The case for investing in paratransit Strategies for regulation and reform Volvo Research & Educational Foundations This research synthesis summarizes, updates and presents the main messages in the book publication Paratransit in African Cities: operations, regulation and reform, edited by Roger Behrens, CONTENTS Dorothy McCormick and David Mfinanga (Routledge, 2016). Paratransit: the dominant mode in Sub-Saharan cities 4 The synthesis was produced by Gail Jennings and Roger The advantages and disadvantages of paratransit 4 Behrens, in cooperation with the Volvo Research & Educational Foundations. We encourage readers to refer to the book Paratransit: a critical part of the transport mix 6 publication for greater detail on the issues discussed in this Preparing for public transport reform: 8 synthesis, obtainable at https://www.routledge.com/Paratransit- institutional overhaul in-African-Cities-Operations-Regulation-and-Reform/Behrens- McCormick-Mfinanga. Case study: The Lagos Metropolitan Area 8 Transport Authority (LAMATA), Lagos, Nigeria The authors wish to thank the Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF, www.vref.se) for the generous funding Case study: Executive Council of Urban 9 awarded to the Universities of Cape Town, Dar es Salaam and Transport (CETUD), Dakar, Senegal Nairobi to initiate the research projects which formed the Case study: Urban Transport Agency (AGETU), 9 basis of this research. These research projects formed part of a Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire broader research programme conducted by the African Centre of Excellence for Studies in Public and Non-motorised Transport Successful hybridity: planning for both paratransit 10 (ACET, www.acet.uct.ac.za). and formal modes n FEEDER-TRUNK-DISTRIBUTOR MODELS 10 Case study: From comprehensive paratransit 11 CITATION replacement to a planned hybrid model, Jennings, G & Behrens, R (2017) The case for investing in Cape Town, South Africa paratransit strategies for regulation and reform. Volvo Research Case study: Moving from Bus Rapid Transit to 12 and Educational Foundations (VREF). May 2017 Integrated Public Transport, Johannesburg, Layout and design: Colleen Mulrooney South Africa Relatively new paratransit vehicles at a formal rank in Cape Town, South Africa. Credit: Rodger Bosch 2 The case for investing in paratransit 3 The case for investing in paratransit n PEAK-LOPPING 13 We have not included individual references or citations Case study: The University of Cape Town’s fareless in this synthesis which have already been included in student and staff bus service 13 the book publication. Achieving complementarity: finding the right match 14 Additional references n LICENCING 15 Behrens, R, McCormick, D, Orero, R and Ommeh, M (2017) n CONCESSIONING 16 Improving paratransit service: lessons from inter-city n FRANCHISING 17 matatu cooperatives in Kenya. Transport Policy 53 (2017) 79–88 n CONTRACTING 18 Schalekamp, H, McLaren, M and Behrens, R (2017) Working with what we have: 20 Exploring cashless fare collection in the context of urban harnessing the paratransit dividend public transport reform in South Africa. Southern African Transport Conference, 2017 Case study: The Cape Town taxi mapping project 22 Behrens, R. Hawver, H, Birungi, C and Zuidgeest, M Case study: The potential for cashless fare 22 (2017). Case study investigation of unscheduled feeder collection in South Africa and trunk service relationships in Cape Town. Southern Case study: SMS-based ticketing platform in 23 African Transport Conference, 2017 Nairobi, Kenya Seftel, L (2016) Moving from BRT to Integrated Public Case study: Operator development in 24 Transport, Southern African Transport Conference, Cape Town, South Africa Pretoria, 2016 Case study: Learning from the cooperatives in 25 Nairobi, Kenya Summary 26 Minibus-taxi vehicles seldom have spare seating for children. Credit: Rodger Bosch 3 The case for investing in paratransit Paratransit: the dominant mode in Sub-Saharan cities In Sub-Saharan African cities the pressure to provide affordable Where paratransit and formal transportation, and match the needs of the entire and rapidly public transport systems expanding urban population, has placed formal public transport systems under such strain over recent decades that they duplicate services, they are have largely collapsed or disappeared altogether. Paratransit emerged to fill the gap. ‘non-complementary’ and can The appearance of paratransit was seldom the result of a undermine each other’s deliberate policy, but rather, a localized response to growing operations in the competition for numbers of unserved passengers, and a regulatory vacuum that placed few restrictions on entry into this market. passengers. Today paratransit accounts for between 50-98% of passenger trips in