The War in Syria: Lessons for the West Editors: Andis Kudors, Artis Pabriks The Centre for East European Policy Studies University of Latvia Press Rīga, 2016 The project was implemented with the support of the European People’s Party (EPP) Group at the European Parliament and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Co-Editors: Andis Kudors, Artis Pabriks Assistant to the editor: Anna Lasmane Authors of the articles: Henri J. Barkey, Māris Cepurītis, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Julian Lindley-French, Malte Gaier, Mehmet Hecan, Michael Kofman, Andis Kudors, Artis Pabriks, Katharina Senge, Liz Wahl, Rafał Zgryziewicz Layout: Ieva Tiltiņa Cover design: Agris Dzilna © Henri J. Barkey, Māris Cepurītis, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Julian Lindley-French, Malte Gaier, Mehmet Hecan, Michael Kofman, Andis Kudors, Artis Pabriks, Katharina Senge, Liz Wahl, Rafał Zgryziewicz, 2016 © The Centre for East European Policy Studies, 2016 ISBN 978-9934-18-119-1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Artis Pabriks Foreword 5 Andis Kudors Introduction 11 Part I: Lessons Learned: European Union Malte Gaier, Katharina Senge The Syrian Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the European Union — A German Perspective 17 Julian Lindley-French Can Europe Apply Grand Strategy to Grand Tragedy? 35 Part II: Lessons Learned: USA Henri J. Barkey The US and the Syrian Experience: Some Lessons 53 Michael Kofman US and Russia in Syria’s War: Cooperation and Competition 65 Part III: Lessons Learned: The Propaganda War Rafal Zgryziewicz Daesh Strategic Communications 89 Liz Wahl Russia’s Propaganda on the War in Syria 109 Part IV: Lessons Learned: The Region and Beyond Māris Cepurītis Russia’s Strategy in Syria: Multiple Aims 129 Osman Bahadir Dincer and Mehmet Hecan Turkey’s Changing Syria Policy: From Desired Proactivism to Reactivism 147 Andis Kudors, Artis Pabriks Conclusion 169 Notes on Authors 173 Foreword FOREWORD Six years ago, when Syrian crisis started nobody believed it would leave such an imprint on EU internal affairs as well as international politics Hundred thousands of migrants and refugees which crossed Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece to look for safety and better life conditions was one of many wake up calls for European societies In 2015, it was a record number of 1 3 million migrants which reached European soil from battered regions of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Africa and elsewhere European countries and EU institutions were not ready to receive these people, administer their arrival, screen them for security reasons and provide with decent living conditions upon arrival In late summer of 2015 Greece, Balkan countries, Hungary and later Austria experienced unprecedented and uncontrolled migration flow across their borders German Chancellor Angel Merkel decided to open German borders to migrants and along with welcoming them announced her famous phrase “Wir Schaffen Das”1 Since than more than a year has passed and the question remains — can Germans or indeed European Union manage this challenge without seriously undermining its unity and security It is timely to analyse all aspects and impact of so called “Migration Crisis” on the European Union and Europe in general Without proper self-criticism it will be very difficult to tailor new political strategies and counter rising populism and advance of authoritarianism One of the major assumptions reader can observe in following articles is that ultimately passivity in international and security policy sometimes is more costly than activity Moreover, it is not correct to call it Migration crisis, since huge migration wave to Europe started as a consequence of lengthy and bloody military conflicts and civil wars Therefore, in broader terms it is crisis of contemporary international order, international and security policies where the EU and the United States as strongest players were unable to deliver meaningful, efficient, and timely answers Since the beginning of the conflict the West clearly declared that dictator Assad “should go” At the same time it failed to propose any realistic way how to remove Assad, create an interim government or to assist opposition to remove Assad No fly zones were introduced despite of Turkish suggestion at a time When Assad crossed the red line drawn by USA President Obama not to use chemical weapons against civilians and opposition, consequences did not follow It further encouraged Assad to use any force to crush his opposition The result is weakening international stability, increasing fragmentation of democratic Western world and unprecedented rise of populism 1 From German — “We make it” 5 The War in Syria: Lessons for the West Who are “losers” and who are “winners” in escalation of Syrian civil war? War in Syria