Coercion, Norms and Atrocity: Explaining State Compliance with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Arrest and Surrender Orders Word Count: 92,981 Christopher Kazumi Lamont Submitted for the degree of PhD in Politics Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences Department of Politics University of Glasgow 2 April 2008 © all rights reserved by author Lamont, C. 2008 Abstract State compliance with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) arrest and surrender orders, Article 29(d) and (e) obligations, remains under explored in international criminal tribunal (ICT) scholarship despite the fact compliance with ICTY orders often proved not forthcoming from the states of the former Yugoslavia. This thesis will attempt to identify causal phenomena behind compliance with ICT arrest and surrender orders through an exploration of compliance on the part of the diverse spectrum of states and non-state governing entities across the former Yugoslavia. Because International Relations (IR) scholarship identifies competing causal mechanisms to explain compliance and non-compliance outcomes, which range from a rationalist focus on material incentives and disincentives to norm-centric approaches, there will be an exploration of both ideational and material explanatory variables. Moreover, as mainstream neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories are unable to cope with entities where an autonomous state is not an ontological given, this thesis will be divided into two constituent parts. Part I will address the question of state compliance and include the three state case studies, Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, while Part II will address the question of compliance in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, both of which do not conform to traditional models of the Westphalian state. This thesis will argue that the study of compliance is limited by the state centricity of international law and the rationalist failure to integrate ideational structures into the study of compliance. 2 Lamont, C. 2008 Table of Contents Abstract 2 Table of Contents 3 List of Tables 7 List of Figures 8 Acknowledgements 9 Preface 10 Chapter One -International Criminal Tribunals: the Politics of State Compliance 13 1 Introduction: From Nuremberg and Tokyo to The Hague 13 2 From Law Creation to Law Enforcement 15 2.1 Ad Hoc Justice 18 2.2 Explaining Compliance 19 3 Tribunal Literature: Bridging Theories of International Law and International Relations 22 3.1 Realism and Neorealism: International Justice or Realpolitik? 23 3.2 Liberalism: Tribunal Justice and Democratic Peace 28 3.3 Neoliberal Institutionalism and an Atrocities Regime 29 3.4 The Two Logics 31 3.5 Norms, Rules and Legitimacy 33 3.5.1 The Boomerang Pattern and Spiral Model 34 3.5.2 Compliance and Legitimacy 36 4 Sovereignty Compromised 41 4.1 The Tribunal Regime and State Sovereignty 42 4.2 Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 43 5 Conclusions: Introducing the Case Studies 45 Part I – State Compliance: Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia 47 Chapter Two – Croatia: A Coercive Model for Compliance 48 1 Introduction: Tracing Causal Pathways to Compliance Outcomes 48 2 Domestic Politics of Compliance 51 2.1 State Legitimization 52 2.2 The Domestic Politics of Compliance 1996-1999 54 2.3 The Domestic Politics of Compliance 2000-2006 56 2.3.1 Challenging Article 29 – the Bobetko Crisis 58 2.3.2 From Non-compliance to Compliance 60 3 Constructing International Justice – International Norms and Domestic Politics 61 3.1 The ICTY and Transnational Advocacy Networks 62 3.2 Civil Society: Victims, Veterans and Human Rights NGOs 65 3 Lamont, C. 2008 4 The International Politics of Compliance 67 4.1 Phase I: The US and the ICTY 68 4.1.1 The United States and the Coercive Model 69 4.1.2 European Union Member States and the ICTY 73 4.2 Phase II: Challenging the Tribunal 74 4.2.1 Enforcement Ambiguity and Non-Compliance 75 4.2.2 Article 98: Contradictory Norms 77 4.3 Phase III: Compliance 78 5 Conclusions 79 Chapter Three – Serbia: State Compliance and the Limits of Coercion 81 1 Introduction: The Power of Human Rights? 81 2 Domestic Politics of Compliance 83 2.1 State Legitimization 84 2.1.1 The Domestic Politics of International Institutions 85 2.1.2 State Legitimization and Identity 87 2.1.3 State Legitimization and Ethnicity 87 2.2 Domestic Politics of Compliance 1993-2000 89 2.3 Domestic Politics of Compliance 2000-2006 91 2.3.1 Serbia’s Domestic Non-Compliance Pull 92 2.3.2 Pragmatic Compliance 96 3 Constructing International Justice – International Norms and Domestic Politics 97 3.1 The ICTY and Transnational Advocacy Networks 99 3.2 Civil Society: Human Rights NGOs and the Ethno-Nationalization of Civil Society 101 4 International Politics of Compliance 103 4.1 Phase I: From Pariah State to Peace Partner 103 4.2 Phase II: The Kosovo Crisis and War with the West 106 4.3 Phase III: The US, EU and Coercing Compliance 109 4.3.1 Explaining Compliance and Rationalizing Non-compliance 110 4.3.2 Ratko Mladić and EU Conditionality 112 5 Conclusions 113 Chapter Four – Macedonia: