CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD - - NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL L- - I L _ .a , NATO UNCLASSIFIED ORI GINAL : ENGLI SH '213 - 6 S+I~~- 5th May, 1956 ' SUMMARY RECORD C-R(56123 Summary Record of a meeting of the council held at the Palais de Chaillot-Paris, XVIe., on Saturday. 5th May, 1956; at 3 p.m. PRESENT Chairman : HOE. Mr. K. Gudmundsson (~celand) Vice -Chai man and Secretary General : The Lord Ismay - 3 . BELGIUM H.E. Mr. P.H. Spaak (Minister for Foreign Affairg) H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke (permanent Representative) CANADA The Hon. L.B. Pearson (secretary of State for External ~ffairs) H.E. Mr. L.D. Wilgress (permanent ~epresentative) DEW~RK H.E. Mr, H.C. Hansen (prime Minister and Minister for. Foreign Affairs) H.E. Mr. M.A, Wassard (permanent ~epresentative) FRANCE H.E. Mr. C, Pineau (~inisterfor Foreign ~ffairs) H.E, Mr. A. Parodi (permanent ~epresentative) The Committee of Three: from left to right,GERMANY Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. GaetanoMakino. and Mr L. B. Pearson H.E. Mr. H. von reh ha no (~ederalMinister for Foreign Affairs) HOE. Mr. H. Blankenhorn (Permanent Representative ) GREECE H.E. Mr. S. Theotoky (~inisterfor Foreign kffairs) H.E. Mr. M.. Melas (permanent ~epresentative) ICELAND H.E. Mr. H.G. Andersen (permanent Representative) ITALY H.E. Mr. G. Martino (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E. Mr. A. Alessandrini (Permanent ~epresentative) NATO SECRET C-R(56)23 LUXEMBOURG H.E. Mr.- J, Bech (prime Minister, Minister for Foreign ~ffairs) H.E. Mr. N. Hornrnel (Permanent ~epresentative) NETHERLANDS H.E. Mr. J.Vi. Beyen (~inisterfor Foreign Affairs) Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (Pe rrnanent ~e~resentative) NORWAY H.E. Mr. H. Lange (~inisterfor Foreign ~ffairs) H.E. Mr. J. Boyesen (Permanent ~e~resentative) PORTUGAL Prof. Dr. P, Cunha (~inisterfor Foreign ~ffairs) Count de Tovar (permanent ~epresentative) TURKEY H.E. Mr. Fuat ~gprdld (~inisterfor Foreign Affairs) H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi (secretary General Ministry of Foreign ~ffnirs) UNITED KINGDOM The Rt. Hon. Selwyn Lloyd (secretary of State for Foreign ~ffairs) Sir Christopher Steel (permanent ~epresentative) UNITED STATES H.E. Mr. J. Foster Dulles (secretary of state) H.E. Mr. G.W. Perkins (permanent ~e~resentatlve) INTERNATI ONAL STAFF The CommitteeBaron A, of Three:Bentinck from left to right, Mr (~eput~Halvard Lange,Secretary Prof. GaetanoMakino.~eneral) and Mr L. B. Pearson Mr. G. Cosmelli (Assistant Secretary General for Political ~ffairs) Mr. F.D. Gregh (~ssistantSecretary General for Econoinics and ~inance) Mr, J. Murray Mitchell - (Assistant Secretary General for Production and ~ogistics) The Lord Coleridge (~xecutivesecretary) ALSO PRESENT General D.H. Buchanan (Standing Group Liaison office) NATO SECRET NATO SECRET C-R(56)23 CONTENTS I -Item Subject Page No. Continuation of the discussion on the survey of Article 2 activities Discussion of the second draft of the final cornrnuniqu6 prepared by the Working Group NATO information policy Terms of reference for the group of three Ministers Discussion of' other matters of common concern in the international situation 6 Extension of non-military co-operation between NATO countries 15 VII. Final comrnuniqud The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. GaetanoMakino. and Mr L. B. Pearson NATO SECRET -NATO SECRET C-~(56)23 I. CONTIfiTUATION OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE SURVEY OF ARTICLE 2 ACTIVITBS 1, Mr. THEOTOKY (~reece)thought that the Council should concentrate its attention on three distinct fields. First, in the military field, it should be noted that Stalinist principles were still honoured in Russia and that the military threat therefore retained its absolute priority, Hence it was important to maintain the defence effort, cven if it were supposed that a real change in Soviet policy was likely. 2. In the political field; the problems were of two types, First there was the problem of Atlantic policy towards the USSR. It was difficult to devise a proced.ure whereby a common Atlantic policy could be pursued, but it should be possible to concert the activities of NATO as Tar as Russia was concerned, and Russia should understand that she was dealing, not merely with a transient figure, but with an enduring concert of nations. 