Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 5 Article 4 Issue 2 Summer 1974 1974 A Dilemma in Springfield: The copS e and Limitations of the Governor's Amendatory Veto Power in Illinois David W. Inlander Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj Part of the Constitutional Law Commons Recommended Citation David W. Inlander, A Dilemma in Springfield: The Scope and Limitations of the Governor's Amendatory Veto Power in Illinois, 5 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 394 (1974). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol5/iss2/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Dilemma in Springfield: The Scope and Limitations of the Governor's Amendatory Veto Power in Illinois Delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention arrived in Springfield without any intention of transforming their state government into a dictatorship. Yet, with the enactment of article IV, section 9(e),' of the new constitution (hereinafter referred to as the amenda- tory veto), many legislators have expressed fears that the downfall of the democracy in Illinois is imminent. Senator Hudson R. Sours pre- dicted that the power of the Governor would rise to a height compar- able to Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini or Julius Caesar.' Representative John S. Matijevich concurred in this prophecy of catastrophic conse- quences: This provision places dictatorial powers in the hands of the gov- ernor. It's very dangerous. A ruthless governor could use it and wield it to the detriment of everybody. 3 As yet, Sours' and Matijevich's forecasts of doom have not material- ized. However, the scope and limitations of the amendatory veto power of the Governor of Illinois have remained the subject of consid- erable debate among the three branches of government since the con- stitution's passage in 1970. The amendatory veto concept has been praised by some constitu- tional scholars as a pragmatic gubernatorial device which maximizes efficiency and excellence in the legislative process.4 The progressive intent behind the clause is to "provide an avenue for the governor to suggest a change instead of vetoing outright bills presented to him."' 1. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e). 2. Transcript of the Senate Session, May 1, 1973, at 47. 3. Wheeler, Legislators Tell Dangers of Amending Veto Power, Chicago Sun- Times, Nov. 22, 1971, at 6, 18, col. 1. 4. Netsch, The Executive, CoN-CON-ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 180 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Netsch]. 5. 6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, vol. 3, at 1338. 394 1974 Amendatory Veto In the past, important legislation met an unfortunate death on the Gov- ernor's desk whenever he failed to agree with one minor portion of a bill passed by the General Assembly. Proponents of the amendatory veto have heralded the provision as a money-and-time-saver since it provides an opportunity to expeditiously enact an altered bill into law. There is no longer need for the bill's sponsor to regroup his forces, hoping his piece of legislation will fare better during the next General Assembly session. These conflicting views regarding the scope of the amendatory veto provision result from a failure of the Convention delegates to resolve the ambiguities of the veto clause. Unstated in either the transcripts of the Constitutional Convention or in the final language of article IV, section 9(e), is an explicit declaration of the scope of the veto power. As a result of this lack of constitutional guidance, the delegates in Springfield created more than just a constitution in 1970; they created an interpretive battleground. THE BIRTH OF A CONFRONTATION In an attempt to offer the Governor an alternative to an outright veto of a bill, the delegates on the Executive Committee, the Legislative Committee, and the Committee on Styling, Drafting and Submission formulated the amendatory veto clause.' Taking note of the relative success of the amendatory veto provision in four other states' constitu- tions,7 the delegates from these committees attempted to present to the Convention a provision that would allow the lawmaking wheels of gov- ernment to turn more effectively than they had operated under the three previous Illinois constitutions.8 The amendatory veto clause as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention states: The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommenda- tions for change to the house in which it originated. The bill shall be considered in the same manner as a vetoed bill but the specific recommendations may be accepted by a record vote of a majority of the members elected to each house. Such bills shall be pre- sented -again to the Governor and if he certifies that such accep- tance conforms to his specific recommendations, the bill shall be- come law. If he does not so certify, he shall return it as a vetoed bill to the house in which it originated.9 6. 6TH ILLINOIS CONsTrrTunoNAL CONVENTION, CoMMrTTEE PROPOSALS, Vol. 6, at 403. 7. