Skeptical Responses to Psi Research By Ted Goertzel and Ben Goertzel From Evidence for Psi: Thirteen Empirical Research Reports, edited by Damien Broderick and Ben Goertzel, McFarland and Company, 2015. Editors’ Note One of the peculiarities of psi research is that if any scientific work or publication on the topic gets attention at all outside the community of serious psi researchers, it is met by a barrage of derision from the community of self-styled psi “skeptics” (some of whom, it has been argued, might be better termed “denialists”). We consider it fairly likely that this edited volume will attract a familiar sort of negative attention from the psi skeptic community, and are certainly prepared to debate any of their critical responses to the evidence we have gathered here in a careful and public way. However, given the prominence of the “psi skeptic” phenomenon in the modern scientific and popular-media discussions of psi, we also deemed it worthwhile to include here an explicit analysis of the psi skeptic community itself and its weaknesses and motivations. Toward that end, we invited a brief chapter from a sociologist with expertise in both social movements and associated belief systems, and statistical data analysis—Ted Goertzel, who also happens to be the father of one of the editors. Ted has no historical connection with psi research, and brought to the project an attitude of healthy skepticism toward claims of the reality of psi phenomena. One of the thrusts of Ted’s research career has been the careful skeptical investigation of claims made by various parties based on statistical and other evidence, mostly related to social policy (the effect of capital punishment on homicide rates;1 the impact of welfare reform,2 etc.), but also including other topics such as UFO abductions.3 Ted’s initial chapter draft ultimately resulted in the jointly authored chapter you will find below. 1“Capital Punishment and Homicide: Sociological Realities and Econometric Illusions,” Skeptical Inquirer, July/August 2004, pp. 23-27. Reprinted in Paul Kurtz, ed., Science and Ethics. Prometheus Books, 2007, pp. 184-192. Reprinted in Diane Henningfeld, ed., The Death Penalty: Opposing Viewpoints, New York: Greenhaven Press, 2006, pp. 99-104.. 2 “New Jersey’s Experiment in Welfare Reform,” The Public Interest, Fall 1996, pp. 72-80. With Gary Young. 3 “Measuring the Prevalence of False Memories,” Skeptical Inquirer, 18 (3): 266-272, 1994. Skeptical Responses to Psi Research By Ted Goertzel and Ben Goertzel Psi research is unusual, but not unique, in that the community of researchers is complemented by a well-organized community of professional “skeptics,” who make it their business to attempt to debunk published psi research results via exposing them as erroneous or fraudulent. This chapter presents a brief investigation and discussion of the psi skeptic movement. Who are these skeptics? What are their motivations? How valid are their criticisms? What might psi researchers do to convince the skeptics, or counter their arguments? Historical Roots of the Skeptical Movement The organized skeptical movement has had a long and contentious relationship with the psi research community (Frazier, 1998; Kurtz, 2001; Carter, 2012). The conflict goes back to 1976 when philosopher Paul Kurtz and sociologist Marcelo Truzzi joined forces with a group of scientists, writers and activists who felt a need for an organization to promote rational and scientific thinking. Prominent figures in the movement included psychologist Ray Hyman, mathematician and science writer Martin Gardner, magician James Randi, astronomer Carl Sagan and science fiction writer Isaac Asimov. Paul Kurtz, the central figure, had been a leader in the secular humanist movement and was highly skeptical of religious thought. But religious thinkers generally acknowledge that their beliefs are based on faith, which makes them poor targets for rational or scientific criticism. The organizers decided to focus their efforts on the “paranormal” because the paranormal movement made empirical claims that they believed to be irrational and unscientific. They called their new organization the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal, or CSICOP (Frazier, 1996). Later on, they expanded their focus and renamed it the Committee for Skeptical Inquiry, or CSI. CSICOP started by conducting a study under its own auspices, designed to refute the claim of a “Mars Effect” by French psychologist Michel Gauquelin. They were quite shocked when their independent analysis actually confirmed some of Gauquelin’s findings, and there was a minor scandal when they were accused of trying to suppress their own results (Carter, 2012; Rawlins, 1981; Frazier, 1996). Astronomer Dennis Rawlins, who