Voluntary Compliance 115 1 Introduction 115 2 Domestic Politics of Compliance 118 2.1 State Legitimization: Independence, Insecurity and the UN 120 2.2 The 2001 Conflict and Ohrid: A Limited War 122 2.2.1 The Ohrid Framework Agreement 124 2.2.2 Ohrid and External Actors 125 2.3 Nationalist Mobilization in Post-Ohrid Macedonia 126 2.4 Nationalist Mobilization and the ICTY 127 2.5 The Boškoski and Tarčulovski Transfers 129 3 Construction International Justice – International Norms and Domestic Politics 130 3.1 The ICTY and Transnational Advocacy Networks 131 3.2 Civil Society: Victims, Veterans and NGOs 132 4 International Politics of Compliance 133 4.1 Regional Insecurity 134 4.2 The United States, NATO and Compliance 136 4.3 The United States and Ljube Boškoski 138 4.4 Compliance and the European Union 138 4.5 Explaining Compliance: Macedonia, Ohrid, NATO and the EU 140 4 Lamont, C. 2008 5 Conclusion 142 Part II – Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 144 Chapter Five – Bosnia-Herzegovina: Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 145 1 Introduction 145 2 Contextualizing Compliance in Post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina 149 2.1 BiH under International Administration 151 2.1.1 Powers of the OHR 152 2.1.2 Internationalization of the Bosnian State 154 2.2 Rules of the Road: The ICTY as Bosnia’s War Crimes Supreme Court? 154 2.3 A State within a State? The Creation of a Dual Entitied State 156 3 The Domestic Politics off Compliance 158 3.1 Entity Level Compliance 159 3.1.1 The Republika Srpska 160 3.1.2 RS Domestic Politics of Compliance 161 3.1.3 The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 162 3.2 Croatia and Bosnian Croat Compliance 165 4 Constructing International Justice under Diffuse Sovereignty 165 5 Compliance and International Organizations 166 5.1 NATO: IFOR, SFOR and EUFOR 167 5.2 IFOR’s Failure to Arrest ICTY Suspects 168 5.3 Transition to Law Enforcement 172 5.4 Compliance and the OHR 174 6 International Criminal Law Enforcement as Capacity Building 176 7 Conclusions 177 Chapter Six – United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo: International Justice in an International Protectorate 180 1 Introduction: Compliance in an International Protectorate 180 2 Contextualizing Compliance 183 2.1 Creating UNMIK 184 2.2 Challengers to UNMIK 186 2.3 UNMIK Consultative Bodies 189 2.4 Institutional Structure of UNMIK 190 2.5 Kosovo’s Provisional Self-Government 192 3 The Politics of Compliance in an International Protectorate 193 3.1 UNMIK and Compliance 195 3.1.1 UNMIK and the Limaj Incident 195 3.1.2 UNMIK and Haradinaj 196 4 Constructing International Justice in an International Protectorate 199 4.1 The Internationalization of Civil Society 200 4.2 Mobilization against the ICTY 201 5 Compliance and International Organizations 201 5.1 The International Politics of Compliance 202 5.2 Explaining Voluntary Cooperation 203 5.3 Kosovo and the European Union 205 5.4 International Administrations and Contested Norms 207 6 Conclusions 208 5 Lamont, C. 2008 Chapter Seven – Conclusions 210 1 Introduction: Compliance and International Criminal Tribunals 210 2 The Gap between Legal Obligation and Compliance 213 3 State Compliance: Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia 215 3.1 State Compliance and Third Party Coercion 221 3.2 State Compliance and the European Union 224 3.3 State Compliance and Norms 226 4 Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty and International Protectorates 227 4.1 Bosnia-Herzegovina: Compliance under Diffuse Sovereignty 229 4.2 Kosovo: Compliance in a UN Protectorate 232 4.3 Compliance, Diffuse Sovereignty and International Peacekeeping 233 5 Conclusions 235 Appendices 237 Appendix I: Article 29 238 Appendix II: Croatia: War Veterans’ Organizations and Human Rights NGOs 239 Appendix III: Political Parties and the ICTY 240 Appendix IV: Chronology – Croatia and the EU 241 Appendix V: Serbian Public Opinion and War Crimes 242 Appendix VI: UNPREDEP Contributing States 244 Appendix VII: Macedonian Public Opinion and EU and NATO Membership 245 Appendix VIII: High Representatives of the OHR (1995-2007) 246 Appendix IX: Peace Implementation Council Membership 247 Appendix X: European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina 248 Appendix XI: Special Representatives of the Secretary General 249 Appendix XII: Responsibilites of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 250 Appendix XIII: Interviews 251 Glossary 252 References 254 6 Lamont, C. 2008 List of Tables Table 1.1 State Compliance and Theories of IR 33 Table 1.2 International Criminal Tribunals 42 Table 5.1 Rules of the Road Procedure 156 Table 6.1 UNMIK’s Four Pillars 291 7 Lamont, C. 2008 List of Figures Figure 1.1 Compliance Continuum 33 Figure 1.2 Compliance Feedback 37 Figure 5.1 The Bonn Powers 153 Figure 6.1 UNMIK Consultative Bodies under JIAS (2000-2001) 190 Figure 7.1 Transfers to ICTY Custody (1995-2007) 214 Figure 7.2 The ICTY and States 220 Figure 7.3 ICTY Referral to the UNSC 222 Figure 7.4 The ICTY and Third Party States 222 Figure 7.5 Diffuse Subjects of Article 29 Obligations 229 8 Lamont, C.