ANGLO-ITALIAN RELATIONS IN THE RED SEA AND ZANZIBAR, 1880-1888 by TIMOTHY JOHN DAVIES A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS BY RESEARCH Department of History School of Arts and Laws University of Birmingham November 2017 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT When Italy became a fully united country in 1870, Britain was an enthusiastic supporter of the new state. This feeling was reciprocated, with Italy regarding Britain as her most sincere friend in Europe. In February 1887 Britain joined Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Mediterranean Agreements, by which Britain guaranteed support for Italy in the event of attack upon her. However, by then circumstances had changed. The British occupation of Egypt and the Mahdist uprising had led to Britain becoming a significant Power in North-East Africa. During the same period, Italy had started establishing colonial settlements on the Red Sea. This led to a conflict in the region between Italian and British interests. In addition, Franco-Italian friction increased as Crispi, the Italian Premier since August 1887, continually provoked France, culminating in a crisis which nearly tipped Europe into a full-scale war in 1888. At the same time, Italy was trying to establish a colony on the Benadir coast of Zanzibar, which also disturbed British authority in East Africa. The combination of Italian challenges to British interests, and her provocation of France, led to an erosion of British trust in Italy and eventual dissolution of Britain’s association with her. CONTENTS Introduction p.1 Chapter 1: The Accidental Imperialists p.10 - Introduction p.10 - Part 1. The Comity of Nations p.11 - Part 2. The Importunate Gadfly p.28 - Part 3. The Esploratore Affair p.50 - Conclusion p.62 Chapter 2: The Massawa Incident p.65 - Introduction p.65 - Part 1. The Italian Occupation of Massawa - British Treachery, Anglo-Italian Conspiracy or Gladstonian Muddle? p.66 - Part 2. The Crispi Era p.92 - Part 3. War in Sight p.111 - Conclusion: Italy and the Orthodox Conspiracy p.132 Chapter 3: Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Slavery, Massawa, Spheres of Influence and Trade - an Italian Perspective p.137 - Introduction p.137 - Part 1. Slavery: The Universal Curse p.138 - Part 2. Spheres of Influence: an impossible situation p.151 - Part 3. Italy and Zanzibar: Trade follows the Flag p.168 - Conclusion: Sympathy for the Devil p.181 Conclusion p.185 Photographic illustrations following p.189 Appendices Appendix 1. Britain and the Continental Powers: British military power, Anglo-French relations and the Chimera of the Franco-Russian threat p.190 Appendix 2. The Russian Bear and India p.198 Appendix 3. The Greco-Russian symbiosis and its effect upon European Stability and British public opinion p.201 Appendix 4. Background to Egypt p.212 Appendix 5. Britain, Abyssinia, Russia and the Peoples of the Horn p.216 Appendix 6. Italy: social, economic and political background p.227 Bibliography p.236 Maps: German map of East Africa (c.1884) British map of North-East Africa (c.1896) following p.265. List of Illustrations Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany Georges Boulanger, French Minister of War and Prime Minister Lodovico Corti, Italian Diplomat Francesco Crispi, Italian Prime Minister Agostino Depretis, Italian Prime Minister Rene Goblet, French Prime Minister Earl Granville, British Foreign Minister Pasquale Mancini, Italian Foreign Minister Count Robilant, Italian Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury, British Prime Minister List of Abbreviations CAB - Cabinet records DDF - Documentes Diplomatiques Francaises DDI - Documenti Diplomatici Italiani DMI - Director of Military Intelligence FO - Foreign Office GDD - German Diplomatic Documents HMG – Her Majesty’s Government HMS – Her Majesty’s Ship IO – India Office SP – Salisbury Papers INTRODUCTION Theories abound as to why European countries - especially Britain, indisputably the most successful of all - came to develop Empires during the late nineteenth century. Inter Alia, as early as 1885 Seeley expressed a belief that the British Empire grew, like a fungus, as an extension of the country’s underlying social, economic and political integration:1 Hobson’s opinion was that they grew out of a conspiracy of capitalists who might be expected to gain from its creation, such as armaments manufacturers;2 Hilferding typified the Marxist view that they were an effort to utilise surplus capital by exporting it;3 Schumpeter believed that they resulted from the atavistic urges of the European ruling classes to conquer, regardless of the cost;4 Robinson and Gallagher’s thesis - broadly speaking - is that ‘informal Empire’ (resulting from commercial expansion abroad without the connivance of Government) generally led indirectly to the spread of Imperial power, which only became ‘formal’ when changing circumstances, such as rival Empires or indigenous resistance, made life difficult for informal practitioners and forced the intervention of governmental agency;5 while more recently, the views of Cain and Hopkins, whose theory of ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ - basically that Hobson’s rising 1 See D. Wormell, Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History (Cambridge: University Press, 1980). 