Fordham Law Review Volume 75 Issue 4 Article 3 2007 Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law Caroline Mala Corbin Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1965 (2007). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law Cover Page Footnote Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. B.A., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Michael Dorf, Elizabeth Emens, and Kent Greenawalt for their extensive and insightful comments. I also thank the members of the Columbia Associates Workshop, particularly Hoi Kong and Olati Johnson. Finally, a special thank you to Michael Cheah for his first-rate editing. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol75/iss4/3 ARTICLES ABOVE THE LAW? THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW Caroline Mala Corbin* INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1967 I. THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION ............................................... 1973 A. The Scope of the MinisterialExemption ................................. 1973 B. First Amendment Justificationsfor the Ministerial E xemp tion ............................................................................. 1977 1. The Free Exercise Clause ................................................. 1977 2. The Establishm ent Clause ................................................ 1979 3. Freedom of Expressive Association ................................. 1981 II. CRITIQUE OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION ................................................................... 1981 A. The Church Property Cases ................................................... 1985 B. Religious Institutions Versus Religious Individuals ............... 1987 C. The Change in Paradigm........................................................ 1990 1. Separationism ................................................................... 1990 a. Free Exercise Clause.................................................. 1991 b. Establishment Clause ................................................. 1991 2. The Shift Towards Neutrality .......................................... 1992 a. Establishment Clause ................................................. 1992 b. Free Exercise Clause ................................................. 1994 c. Reaction to the ParadigmShift .................................. 1996 3. The Effect of the Paradigm Shift on the Ministerial E xem ption ....................................................................... 1998 * Associate in Law, Columbia Law School. B.A., Harvard University; J.D., Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Michael Dorf, Elizabeth Emens, and Kent Greenawalt for their extensive and insightful comments. I also thank the members of the Columbia Associates Workshop, particularly Hoi Kong and Olati Johnson. Finally, a special thank you to Michael Cheah for his first-rate editing. 1965 1966 FORDHAM LA W REVIEW [Vol. 75 a. DiscriminationUnder the Free Exercise Clause ....... 1998 b. Resistance to Losing the Free Exercise Justification for the MinisterialExemption .................................... 2001 III. CRITIQUE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JUSTIFICATION ................................................................... 2004 A. ProceduralEntanglement ....................................................... 2006 B. Substantive Entanglement ...................................................... 2009 1. Prim er on Title VII Claim s .............................................. 2010 2. The Risk that Courts Will Substitute Their Judgment for That of Religious Institutions on Matters of Spirituality and Doctrine .................................................................... 20 13 a. Type A Cases: Defendant's Religion Requires D iscrimination ........................................................... 2014 b. Type B Cases: Defendant Offers No Religious Justification............................................................... 2015 c. Type C Cases: Defendant Offers an Objective Religious Justification............................................... 2016 d. Type D Cases: Defendant Offers a Subjective Religious Justification............................................... 2018 3. The Risk that Title VII Remedies Will Lead to E ntanglem ent .................................................................. 2022 C. Entanglement Problems of Applying the Ministerial Exem p tion .............................................................................2026 IV. LIMITATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION JUSTIFICATION ............................................ 2028 A. The Right of Expressive Association ...................................... 2029 B. Religions Without DiscriminatoryMessages ......................... 2031 C. Religions with DiscriminatoryMessages ............................... 2032 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 2038 This Article critiques the constitutional underpinningsof the "ministerial exemption," which grants religious organizations immunity from discrimination suits brought by "ministerial"employees. These employees, who rangefrom parochialschoolteachers to church music directors, cannot assert Title VII race or sex discrimination claims against their religious employers-regardless of whether or not religious belief motivated the discrimination. Lower courts and commentators assert that the right of church autonomy created by the religion clauses requires this result, but the Supreme Court has never blessed (nor rejected) it. This Article argues there is no place for the ministerial exemption under the Supreme Court's current religion clause jurisprudence. The free exercise clause neither guarantees religious organizations autonomy in their internal affairs nor 2007] THE MINISTERIAL EXEMPTION 1967 shields them from neutral laws of general applicability like Title VII. And while the establishment clauseforbids courts from resolving theological or spiritual disputes, this Article rejects the unexplored assumption that adjudicating a Title VII suit requires courts to evaluate a plaintiffs spiritual qualifications. The Article also briefly explores freedom of expressive association as an alternative justification for the ministerial exemption and concludes that, to the extent it applies at all, it only protects those employers whose religious doctrine requires discrimination. INTRODUCTION Consider two sisters. Both want to pursue professional careers where they can do good. One decides to become a public interest attorney, while the other feels called to serve as a minister. Each is an academic superstar and graduates at the top of her respective class. The attorney is rejected from her town's most prestigious public interest law firm because the senior partner does not believe that advocacy is an appropriate field for women. She settles for a job at a public interest firm that purports to be an equal opportunity employer. To her dismay, she soon hits a glass ceiling.' Despite her impressive evaluations, all the best cases and mentoring seem to go to her male colleagues. 2 After she complains to her superiors about the discriminatory treatment, she is fired. Her devout sister encounters similar obstacles. After graduation, her church clarifies its doctrine and declares that ordination is reserved for men only. 3 In order to fulfill her dream of becoming a minister, she reluctantly switches to a church that believes men and women may equally serve God as leaders. Much to her dismay, she encounters a stained glass ceiling. 4 While men who went to school with her win positions at large churches, she 1. Women comprise 17.3% of partners at major law firms and 25% of full professors at ABA-approved law schools. Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Legal Career Prof Is, Women and Attorneys of Color Continue to Make Small Gains at Large Law Firms (Nov. 17, 2005), availableat http://www.nalp.org/press/details.php?id=57; Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Statistical Report of Law School Faculty #6 (2004-05). 2. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and the Profession: The No-Problem Problem, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 1001 (2002) (detailing obstacles for women in the law). 3. Religions that do not permit women to serve as clergy include Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Southern Baptist Convention, Church of the Latter Day Saints, and Orthodox Judaism. See, e.g., Alan Cooperman, Conservative Rabbis Allow Ordained Gays, Same-Sex Unions, Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 2006, at A17 (reporting that Orthodox Jews do not ordain women); Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance, Women as Clergy: When Some Faith Groups Started to Ordain Women, and When Two Denominations Stopped, http://www.religioustolerance.org/femclrgl3.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (listing Roman Catholicism,