far the love of your friends and family extends, when for the better part of two years you have been sleep-deprived, worn out, inflexible, and fixated on a narrow philosophical problem, and their love for you has not come close to running out. Audrey, Allyce, Andrea, Beth Ann, Carolyn, Hannah, Lauren, Melany, Megan, Paige, Shaden, and Tatiana: thank you for your care and faithful friendship. To my found family, Katherine, David, Josh and Taylor: I am exceedingly grateful not only that you are all such bookworms that my work on vacations went nearly unnoticed, but also that you have constantly cheered me on, and when needed, cheered me up (blithe Scots that you are!). I could never sufficiently thank my mother, Trent, who has always shown more interest in my work and faith in my ability to complete it than I deserve. My late father, Richard, too, was a constant encourager and valued every project I undertook because he so valued me; I wish he were here to share in the joy of the completion of this project, as his and my mother’s support made it possible. Finally, I wish to thank the person who spans the categories of philosophical interlocutor, friend, family member, and occupies one of his own. To my husband, Gideon, I owe thanks for his feedback on the arguments of this dissertation (almost every one of which I probably rehearsed to him first), for the insights he offered, and for the exemplary precision and attentiveness to detail in his own work on Aquinas, from which mine has profited. More importantly, during the last two years he has patiently shared my burdens and afforded me the respite and light-heartedness I needed in order to finish. It is with love and profound gratitude that I dedicate this work to him. v Table of Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv 1 The Puzzle About Moral Reasons ................................................................................. 1 1.1 The Puzzle About Moral Reasons ........................................................................................... 1 1.1.1 What Are Moral Reasons? ..................................................................................... 1 1.1.2 The Puzzle About Moral Reasons .......................................................................... 7 1.1.3 A Strategy for Solving the Puzzle ........................................................................ 10 1.2 Formulating and Motivating the Puzzle ................................................................................ 12 1.2.1 Objectivity, Practicality, and Mind Dependence ................................................. 13 1.2.2 Why Think Moral Reasons Are Necessarily Practical? ....................................... 18 1.2.3 Why Think Moral Reasons Are Necessarily Objective? ..................................... 24 1.2.4 The Tension Generated by the Mind-Dependence Thesis ................................... 32 1.2.5 Why Not Revise the Concept? ............................................................................. 37 1.3 Conceptual Revision in the Direction of Practicality ............................................................ 43 1.3.1 Williams’s Argument for Internalism .................................................................. 44 1.3.2 Staving off Metaphysical