On Compositionality Jönsson, Martin 2008 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Jönsson, M. (2008). On Compositionality. Lund University (Media-Tryck). Total number of authors: 1 General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Read more about Creative commons licenses: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 On Compositionality Doubts about the Structural Path to Meaning Martin L. Jönsson Lund University Department of Philosophy Compositionality: Doubts about the Structural Path to Meaning Martin L. Jönsson © 2008 Martin L. Jönsson Cover Art: Vow, 2006, Robin Richmond, Oil and uki kaki paper (18thC) on canvas. Copyright of the artist. Used with kind permission of the artist. First Published August 2008 Printed by Media-Tryck, Lund University, Lund (www.lu.se/media-tryck) ISBN: 978-91-628-7581-7 For Pernilla Preface What follows is my Ph.D. thesis in Philosophy. I wrote it mostly while at the philosophy department at Lund University, and, discounting time spent teaching and on leave abroad, I have worked on it for just over four years. The finished thesis is, of course, only the end result of my work. It therefore contains only hints of the process leading to its completion, and of the intellectual debts I have incurred while working on it. To rectify this to some small degree, I want to take this opportunity to briefly describe some of preceding events that were of particular importance to me and to acknowledge some of the places where my debts lie. But before I do this I want to make a quick but important remark on the methodology and aim of the thesis. After having initially reviewed some of the literature on compositionality I was struck by the fact that it was fairly compartmentalized; areas that seemed clearly related weren’t discussed together. For instance, the discussion in formal semantics of the triviality of compositionality seems to be connected with the discussion in philosophy of what compositionality could do, but the two debates were seldom covered by the same work; and investigations into what compositionality could do were rarely coupled with in-depth discussion of the reason for holding compositionality true and for rejecting alternatives. In this thesis I have tried to overcome this compartmentalization and have attempted to integrate several strands of research in order to answer the main research question as satisfactorily as possible. I’m hoping that the juxtaposition and integration that feature in the thesis resulted in the intended cross-fertilization rather than – as is always the risk when one attempts to combine different forms of research – forcing one or several discussions into molds that they do not quite vi Preface fit. However, my integrative approach might invite reading the thesis in a way that was not intended, and I would like to explicitly discourage this reading. Since I describe and discuss theories in several other research traditions than the philosophical one, a reader might have the impression that the following work is an attempt to work in these traditions. It is not. The methodology and the results presented here are not those of (say) formal semantics or cognitive psychology, and this thesis is not a work in either tradition. I’m hoping that the results will be of methodological importance to these traditions, but I have not attempted to directly contribute to the subject matter of these disciplines. The work, both in its conclusions and its methodology, is philosophical through and through. The theories from other disciplines and traditions that I consider are often versions that I have simplified in order to make the philosophical points I want to make as clear as possible. The project might be classified as philosophy of language, but it might also be classified as philosophy of linguistic science (as a subspecies of the philosophy of science). In any case, it would be erroneous to classify it as a work in one of the linguistic sciences. My first attempt at independent work in philosophy also dealt with composition. My bachelor’s thesis in theoretical philosophy, written in 2000, dealt with the regress that Francis Bradley had suggested threatened any metaphysical account countenancing complex entities. This convergence on the topic of composition seems accidental in retrospect. I have at no point been aware of being especially interested in matters pertaining to composition that could have acted as a common cause in my choice of topics, and it seems to me that I pursued the two projects for quite different reasons. The link between the two projects that does exist derives instead from the encouragement I received, after finishing my work on the Bradley regress, in particular from Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin, Marcus Ivarsson and Anna-Sofia Maurin, which acted as a part of the motivation for pursuing additional projects in philosophy, and for which – even though it was given a very long time ago – I’m still very grateful. I was first notified that I had been accepted as a Ph.D. student in the spring of 2002, and it was mutually agreed that I would start working at the start of September that year. I spent much of the summer practicing capoeira in Brazil on a very memorable, but rather Preface vii unphilosophical trip, and I returned with only the vaguest ideas about what I wanted to pursue as a research topic. Since I wrote my bachelor’s thesis in philosophy, I had developed an interest in questions concerning meaning and concepts, and I had worked on the semantics of thought and psychological theories of categorization as part of additional undergraduate theses in philosophy and cognitive science. As I read up on the literature on meaning and concepts I became aware that compositionality was often assumed in order to make headway in inquiries. However, in the literature I came across, it seemed to me somewhat unclear not only what compositionality amounted to, but also what, exactly, licensed its use it as a constraint on semantic theorizing. Shortly after I had begun looking into it more carefully, I had the opportunity to discuss some of the issues with Jerry Fodor – a leading researcher in the field and someone whose writings had spurred my interest in the topic. We talked at a cognitive science symposium in Stockholm in the summer of 2003, and he encouraged me to pursue compositionality as the topic in my thesis. A few months later, in October, I was fortunate enough to attend Dag Westerståhl’s talk ‘What we now know about compositionality’ at a conference in honor of Peter Pagin on his fiftieth birthday. Professor Westerståhl’s talk, and the tradition he drew attention to, provided a firm foundation on which matters pertaining to compositionality could be discussed, and this influenced my thinking from then on. Professor Pagin’s own very interesting work on compositionality, in particular his ‘Communication and Strong Compositionality’, also shaped my thinking substantially. I’m grateful to both men for writing such wonderful things and for being so helpful in clarifying them in conversation. Professor Pagin’s and Professor Westerståhl’s work led me to the work of Wilfrid Hodges, who had developed a very influential framework they both made use of. My contact with Professor Hodges has also been very beneficial for me and I’m grateful for his patience and helpfulness in explaining some of the intricacies of the systems he has developed and for taking the time to read and comment on the initial chapters of the thesis. My investigation of supposed problems with non-compositional accounts of meaning lead me to contact James Hampton and propose that we together investigate some empirically driven compositionality viii Preface arguments against prototype theory. I spent a substantial part of the spring of 2005 at City University in London working with Professor Hampton. It was an amazingly productive stay. I benefited enormously from the collaboration and from all the opportunities I got to tap into Professor Hampton’s genius. The academic year 2006–2007 was also very productive. I was fortunate enough to be awarded both a Fulbright and a Sweden- America scholarship and Jerry Fodor was kind enough to invite me to come to Rutgers for a year. I’m very grateful to him for inviting me, and for being so generous, once I had arrived, in spending time with me discussing various issues connected with compositionality. During my stay I also benefited a good deal from my contact with Maria Bittner, Sam Cumming, Ernest Lepore, Stephen Neale, Jason Stanley and Jason Turner. During my second semester at Rutgers I organized ‘The Compositionality Sessions’, a series of weekly meetings with alternating presentations by researchers who had done notable work on compositionality and the discussion of central texts on compositionality. I’m very grateful for everyone who contributed towards making this happen and for making it so successful.