3. Then there was the problem of the policies of the members of the Alliance in regard to one another: where reay or potential conflicts existed it was important to examine them either when they arose or, even better, in advance, so as to create harmony in the ranks of. NATO. For this purpose it might be considerable to set up a co-ordimting body. t 4. Finally, there was the problem of extending comnlitments under Article 2 of the Treaty. No doubt to meet the new trends in Soviet policy it would be desirable to contribute to the economic develo~mcntof the less prosperous countries. It was also true that qven in NATO there were underdeveloped countries which werc alre2.d~called on to make heavy sacrifices in the name of joint defence, and on which it was proposed to hke further demands under Article 2, ' 5. He thought it would be undesirnble to set up a'new body to implement decisions taken under Ai-ticle 2 when other inter- national organizations already existed which werc competent in matters of economic and technical aid. That said, it was up to NATO to draw up under Article 2 an order of priority whereby aid to the less prosperous NATO countries would take priority over The Committee of Three: from left to right, Mr Halvard Lange, Prof. GaetanoMakino. that which should be givenand Mr toL. B.other Pearson underdeveloped countries. 6. Mr. von BRENTANO (~crmny)said that he could support the draft resolution submit tea by the Italian Delegation. He proposed a drafting amendment which was accepted by the Italian Minister of' Foreign Affairs. 7. The COUNCIL: took note of the statements by the Greek and Ge-n Foreign Ministers. NATO SECRET NATO SECRET C-R(56123 . NATO CONFIDFJTTXAL 11, DISCUS3ION OF THE XXOKD DPAZ'T OF TEE FINAS; CO~ll~IQ,UE PRZPARED BY THE WOFKING GROUP Document:. FC,/~ 8. There was discussion of the wording of the paragraph of the above document, dealing with ways of improving political c.onsultation among members of NATO, and of the paragraph of the document dealing with methods of implementing Article 2 of the North h tlant ic Treaty. 9, The COUNCIL: invited the Vorking Group on the Final ~omrfluni~ue to -paepare a third draft in the light of the observations made by Ministers during the co,urse of discussion. I >. NATO CONFIDENTIAL I 11, NATO INFORnAAT ION POL ICY Reference document: ~-~(56)18. 1 : 10. Mr. PEARSON (~annda)underlined the importance of information and propaganda within the general field of NATO' s activities, The NATO countries had not yet succeeded in informing their public opinion, let alone that of the neutral or uncommitted nations, of the imjportance of the part played by NATO in preserving freedom. This was not an easy task for the best information could not be fully effective &less the policies and acticns to which it related provided a sound foundation for it, He thought that most NATO governments had not yet recognised the part to be played by NATO as an international i~orrna'tionagency. This was unfortunate because the efficiency of natioml information was impaired by lack of co-ordination on the international plane, NATO should therefore consider what further progress could be made with a view to co-ordinating or centralising to a greater degree inTormaJ~ionon all matters of common interest. Of primary significance in this field was the fact that the danger of Themilitary Committee aggression of Three: from had left tonot right, yet Mr disappeared.Halvard Lange, Prof.StressGaetanoMakino. should also be laid %?on the interdependenceand Mr L. B. Pearson of all NATO nations and that weakness wi'chin '~hk smallest or these na Lions was a weakness in the entire Alliance. Co-ordination of information was also necessary in the case of disputes between NATO nations.- 11. In conclusion, NATO's action in the field of information co,uld be greatly irnpoved if it devoted more resources to this end. If the desire Lo co-ordinate information activities and $0 encourage them weye increased and if closer contact were maintained between the various national informat ion agencies and NATO, much more could be achieved. 12, Mr. LmGE (~orwa~)suggested! that public opinion might be able to ramiliarise itself better with what NATO did if', occasionally, a meetin? of' Foreign Ministers were held in a BAT0 c7pital other than Pai71s. In order to limit expenditure, such mee-t-ings rriight be held on a restricted basis as regards the size of delegations. UATO SECRET NAT.0 SECRET -C-R( 56)23 --NATO CONFIDENTIAL 13... THE COUNCIL: (1) took note of document C-~(56)18; (2) took note of the statement by the ~nnrrdianRepresen- tative recorded in paragraphs 10 and 11 above; (3) invited the Permanent council to consider the suggestion put forward ,by the Norwegica Rapresentative recorded in parz.graph 12 above, NATO SECRET IV. TERMS OF REFERENCE FAR THE GROUP OF THREE MINISTERS- 14. There was general agreement thct certain pcrcgrqhs of a draft term of recerence for the "three wise men" could be in- corpor~ted~inthe final communique'. It was zlso ^greed that the points dea3.t with in the first two paragraphs of the draft were covered in the draft alre~dysubmitted by the Working Group on the Final ~ornrnuniqud, 15. Mr. LANGE orwa way). thought that the Council should reflect very sdriously before deciding to appoint a Ministerial .