CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS An ETH Center Vol. 2 • No. 5 •January 2007 BIOLOGICAL RISKS: PROTECTION FROM PANDEMICS AND BIOTERRORISM Scenarios for natural outbreaks or intentional dissemination of microorganisms that can cause infec- tious diseases are currently subject to intense political debate. In formulating strategies for defense against biological risks, most states pursue a variety of approaches depending on the hazard: While the security services focus on bioterrorism, the health sector concentrates on naturally occurring infectious diseases. A comprehensive approach would not only be more cost-effective, but would also provide a greater degree of political sustainability. no indications, however, that this circle of states has significantly expanded in the past 20 years. The likelihood of industrialized democracies using biological weapons is low. The Biologi- cal and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 outlaws the production, storage, or acquisition of biological weapons by signa- tory state parties. Violations of its norms, which ban state use of bioweapons, would entail at least a considerable loss of face, and possibly international ostracism. On the other hand, these states already have other means at their disposal for providing secu- ABC-excercise in Rieti, Italy Max Rossi / Reuters rity, and do not depend on B-weapons for the protection of their populations. However, The letters laced with anthrax spores that occurring naturally or deliberately relea- what is missing from the BTWC so far is an were delivered to US recipients five years sed, poses complex challenges to politics effective monitoring and verification mecha- ago, in the aftermath of the 11 September and modern society. Protective measures nism. The Convention therefore cannot pro- 2001 attacks, killed five individuals and gave against a triple threat – emanating from vide reliable guarantees that states are not rise to thousands of copycat pranks world- states, non-state actors, and natural ha- engaged in secret research programs, or that wide, as well as hysterical, but momentous zards – must be planned and executed. know-how and material will not be passed reactions from politicians. Furthermore, the Furthermore, many of these measures are on from states into the hands of terrorists. destructive outbreaks of foot-and-mouth interdisciplinary in nature and impinge on It is assumed that authoritarian states with disease, mad cow disease, and previously many different policy fields, government a pre-existing military-industrial complex unknown viruses such as SARS and H5N1 agencies, and private institutions, necessi- that feel exposed to an existential threat are have created widespread awareness of the tating considerable coordination efforts. most likely to be motivated to develop secret dangers emanating from microorganisms. B-weapons programs and to choose the biological option as an asymmetric counter- In fact, the challenge is an old one that A triple threat strategy. societies over the centuries have learned to States: To assess the extent and quality of deal with. However, three developments of states’ bioweapons programs is a difficult Non-state actors: The threat from bioterro- our age add a new dimension to the risks undertaking. First of all, the distinction bet- rism is a highly controversial one, due to the from biological hazards: the increasing ween defensive and offensive research pro- dearth of historical data and the very limited mobility of humans, animals, and goods grams is a blurry one, and secondly, many number of instances of premeditated disse- due to globalization; rapid progress in the of the components required are suited mination attempts. Some voices warn that life sciences; and the intensification of glo- for both civilian and military applications biological weapons are becoming easier to bal terrorism as well as indications that (so-called dual-use goods). Current intel- produce and proliferate because of the rapid elements of the terrorist al-Qaida network ligence estimates assume that a small spread of biotechnical goods, advances in the have attempted to acquire biological wea- number of states continue to maintain of- life sciences, and the expansion of many na- pons. The danger from pathogens, whether fensive bio-weapons programs. There are tional biodefense programs. They also point © 2007 Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich 1 CSS Analyses in Security Policy Vol. 2 • No. 5 •January 2007 out that there has been increasing interest Examples of biological risks by individual extremist groups in the use of biological weapons as part of a general trend State B-weapons programs towards “mass casualty” terrorism. Difficult to assess: Soviet program was dramatically underestimated, Iraqi activities overes- timated. Other, more skeptical voices point out that Various sources assume the existence of between 6 and 12 active state programs. terrorist groups would hardly be able to Non-state actors and B-weapons carry out the envisaged large-scale and complex catastrophic attacks without state 1984: The Rajneesh cult contaminates a salad bar in Oregon with salmonellae support. Indeed, there is a tendency to 1990–1994: The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult tries unsuccessfully to carry out an attack using anthrax and botulinum toxin. underestimate the know-how, procurement activities, and organizational resources 1999–2001: Failed attempts by al-Qaida to procure anthrax spores and to set up a required for the production and control- laboratory. led dispersal of biological weapons. These 2001: After 11 September 2001, an unknown perpetrator mails out letters containing wea- obstacles, together with the very low num- ponized anthrax (labeled the “Amerithrax” case by the FBI). The series of attacks kills five people – the only victims to die of a bioterrorist attack since 1900. ber of attempted attacks to date, suggest that non-state actors have other more effi- Influenza pandemics over the past century cient and conventional methods at their dis- 1918: The Spanish Flu (H1N1) kills between 80 and 100 million humans worldwide. posal of killing large numbers of people. 1957: The Asian Flu (H2N2) claims between one and four million victims. 1968: About 750,000 people die of the Hong Kong Influenza (H3N2). Nevertheless, when weighing the pros and cons of different tactics, terrorists are not sequences on its own. The situation would transfers of expertise and/or material from necessarily concerned with the number of likely be compounded by critical psycholo- high-security laboratories. An exaggerated casualties that can be caused by biological gical and economic effects such as wide- threat perception can lead to questiona- weapons. Even small-scale attacks using spread uncertainty, absences from the ble political prioritization. Expertise and “simple” pathogens and delivery systems workplace, restrictions on trade and travel, funding are provided for national secu- can cause great psychological, social, and and goods shortages. The World Bank esti- rity purposes, at the expense of the health economic damage. As illustrated by the mates that an influenza pandemic would sector and research into natural infectious anthrax letters (including the fake ones) in cost the global economy about US$800 bil- diseases and their respective vaccines. autumn of 2001, attacks involving biological lion per year. pathogens generate huge public attention. This factor, combined with the invisibility of One-sided focus on national Challenges of an “all-hazards” the pathogenic threat, may carry the risk of biodefense approach causing a mass panic, the consequences of The US example demonstrates the unin- When drafting policies for dealing with which might be more grievous than those of tended side-effects arising from a one- biological risks, it makes sense to follow an the attack itself. sided focus of national biodefense on un- “all-hazards” approach that is designed for likely catastrophic bioterrorism scenarios. comprehensive protection of the popula- Naturally occurring infectious diseases: Since 9/11, the US has been expanding tion, irrespective of the nature of the threat. Worldwide, naturally occurring infectious its (partially secret) biodefense program An inclusive understanding of the problem diseases are the most widespread cause in the framework of a narrow program makes it easier to focus on synergies in- of death in humans, killing more than 14 for homeland security. While the related stead of a trade-off between the partners million people annually, according to the civilian expenditures in 2001 amounted and sectors involved. Apart from the activi- World Health Organization (WHO). This to only US$417 million, that figure had in- ties of the intelligence services and certain figure does not include the potential effects creased to an estimated US$7.6 billion in police and military responsibilities, most of of an influenza pandemic. Such a pandemic 2005. At the same time, transparency and the precautionary measures and resources – statistically occurs about once every 25 to openness were diminished in the US bio- especially in the health sector – are intended 30 years, with three waves recorded in the sciences, whose integration into the as protection against deliberate or naturally past century. The WHO points out that since national security strategy had global re- occurring releases of biological pathogens. 1968, the risk of an outbreak has never been percussions on the perception of the alle- The fact that natural