created a huge grey zone of insecurity giving chance to different terrorist organizations to establish themselves It also gave an opportunity for countries like Russia to misuse Western absence to create its own military and political presence in Syria Politics is like water, if there is an empty space it will be filled with it Where Western policies are absent, someone else takes the place Among losers first of all one should mention Syrian people, more than 350,000 lost lives However, politically among losers are also Europeans, their relationship with Turkey was damaged greatly Also the United States prestige suffered during these wars Whereas authoritarian regimes like Russia, Iran, and number of radical organizations are major beneficiaries of Western political confusion and delay to act on international stage For understandable reasons the West was tired of former interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan which did not bring expected result — stability, peace and democracy to these countries Citizenry of democratic Western societies increasingly abandoned military component as a solution to any crisis Simultaneously we became more concerned with decreasing social security and economic prosperity at home after the financial crisis In turn, Assad and his ally Russia understood that apart of political declarations not much will be done against him from the EU or US side While we in the West are increasingly losing our compass and ability to act on the international stage, Russian authoritarian leadership under Putin is grasping the momentum Their goal can be characterized by slogan from Trump’s campaign in US presidential elections — Make Russia (US) Great Again! A legitimate question is — What comprises Great Russia in the minds and souls of current Russian leadership? Assumption would be that Great Russia means some revival of lost empire, either Tsarist or Communist Perhaps some mixture of both Moreover, it would mean to enforce on the West situation where the West would be incapable to make external or even internal political decisions without Russian influence To reach this goal Russian leadership shall not only control its internal affairs with iron fist, but reestablish relative control over territories of former Tsarist or Russian Empire, weaken or possibly assist the dissolution/fragmentation of economic, political, and military competitors like the EU and NATO The assumption is that Russia can be stronger if others are divided and weaker To reach this goal current Russian leadership are using geopolitical, financial, economic, military means It has developed cyber and strategic communication capacity with assistance of its military and state controlled media It attempts to use weakness of open and democratic societies to challenge them from inside by assisting various fake or/ naive NGO’s and movements to shed a doubt on value of their free societies Russia has been openly endorsing Brexit and Trump knowing that both would weaken the West and thus make Russia relatively stronger In other words, as weaker and more divided the West is, as stronger and more influential is Russia At the same time Syria just like Ukraine is a showcase of these ambitions Russians had a clear goal and motivation to keep Assad in power It would grant 6 Foreword to Russia possibility to continue its military presence in Syria and eventually reestablish its leverage in the Middle East Additional success would be to enforce its position on the West by fragmenting our political unity and disabling decision making Western inability to revert the occupation and annexation of Crimea just like occupation of South Ossetia in 2008 war against Georgia gave to Kremlin a reason to believe that it can go further And Russia acted, this time by deploying its Air Force, special operation forces and other combat units in Syria to bolster battered regime of Assad Unfortunately, many leaders in Western Europe were taken by surprise At home in Russia, Kremlin leadership presented themselves as major fighters of growing terrorism ready to combat ISIS in the region It must be noted that skillfully using strategic communication Russia established its perception as World power at home as well as requested its place at decision table in the West Number of Western leaders publicly acknowledged that Syrian conflict cannot be solved without taking Russia on board It also increased support in number of European countries to lift imposed sanctions on Russia despite the fact that no changes of Russian aggressive behavior in international politics can be observed Minsk agreement is not implemented, Crimea remains annexed, Donbas is under control of Russian sponsored guerrillas, Russian military presence is there, Normandy format talks are abandoned, military sable rattling continues in Russian western, southern and northern districts