Princeton University Press Chapter Title: John Locke’s Democratic Theory Book Title: The Real World of Democratic Theory Book Author(s): Ian Shapiro Published by: Princeton University Press. (2011) Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7s2q9.5 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms Princeton University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Real World of Democratic Theory This content downloaded from 106.207.24.169 on Mon, 06 Apr 2020 08:21:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER ONE John Locke’s Democratic Theory Introduction The democratic tradition has ancient origins, but contemporary for- mulations are generally traced to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s discussion of the general will in The Social Contract , published in 1762. Joseph Schumpeter went so far as to characterize Rousseau’s account as the “classical” theory of democracy, even though his was really a neoclassi- cal view—an eighteenth-century adaptation of the ancient Greek theory in which democracy had meant ruling and being ruled in turn. 1 Many commentators have followed Schumpeter’s lead in treating Rousseau as the father of modern democratic theory, yet it is my argument here that John Locke merits the distinction. He developed the elements of an ac- count of democracy that is more realistic, far-reaching, and appealing than is Rousseau’s, and it has greater continuing relevance than does Rousseau’s to contemporary democratic thinking. Locke conceived of the relationship between people and ruler as one of authorship at a more fundamental level than did Rousseau, placing the authorizing people, acting collectively, at the center of his account of political legitimacy. Yet, unlike Rousseau, he did not reify collective action or the general will in ways that have since been debunked by social choice theorists. Moreover, Locke’s democratic theory had other dimensions as well, ranging over accounts of the moral equality of persons, what we might today describe as a political rather than a metaphysical approach to moral and political disagreement, and a strong defense of majority rule as the wellspring of institutional legitimacy. Some will fi nd my suggestion jarring not so much for the invidious com- parison with Rousseau as for the fact that Locke is typically portrayed as a theorist of individual rights rather than of democracy. In the debate over the ideological origins of the American Revolution, for instance, the Lockean view is contrasted, as a rights-centric one, with a civic republi- can interpretation of the founders’ self-understandings. There has been no suggestion by protagonists on either side of that debate that Locke’s 1 See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1942), pp. 250–68. This content downloaded from 106.207.24.169 on Mon, 06 Apr 2020 08:21:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 40 • Chapter One view was democratic. 2 Add to this the fact that Locke spent almost no time discussing political participation or representative institutions, and the prima facie case for him as a democratic theorist seems decidedly bleak. It is my contention, however, that the deep structure of Locke’s account of politics is profoundly democratic. His understanding of the moral equality of persons lends itself better to democratic than to liberal thinking, even if his is not the “strong democracy” characteristic of the participatory and deliberative democratic traditions. 3 Moreover, as an institutional matter his defense of individual rights is nested in, and sub- ordinate to, majority rule—casting his historical role as a proto–liberal rights theorist in a dubious light. This last contention is not new. As long ago as 1940 Willmoore Kendall noted that Locke’s partiality to majority rule lived in tension with his account of individual rights. 4 Kendall saw this as a defi ciency of Locke’s theory, whereas on my account his defense of majority rule is part of a more sophisticated view of institutional le- gitimacy than Kendall was able to grasp. Another way to put this is that although Locke was no theorist of democratic participation, he was an innovative theorist of democratic legitimacy. Does this mean the historical Locke was a democrat? Up to a point, al- beit a debated one. 5 The gravamen of my claim here has more to do with the logic of his argument than with his intentions, but I mean to show that even they exhibited a democratic hue that has not been fully appre- ciated. As a matter of personal biography we know that Locke evolved over the course of his life: a fairly conservative, or, at any rate, apolitical person in his early adult years—one who gave unrefl ective endorsement to authoritarian political arrangements—he became a political insurrec- 2 For a discussion of this debate, see my “J.G.A. Pocock’s Republicanism and Political Theory: A Critique and Reinterpretation,” Critical Review 4, no. 3 (Spring 1990): 433– 71. 3 Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Califor- nia Press, 1984); James Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Demo- cratic Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). 4 Willmoore Kendall, John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule (1940) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965). 5 See Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Govern- ment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Mark Goldie, “John Locke’s Circle and James II,” Historical Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 557–86; Ellen Wood, “Locke against Democracy: Consent, Representation and Suffrage in the Two Treatises ,” History of Politi- cal Thought 13, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 657–89; Ashcraft, “The Radical Dimensions of Locke’s Political Thought: A Dialogic Essay on Some Problems of Interpretation,” History of Political Thought 13, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 703–71; and Wood, “Radicalism, Capitalism, and Historical Contexts: Not Only a Reply to Richard Ashcraft on John Locke,” History of Political Thought 15, no. 3 (Autumn 1994): 324–72. This content downloaded from 106.207.24.169 on Mon, 06 Apr 2020 08:21:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms John Locke’s Democratic Theory • 41 tionist in Shaftesbury’s circle in the 1670s and after. His political outlook expressed itself mainly in terms of the great issue of the day: whether there is a legitimate right to resist an illegitimate monarch to the point of removing him by force. Locke famously concluded that there is indeed such a right. This argument might be thought to have little consequence for democratic politics, dealing, as it does, with the legitimacy of revo- lution. Moreover, it seems clear that in some respects even the Locke of the 1680s and after distanced himself from the most radical politi- cal movements of his day. Without delving deeply into these historical controversies, I will argue that Locke’s account of the conditions under which revolution is legitimate is nonetheless decidedly democratic in its assumptions, and that the ever-present possibility of legitimate revolution has signifi cant democratic consequences for thinking about day-to-day politics. I begin with an exploration of Locke’s account of three dimensions of human moral equality, where I show that his inclusive view of all human beings as equally God’s property, as intrinsically rational, and as the “au- thors” of the state was advanced for his day and, moreover, exhibited a fundamentally democratic egalitarian outlook. This is followed by a dis- cussion of Locke’s views on toleration and dissent, where I show that, in addition to embracing a comparatively capacious view of toleration for his own day, Locke’s justifi cation for the limits on toleration that he ad- vocated was in some respects akin to the mature John Rawls in his “po- litical, not metaphysical” mode, though Locke’s political, not metaphysi- cal stance turns out on close inspection to be more thoroughly political (and less problematic) than does Rawls’s. This leads to a discussion of Locke’s account of the relations between majority rule and institutional legitimacy, where I argue that Locke’s embrace of majority rule was less starry-eyed than that of subsequent democratic theorists, but that it was by the same token more attractive given the realities of politics in plural- ist societies. Human Moral Equality The fi rst and most basic sense in which we are equal, for Locke, is as God’s property. Here we need to elucidate both the senses in which we are equal and those in which we are God’s property, since both turn out to be relevant to subsequent democratic understandings. Starting with the latter, Locke’s view of humans as God’s property is a special case of his workmanship theory by reference to which author- ity, ownership, and even authentic knowledge are all rooted in acts of creative making. This theory was developed as a consequence of Locke’s This content downloaded from 106.207.24.169 on Mon, 06 Apr 2020 08:21:17 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 42 • Chapter One position on the nature and meaning of natural law.