The University of Southern Mississippi The Aquila Digital Community Dissertations Spring 5-1-2013 Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command: Johnston, Davis, Hood, and the Atlanta Campaign of 1864 Dennis Blair Conklin II University of Southern Mississippi Follow this and additional works at: https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations Recommended Citation Conklin, Dennis Blair II, "Conflict and Controversy in the Confederate High Command: Johnston, Davis, Hood, and the Atlanta Campaign of 1864" (2013). Dissertations. 574. https://aquila.usm.edu/dissertations/574 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by The Aquila Digital Community. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of The Aquila Digital Community. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The University of Southern Mississippi CONFLICT AND CONTROVERSY IN THE CONFEDERATE HIGH COMMAND: JOHNSTON, DAVIS, HOOD, AND THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 by Dennis Blair Conklin II Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Southern Mississippi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy May 2013 ABSTRACT CONFLICT AND CONTROVERSY IN THE CONFEDERATE HIGH COMMAND: JOHNSTON, DAVIS, HOOD, AND THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 by Dennis Blair Conklin II May 2013 The Union capture of Atlanta on September 2, 1864 all but assured Abraham Lincoln's reelection in November and the ultimate collapse of the Confederacy. This dissertation argues that Jefferson Davis's failure as commander-in-chief played the principal role in Confederate defeat in the war's most pivotal campaign. Davis had not learned three important lessons prior to the campaign season in 1864. First, the president failed to appreciate the benefit of a centralized command, opting instead for a departmental structure that promoted parochialism. Indeed, Joseph E. Johnston, in charge of the Army of Tennessee, was unable to secure assistance from neighboring departmental commanders during the campaign. Second, the president's tendency to allow his personal feelings to affect his decisions regarding strategy and his handling of officers proved disastrous to Confederate chances in the West. Davis permitted his friendship with Braxton Bragg and John Bell Hood to influence his assessment of Johnston as the army's commander. At the same time, the president's antagonistic attitude toward Georgia governor Joseph E. Brown deprived Johnston of an adequate militia force, making Johnston's defense of Georgia more difficult. Further, Davis's long- standing feud with Johnston interfered with his willingness to cooperate with his general as the Federal army pushed toward Atlanta. Finally, Davis's distrust of Johnston led him ii to appoint John Bell Hood to command one of Johnston's corps with instructions that Hood keep the administration apprised of Johnston's performance. The scheme produced unintended consequences when Hood undermined Johnston in an effort to secure command of the army for himself. The dissertation also offers a re-evaluation of Joseph E. Johnston, and challenges the traditional interpretation that casts Johnston as overly cautious and unwilling to engage in offensive action. Additionally, it reassesses John Bell Hood's role in determining the outcome of the campaign. In particular, it argues that historians have been too critical of Hood's handling of the army in the battles around Atlanta. iii COPYRIGHT BY DENNIS BLAIR CONKLIN II 2013 The University of Southern Mississippi CONFLICT AND CONTROVERSY IN THE CONFEDERATE HIGH COMMAND: JOHNSTON, DAVIS, HOOD, AND THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN OF 1864 by Dennis Blair Conklin II A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of The University of Southern Mississippi in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Approved: ___________________________________ Director ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ ___________________________________ Dean of the Graduate School May 2013 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the director of this dissertation, Dr. William K. Scarborough, for his support, advice, and consummate attention to detail. I would also like to thank Dr. Susannah J. Ural for her insightful commentary and her ability to help me look at the project from a broader perspective. Special thanks go to both Dr. Scarborough and Dr. Ural for their patience despite my many episodes of anxiety attacks. I could not have completed the task without their guidance. Additionally, I need to thank Dr. Kyle F. Zelner for the invaluable assistance he has provided during the course of my graduate career at The University of Southern Mississippi. Dr. Phyllis Jestice also warrants thanks for all of the support she has given me over the years and for her editorial help on the current project. I want to thank Dr. Andrew Wiest for his advice and friendship as well. Finally, I must thank my wife, Donnelle Conklin, for her editorial input, her assistance in producing the maps for the dissertation, and most importantly for putting up with me all these years. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................................iii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..............................................................................................vi CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................1 II. STRUCTURAL DAMAGES....................................................................40 III. REORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICER CORPS:A SPY IS BORN.....97 IV. SPRING PLANS: THE ABSENCE OF A UNIFIED VISION...............130 V. DALTON TO ADAIRSVILLE: MAPS, MILITIA AND MANEUVER...........................................................................................171 VI. CONTROVERSY AT CASSVILLE.......................................................225 VII. CASSVILLE TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE: JOHNSTON'S REMOVAL..............................................................................................272 VIII. WITH DRAWN SABERS FLASHING IN THE LIGHT.......................329 IX. CONCLUSION........................................................................................369 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................381 v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 1. Johnston's Map of Dalton....................................................................................180 2. Henry Clayton's Map of Dalton...........................................................................181 3. Campaign Map of Dalton.....................................................................................183 4. Clayton's Map of Kennesaw Mountain Area.......................................................184 5. Polk's Map of Kennesaw Mountain Area............................................................185 6. Map of Dalton – Ray's Gap..................................................................................187 7. Battle of Resaca...................................................................................................214 8. Campaign Map – Resaca to Cassville..................................................................221 9. Cassville Campaign Map.....................................................................................234 10. Johnston's Planned Attack...................................................................................239 11. View From Hood's Position Toward the Canton Road........................................245 12. View From the Canton Road Toward Hood's Position........................................246 13. Walter Morris Map..............................................................................................259 14. Wilbur Kurtz Map................................................................................................261 15. Orlando Poe Map.................................................................................................263 16. Campaign From the Etowah to the Chattahoochee..............................................277 17. Pickett's Mill, May 28..........................................................................................288 18. Little Pumpkin Vine Creek..................................................................................289 19. Operations on the Chattahoochee........................................................................308 20. Battle of Peachtree Creek.....................................................................................343 21. Battle of Bald Hill................................................................................................356 iv 22. Campaign Map South of the Chattahoochee.......................................................362 23. Battle of Ezra Church..........................................................................................363 vii 1 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In 1864 three long years of fighting had not yielded a victor in America's Civil War. Despite the imbalance in manpower and industrial productivity that favored the North, the Confederacy still fielded strong and capable armies in both of the major theaters of operation: Virginia and