Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Occasional Paper The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens Occasional Paper, April 2017, updated August 2017 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies ii The Consequences of Brexit for European Security and Defence About RUSI The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) is the world’s oldest and the UK’s leading defence and security think tank. Its mission is to inform, influence and enhance public debate on a safer and more stable world. RUSI is a research-led institute, producing independent, practical and innovative analysis to address today’s complex challenges. Since its foundation in 1831, RUSI has relied on its members to support its activities. Together with revenue from research, publications and conferences, RUSI has sustained its political independence for 185 years. London | Brussels | Nairobi | Doha | Tokyo | Washington, DC About the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a non-profit German political foundation committed to the advancement of public policy issues in the spirit of the basic values of social democracy through research, education, and international cooperation. The FES, headquartered in Berlin and Bonn, has thirteen regional offices throughout Germany and maintains an international network of offices in more than 100 countries. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s), and do not reflect the views of RUSI, FES or any other institution. Published in 2017 by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – No-Derivatives 4.0 International Licence. For more information, see <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>. RUSI Occasional Paper, April 2017, updated August 2017. ISSN 2397-0286 (Online). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Royal United Services Institute 44 Charlotte Street for Defence and Security Studies London W1T 2NR Whitehall United Kingdom London SW1A 2ET +44 (0) 207 612 1900 United Kingdom [email protected] +44 (0)20 7747 2600 www.feslondon.org.uk www.rusi.org RUSI is a registered charity (No. 210639) Contents Executive Summary v I. Justice and Home Affairs 1 Intelligence and Information-Sharing Platforms 2 The UK’s Debate on the Use of EU Intelligence-Sharing Platforms 5 II. The EU Common Security and Defence Policy 9 Background 9 The UK’s Role in the CSDP 10 III. EU Defence Policy Post-Brexit 13 What Will the UK Lose Post-Brexit? 13 How Could the UK Still Participate and Have Influence? 15 What Might the EU Lose if the UK Cannot or Does Not Participate in the CSDP? 20 IV. Indications of the EU’s Future Plans 23 Appendix 1: UK Contributions to CSDP Military Operations 2007–15 27 Appendix 2: UK Contributions to CSDP Civilian Operations 2007–15 29 Executive Summary N THE WAKE of the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which formally began the UK’s exit process from the EU, this paper will examine some of the ways that the UK contributes Ito EU security in justice and home affairs, especially in relation to counterterrorism, and through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In terms of justice and home affairs, the paper will focus specifically on the EU’s current intelligence and information-sharing platforms, especially those involved in counterterrorism. On the CSDP, it will look at the EU’s defence agencies and CSDP missions and operations. The objective is to understand some of the ways the UK contributes in these areas and what the UK might potentially lose post-Brexit, as well as what the EU might lose, if negotiations result in the UK withdrawing from participation in EU security structures. The paper will also identify some areas of mutual interest where continued cooperation between the UK and the EU post-Brexit may be desirable. This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the many ways in which the UK contributes to EU security structures or the benefits it gains from involvement in these structures. As such, it does not examine the UK’s role in issues such as anti-money laundering or criminal asset freezing, nor does it discuss the UK’s role in platforms such as Eurojust or the European Anti- Fraud Office (L’office européen de lutte antifraude, or OLAF). Rather, it looks only at some of the contributions that the UK makes, focusing in particular on counterterrorism. The paper is based on a review of the existing academic literature, government and EU policy documents and legislation, and information from law enforcement. It stemmed from a December 2016 workshop jointly organised by RUSI and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). The objective was to discuss the consequences of Brexit for European security and defence. During the workshop, parliamentarians and experts from the UK and Germany shared their views and insights on what the EU and the UK might lose with a British departure from CSDP and joint institutions such as Europol. Below are some of the key findings from the research: Justice and Home Affairs 1. The UK participates in several EU information-sharing and law enforcement cooperation mechanisms. These include: Europol, the EU’s law enforcement agency; the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), an IT system that helps law enforcement share real-time alerts on people of interest;1 the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), which allows the secure exchange of information on criminal convictions between member states;2 the Passenger Name Record (PNR) 1. Home Office, ‘Second Generation Schengen Information System (SISII) General Information’, 13 April 2015. 2. European Commission, ‘ECRIS (European Criminal Records Information System)’, last updated 24 November 2016, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-e-justice/ecris/index_ vi The Consequences of Brexit for European Security and Defence Directive, which mandates EU-wide transfer of passenger data from airlines to member states’ authorities, including information such as travel dates, travel itineraries and contact details;3 and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), which sits within the European External Action Service (EEAS) and provides strategic analysis to the high representative/vice president based on contributions from member states’ intelligence and security services.4 The UK was due to connect to the Prüm framework – under which the police forces of EU member states will be able to automatically share DNA, fingerprint and vehicle registration data – in 2017;5 although the future of this is now in doubt due to Brexit.6 2. There are clearly benefits, for both the UK and the EU, of participating in these mechanisms. EU INTCEN (previously SITCEN) and the PNR directive were both established with strong British support. Both the UK and the EU have benefited from the UK’s involvement in Europol. The UK is among the ten largest contributors of Europol staff.7 Moreover, according to Europol chief Rob Wainwright, himself British, around 40% of Europol’s cases have a ‘British dimension’,8 highlighting the degree to which the UK not only provides information, but also benefits in terms of national security. The Prüm system has also contributed to national security by aiding in the identification of terrorist suspects – it helped to identify Salah Abdeslam as a suspect in the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015.9 3. There is little precedent for cooperation between these EU mechanisms and countries that are both outside the EU and Schengen. Europol cooperates with various non-EU countries under both strategic agreements and operational agreements, although these are separate from the information-sharing mechanisms among EU states. The EU has strategic agreements with Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.10 The agreement with Russia states that there will be cooperation through ‘exchange of strategic and technical information of mutual interest ... exchange of law enforcement experience ... exchange of legislation, manuals, technical literature and other law ... [and] training’.11 Operational agreements, en.htm>, accessed 30 March 2017. 3. European Commission, ‘Passenger Name Record (PNR)’, <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what- we-do/policies/police-cooperation/information-exchange/pnr_en>, accessed 30 March 2017. 4. European Union Delegation to the United Nations – New York, ‘Factsheet on EU Intelligence Analyses Center (INTCEN)’, 5 February 2015, <http://eu-un.europa.eu/factsheet-on-eu- intelligence-analyses-center-intcen/>, accessed 30 March 2017. Note that INTCEN does not have any collection capability. 5. Rob Merrick, ‘Theresa May “Defies Brexit Vote” and Opts into New EU-Wide Security Measures’, The Independent, 1 November 2016. 6. Hansard, House of Commons, ‘Exiting the EU: New Partnership’, Commons Debate, 17 June 2014, Column 1226. 7. Europol, ‘Consolidated Annual Activity Report 2015’, 12 May 2016, p. 49. 8. Philip Oltermann, ‘Germany Fears UK May Quit Spy Programme Because of Brexit’, The Guardian, 6 November 2016; Giulia Paravicini, ‘Europol First in Line for Life after Brexit’, Politico, 8 October 2016. 9. HM Government, ‘The UK’s Cooperation with the EU on Justice and Home Affairs, and on Foreign Policy and Security Issues’, p. 6. 10. Europol, ‘Strategic Agreements’, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements/strategic- agreements>, accessed 30 March 2017.