----JOHN R. SEARLE----- - A TAXONOMY ()II' rr.r.oCO'l'IONi\HY i\C:TS a prcdictiou, and ouc a promise? 111 order t:o develop higher order ge 11 · era, we must first know how the species promise, prcclictio11, report, etc., differ one from another. When one attempts to answer that ques­ A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts tion one discovers that there are several quite different principles of distinction; that is, there are different kinds of differences that enable us to say that the force of this utterance is different from the force of that utterance. For this reason the metaphor of force in the expression "illocutionary force" is misleading since it suggests that different illo­ I. Introduction cutionary forces occupy different positions on a single continuum of The primary purpose of this paper is to develop a reasoned classifica­ force. What is actually the case is that there are several distinct criss­ tion of illocutionary acts into certain basic categories or types. It is to crossing continua. A related source of confusion is that we are inclined answer the question: How many kinds of illocutionary acts are there? to confuse illocutionary verbs with types of illocutionary acts. We are Since any such attempt to develop a taxonomy must take into account inclined, for example, to think that where we have two nonsynonymous Austin's classification of illocutionary acts into his five basic categories illocutionary verbs they must necessarily mark two different kinds of il­ of verdictive, expositive, exercitive, behabitive, and commissive, a second locutionary acts. In what follows, I shall try to keep a clear distinction purpose of this paper is to assess Austin's classification to show in what between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary acts. Illocutions are a part respects it is adequate and in what respects inadequate. Furthermore, of language as opposed to particular languages. Illocutionary verbs are since basic semantic differences are likely to have syntactical consequences, always part of a particular language: French, German, English, or what· a third purpose of this paper is to show how these different basic illocu­ not. Differences in illocutionary verbs are a good guide but by no means tionary types are realized in the syntax of a natural language such as a sure guide to differences in illocutionary acts. English. It seems to me there are (at least) twelve significant dimensions of In what follows, I shall presuppose a familiarity with the general pat­ variation in which illocutionary acts differ one from another and I shall tern of analysis of illocutionary acts offered in such works as Austin, - all too briskly - list them: How to Do Things with Words, Searle, Speech Acts, and Searle, "Aus­ 1. Differences in the paint (~r purpose) of the (type of) act. The point tin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts." 1 In particular, I shall pre­ or purpose of an order can be specified by saying that it is an attempt suppose a distinction between the illocutionary force of an utterance to get the hearer to do something. The point or purpose of a description and its propositional content as symbolized as F (p). The aim of this is that it is a representation (true or false, accurate or inaccurate) of paper then is to classify the different types of F. how something is. The point or purpose of a promise is that it is an undertaking of an obligation by the speaker to do something~ These IL Different Types of Differences between Different Types of differences correspond to the essential conditions in my analysis of illo­ 2 Illocutionary Acts cutionary acts in Speech Acts. Ultimately, I believe, essential condi· tions form the best basis for a taxonomy, as I shall attempt to show. Any taxonomical effort of this sort presupposes criteria for distinguish­ It is important to notice that the terminology of "point" or "purpose" ing one (kind of) illocutionary act from another. What are the criteria is not meant to imply, nor is it based on the view, that every illocution· by which we can tell that of three actual utterances one is a report, one ary act has a definitionally associated perlocutionary intent. For many, 1 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); perhaps most, of the most important illocutionary acts, there is no es­ J. R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (London: Cam­ sential perlocutionary intent associated by definition with the cone- bridge University Press, 1969); and J. R. Searle, "Austin on Locutionary and Illocu· tionary Acts," Philosophical Review, 1968. ' Searle, Speech Acts, chap. 3. 344 345 John R. Searle A TAXONOMY ()Ii' 11.1.0C UTIONAl\Y ACTS sponding verb, e.g., statements and promises are not by definition at­ fcrence in direction of fit. The delc tive's list has the word-to-world tempts to produce perlocutionary effects in hearers. direction of fit (as do statements, descriptions, assertions, aml explana­ The point or purpose of a type of illocution I shall call its illocution­ tions); the shopper's list has the world-to-word direction of fit (as do ary point. Illocutionary point is part of but not the same as illocutionary requests, commands, vows, promises) . I represent the word-to-world force. Thus, for example, the illocutionary point of a request is the direction of fit with a downward arrow thus ! and the world-to-word same as that of a command: both are attempts to get hearers to do direction of fit with an upward arrow thus j. Direction of fit is always a something. But the illocutionary forces are clearly different. In general, consequence of illocutionary point. It would be very elegant if we could one can say that the notion of illocutionary force is the resultant of sev­ build our taxonomy entirely around this distinction in direction of fit, eral elements of which illocutionary point is only one, though, I believe, but though it will figure largely in our taxonomy, I am unable to make the most important one. it the entire basis of the distinctions. 2. Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world. 3. Differences in expressed psychological states. A man who states, Some illocutions have as part · of their illocutionary point to get the explains, asserts, or claims that p expresses the belief that p; a man who words (more strictly, their propositional content) to match the world, promises, vows, threatens, or pledges to do a expresses an intention to others to get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the for­ do a; a man who orders, commands, requests H to do A expresses a mer category, promises and requests are in the latter. The best illustra­ desire (want, wish) that H do A; a man who apologizes for doing A tion of this distinction I know of is provided by Miss Anscombe.3 Sup­ expresses regret at having done A; etc. In general, in the performance pose a man goes to the supermarket with a shopping list given him by of any illocutionary act with a propositional content, the speaker ex­ his wife on which are written the words "beans, butter, bacon, and presses some attitude, state, etc., to that propositional content. Notice bread." Suppose as he goes around with his shopping cart selecting that this holds even if he is insincere, even if he does not have the belief, these items, he is followed by a detective who writes down everything desire, intention, regret, or pleasure which he expresses, he nonetheless he takes. As they emerge from the store both shopper and detective expresses a belief, desire, intention, regret, or pleasure in the perform- will have identical lists. But the function of the two lists will be quite . ance of the speech act. This fact is marked linguistically by the fact that different. In the case of the shopper's list, the purpose of the list is, it is linguistically unacceptable (though not self-contradictory) to con­ so to speak, to get the world to match the words; the man is supposed join the explicit performative verb with the denial of the expressed to make his actions fit the list. In the case of the detective, the pur­ psychological state. Thus one cannot say "I state that p but do not believe pose of the list is to make the words match the world; the man is sup­ that p," "I promise that p but I do not intend that p," etc. Notice that posed to make the list fit the actions of the shopper. This can be further this only holds in the first person performative use. One can say, "He demonstrated by observing the. role of a "mistake" in the two cases. If stated that p but didn't really believe that p," "I promised that p but the detective gets home and suddenly realizes that the man bought pork did not really intend to do it," etc. The psychological state expressed chops instead of bacon, he can simply erase the word "bacon" and in the performance of the illocutionary act is the sincerity condition of write "pork chops." But if the shopper gets home and his wife points the act, as analyzed in Speech Acts, chapter 3. out he has bought pork chops when he should have bought bacon, he If one tries to do a classification of illocutionary acts based entirely cannot correct the mistake by erasing "bacon" from the list and writing on different expressed psychological states (differences in the sincerity "pork chops." condition), one can get quite a long way.