Sub-Saharan cities. The advantages Paratransit vehicles are known by and disadvantages different names in different countries: daladalas in Tanzania, danfos in Nigeria, of paratransit matatus in Kenya, trotros in Ghana, Paratransit provides essential services for the majority of urban dwellers, but it is not without its particular challenges and car rapides in Senegal, gbakas in Côte failings. d’Ivoire, chapas in Mozambique, and Small-scale individual ownership enabled paratransit ‘minibus-taxis’ in South Africa. to develop in an adaptive and flexible manner; fares are inexpensive, and the services are flexible enough to rapidly respond to changes in demand and passenger needs. Yet it is 4 The case for investing in paratransit ‘Paratransit’ refers to demand-driven, unscheduled public transport provided by small operators, typically in mini- to medium-sized buses. Paratransit is sometimes called ‘informal’, but operators are not always informal businesses, and they are not necessarily unregulated. precisely this independent nature of paratransit, the multiple individual owners and irregular operations, that makes it difficult for authorities to manage the industry and co-ordinate and plan the network. Demand-responsiveness has its downside. A flexible Evening peak in Cape Town, approach to providing services is often accompanied by unsafe South Africa. The bus and operations, and a disinclination to comply with transport minibus taxi (BMT) lane is policies, traffic safety regulations, and more general legal visible centre right. requirements (such as conditions of employment and the Credit: Rodger Bosch payment of taxes). There are structural incentives to poor customer service and Demand-responsiveness has dangerous paratransit driver behaviour. The target system – where drivers keep whatever remains of the fare revenue its downside. Flexibility is after they have paid the owner for the use of the vehicle, and fuel costs – encourages aggressive competition for passengers, often accompanied speeding, vehicle overcrowding, the ‘fill-and-go’ system, and the provision of poor or no service during off-peak periods and on by unsafe operations, and low-demand routes. a disinclination to comply The paratransit industry is at times a tenuous one, operating and surviving on marginal profits. Managing with transport policies, traffic businesses on a cash-basis and ignoring vehicle depreciation means that vehicles are often kept in service longer than they safety regulations, and more should be. It is common to find vehicles that are old, poorly maintained, and dangerous. general legal requirements, from conditions of employment The paratransit and formal public transport systems are often duplicative and ‘non-complementary’, undermining to paying taxes. each other’s operations and competing for passengers. 5 The case for investing in paratransit through illegal means. Phased BRT may simply displace paratransit to other corridors of a city, and the problem of dealing Paratransit: a with these operators is deferred. Ignoring paratransit operators, or insufficiently engaging with them in finding complementary and inclusive solutions, critical part of ultimately risks transport reform as a whole. As later project phases become increasingly more difficult to negotiate and implement as a result of incumbent resistance, so the risk increases that improvements are not extended beyond the transport demonstration corridors. n Secondly, many Sub-Saharan cities currently do not have the institutional capacity to implement BRT. This has led, mix for example, to significant errors in the estimation of capital costs, operating subsidy requirements, and implementation timeframes. Across Africa, transport reform is high on the agenda as cities confront the multiple challenges of congestion, pollution, long commutes, high road crash and fatality rates, transport costs – to users and service providers – and inequitable access to and allocation of public resources. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is the most commonly proposed intervention. With notable exceptions in West Africa, the most popular reform initiative is that of phased (corridor-by-corridor), comprehensive Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) implementation – influenced by this mode’s widely acclaimed successes in public transport improvement in Latin American cities. An anticipated outcome of BRT is that it will replace paratransit, corridor by corridor. The initial intention of most BRT initiatives is to replace paratransit services, first by corporatizing incumbent operators, then through their phased incorporation into contracted, BRT-operating companies as part of an integrated network. The vision is that once all BRT corridors are constructed, the majority of the city would fall within