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 125; MASS. CONST. art. I, § 186; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1 (14a); VA. CONST. art. V, § 6(3). 8. The three previous Illinois constitutions were adopted in 1818, 1848 and 1870. 9. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(e). 395 Loyola University Law Journal Vol. 5: 394 Analogous to an abbreviated ping-pong game, with legislation bouncing back and forth between the General Assembly and the Gov- ernor,' ° the amendatory veto is the newest alternative open to a Gov- ernor who disagrees with a bill." As indicated, when the Governor receives a bill from the Legislature, he may return it to the house of its origination along with "specific recommendations" for change. The initial legislative body then has fifteen days to accept or reject the rec- ommendations and to send the bill to the other house which follows the same procedure. If the General Assembly accepts the alterations by a majority vote of each house, it returns the bill to the Governor for certification. Once again the Governor has the option to sign the bill or return it as a vetoed bill to the original house. On the other hand, if the Legislature chooses to reject the Governor's specific recom- mendations, it can enact the original bill into law only by overriding his veto with a record vote of three-fifths of each legislative body. This procedure places the state's chief executive directly in the middle of the legislative process. As a result, state senators and representatives have vociferously objected that the amendatory veto does great violence to the democratic principle embodied in the state's past constitu- 10. 6TH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT, vol. 3, at 1357. 11. The relevant veto provisions state: (b) If the Governor does not approve the bill, he shall veto it by returning it with his objections to the house in which it originated. Any bill not so returned by the Governor within 60 calendar days after it is pre- sented to him shall become law. If recess or adjournment of the Gen- eral Assembly prevents the return of a bill, the bill and the Governor's objections shall be filed with the Secretary of State within such 60 cal- endar days. The Secretary of State shall return the bill and objections to the originating house promptly upon the next meeting of the same General Assembly at which the bill can be considered. (c) The house to which a bill is returned shall immediately enter the Gov- ernor's objections upon its journal. If within fifteen calendar days after such entry that house by a record vote of three-fifths of the members selected passes the bill, it shall become law. (d) The Governor may reduce or veto any item of appropriations in a bill presented to him. Portions of a bill not reduced or vetoed shall become law. An item vetoed shall be returned to the house in which it origi- nated and may be restored to its original amount in the same manner as a vetoed bill except that the required vote shall be a majority of the members elected to each house. If a reduced item is not so restored, it shall become law in the reduced amount. (e) The Governor may return a bill together with specific recommendations for change to the house in which it originated. The bill shall be consid- ered in the same manner as a vetoed bill but the specific recommenda- tions may be accepted by a record vote of a majority of the members elected to each house. Such bills shall be presented again to the Gover- nor and if he certifies that such acceptance conforms to his specific rec- ommendations, the bill shall become law. If he does not so certify, he shall return it as a vetoed bill to the house in which it originated. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9(b) (c) (d) (e). 396 1974 Amendatory Veto tions. 12 Another criticism of the amendatory veto provision is that 3 it upsets the framework of separation of powers in state government.' Undoubtedly, the Governor takes a more active role in the passage of legislation under the new constitution. However, proponents of the veto clause are neither convinced that such an active part in the legisla- tive process is undesirable nor that it is new to Illinois politics. Senator Dawn Clark Netsch, the original sponsor of the amendatory veto in the Constitutional Convention, noted that the committees designed the veto provision with two thoughts in mind: first, the delegates realized that the Governor already took an active part in proposing and oppos- ing legislation;' 4 secondly, it was the Convention's opinion that the people needed a more resourceful governor to deal expeditiously with current conflicts in the state of Illinois.' 5 In advocating the strength- ening of the Governor's position, Senator Netsch observed: The overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion supports the thesis that effective American state government requires a single, strong, popularly elected executive with adequate powers to serve as the principal spokesman for and leader of the broadest possible public interest.