2 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (NewYork: James Potts & Co., 1902) 3 R. Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital (Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1910) 4 J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951 - English translation) 5 Gallagher & Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, pp.1-15; for Africa specifically see their Africa and the Victorians. For a brief critique of Cain & Hopkins’ argument, see A. Webster, ‘Business and Empire: A Reassessment of the British Conquest of Burma in 1885’, The Historical Journal, 43: 4 (December 2000), pp.1003-25, especially pp.1004-5 & 1006-8. 1 industrialist bourgeoisie rode on the coat-tails of Schumpeter’s atavistic aristocrats - has gained much traction.6 Whatever the reason, the percentage of the world’s land surface occupied or controlled by Europeans rose from 35% in 1800 to 84.4% by 1914.7 Much of this occurred during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the last quarter of the century. Britain’s Imperial acquisitions were, however, greater during the 1815-1914 period than those of any other world power. Between 1871 and 1900 Britain added four and a quarter million square miles and sixty-six million people to her Empire,8 two and a half million miles and forty-four million people of those during the premierships of Lord Salisbury.9 Yet Britain, for all her naval and imperial might, was not so strong in terms of land forces as to be immune from attack from Europe. Though choosing to avoid formal alliance with European Powers after 1815,10 and thereby avoid being dragged into European conflicts, British statesmen of every hue were aware of Britain’s vulnerability to invasion from Europe. Thus, when Salisbury finally decided to become loosely associated with the Powers of the Triple Alliance via the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887, it was in large part due to the friendship which had grown between Britain and 11 Italy since the end of the Napoleonic era. 6 P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: The New Imperialism’, Economic History Review (2nd series) XL: 1 (1987), pp. 1-26. And see their British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London: Longmans, 1993 - 3rd edition, 2016). For a fuller discussion of the nature of Imperial expansion, including Fieldhouse’s (see note 7 below) Theory of Peripheral Expansion, see Chapter 3. 7 D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p.3. 8 P.M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin, 1976), p.181. 9 Sir Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquis of Salisbury (1830-1903), Secretary for India 1866-67 and 1874- 78, Foreign Secretary 1878-1881, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 1885-February 1886, Prime Minister August 1886-1892 and 1895-1902 (Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 1895-1900). And see A. Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1999), p.844. 10 The Crimean War being the very temporary exception proving the rule. 11 Italy having joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance of 1882. 2 The creation of a united Italian nation state, and its admission into the “comity of nations” in 1870 was greeted in Britain with almost universal enthusiasm.12 Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Italy had held a special place in the hearts and minds of the English.13 Byron14 had been involved with the Carbonari,15 and with the evolution of the ‘Grand Tour’,16 Italy became the most favoured destination of English travellers. Gladstone17 had always been a fervent supporter of Italian independence18 - indeed, it was practically the only subject upon which Gladstone and Palmerston saw eye-to-eye19 - and by 1887 Salisbury was speaking no more than the truth when he wrote that ‘there was no nation with whom common action would be more agreeable to the people of this country than with Italy’.20 The Italians, for their part, reciprocated the feeling, with 12 A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 1954), p.124. ‘Unofficial opinion in England… was wildly enthusiastic over the achievement of Italian independence, and half a million Londoners lined the streets to cheer Garibaldi when (he) paid a visit in 1864…’; D.