protested the suppression, was dropped from the organization’s board and CSICOP decided not to do any more of its own original research. Instead, it found its niche in science journalism, and achieved some success with its magazine, The Skeptical Inquirer. The magazine was originally founded by Marcelo Truzzi , who called it The Zetetic. Truzzi wanted it to be a balanced popular scientific journal with contributions from both sides of controversial issues. He favored inviting psi researchers into the organization, a step that was strongly opposed by other key leaders. As a social scientist, Truzzi sympathized with the psi researchers in their earnest efforts to apply rigorous statistical methodology. He observed that: Parapsychologists really want to play the game by the proper statistical rules. They're very staid. They thought they could convince these sceptics but the sceptics keep raising the goalposts. It's ironic, because real psychic researchers are very committed to doing real science, more than a lot of people in science are. Yet they get rejected, while we can be slipshod in psychology and sociology and economics and get away with it. We're not painted as the witchdoctors, but they are (Margolis, 1999). Extraordinary Claims and Extraordinary Evidence One phrase often heard in the discussion of psi research is “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” While this sounds sensible at first, it’s actually not so obvious, and merits a bit of reflection and analysis. What is, actually, the evidence for this claim itself? Truzzi (1978) first coined the dictum “an extraordinary claim requires extraordinary proof” in trying to explain why the parapsychologists were so unsuccessful in persuading the skeptics with their conventionally rigorous research. This slogan became an axiom of the skeptical movement, thanks largely to its popularization by Carl Sagan who rephrased it slightly as “exceptional claims require exceptional evidence.” The dictum was useful as a rhetorical meme, so the skeptics used it that way without subjecting it to a critical analysis. Truzzi tried, defining extraordinary claims as those that contradicted well established scientific principles, but he failed in his effort to clarify what kind of extraordinary evidence might be sufficient to accept such claims. When philosopher Theodore Schick (2002: 332) finally examined the principle seriously, for a skeptical encyclopedia, he concluded quite sensibly that “extraordinary claims do not require extraordinary evidence. It can be reasonable to accept an extraordinary claim in the absence of extraordinary evidence as long as it provides the best explanation of the evidence available; that is as long as it meets the criteria of adequacy better than any other explanation.” Some skeptics have suggested abandoning the “exceptional evidence” argument in favor of simply requiring rigorous, high quality scientific evidence. But they have been reluctant to do so, because they realize it might force them to actually accept some paranormal claims. Philadelphia Skeptics leader Ed Gracely (1998) defended the “extraordinary proof” criterion because “skeptics are not willing to accept the plausibility of most paranormal claims unless the evidence is extremely strong. We risk being perceived (correctly) as disingenuous if we call for solid quality research, then revert to the extraordinary claims argument should it in fact appear.” It seems plain that requiring extraordinarily strong evidence for any claim that is “extraordinary,” in the sense of going against received thinking, will sometimes have the impact of preserving an existing system of belief beyond what is commonsensically warranted by the evidence. If a community holds evidence in favor of its current theoretical understanding to lower standards than evidence challenging this understanding, then obviously this will bias that community against changing its understanding. Examples of this phenomenon abound in the history of science, politics and other areas of human endeavor. Time and time again, the scientific establishment has taken what, in hindsight, appears an irrationally long time to incorporate new evidence contravening its commonly held assumptions. Magnetic field lines, evolution by natural selection, quantum indeterminacy and numerous other scientific concepts, now considered well demonstrated, were initially rejected by the majority of scientists even after the presentation of experimental evidence, now considered reasonably compelling, in their favor. Compared with most other fields of human endeavor, science has proved remarkably good at revising its deepest assumptions based on new evidence. Nevertheless, there have been many, many cases where scientific progress