Report to the City of Portland on Portland Police Bureau Officer-Involved Shootings First Report ◦ May 2012 OIR GROUP Michael Gennaco Robert Miller Julie Ruhlin CITY OF PORTLAND Office of City Auditor LaVonne Griffin-Valade Auditor’s Independent Police Review Division Mary-Beth Baptista, Director 1221 S.W. 4th Avenue, Room 320, Portland, Oregon 97204 web: www.portlandoregon.gov/auditor/ipr May 30, 2012 To: Mayor Sam Adams Commissioner Randy Leonard Commissioner Dan Saltzman Commissioner Nick Fish Commissioner Amanda Fritz From: City Auditor LaVonne Griffin-Valade Re: OIR Group – Review of closed investigations of seven officer-involved shootings In the attached report, the OIR Group presents the results of their review of the closed investigations of these seven officer-involved shootings: James Jahar Perez – March 2004; Raymond Gwerder – November 2005; Jerry Goins – July 2006; Lesley Stewart – August 2007; Jason Spoor – May 2008; Aaron Campbell – January 2010; Jack Dale Collins – March 2010. City Code chapter 3.21 established the Auditor’s Independent Police Review (IPR) division in 2001. City Council subsequently strengthened that Code chapter by empowering the City Auditor to hire outside experts to review closed Police Bureau investigations of officer-involved shootings and in-custody deaths. This is the sixth such review ordered by this office and reported to the public and City Council. As their primary focus in this particular review, the OIR Group selected incidents involving Police Bureau encounters with individuals experiencing some level of mental or emotional crisis. Another theme the OIR Group considered was communication at the scene of a critical event. At my request, the 2004 Perez case was also included in the current review because it is the oldest of the incidents eligible for expert review and because that incident generated intense community concern and contributed to the Police Bureau establishing the Use of Force Review Board. By examining incidents that occurred over a six-year span of time, the OIR Group’s report effectively establishes a historical context. This strengthens and adds to the merit of their thirteen recommendations for improvements in Police Bureau policy and tactics. I appreciate the thorough analysis and clarity in presentation of information, and would like to thank the OIR Group team members for their professionalism throughout the review. This report has significant value for my office, for City Council, for the Police Bureau, and most importantly, for the community we serve. Table of Contents Foreword .......................................................................... 1 SECTION ONE Officer Involved Shootings ............................................ 9 March 28, 2004 ◦ James Jahar Perez ................................... 9 November 4, 2005 ◦ Raymond Gwerder ............................ 21 July 19, 2006 ◦ Jerry Goins ................................................ 29 August 20, 2007 ◦ Lesley Stewart ...................................... 35 May 13, 2008 ◦ Jason Spoor .............................................. 41 January 29, 2010 ◦ Aaron Campbell ................................... 49 March 22, 2010 ◦ Jack Dale Collins .................................... 61 SECTION TWO Common Themes and Issues .................................... 67 Delays in Interviewing Involved Officers ............................. 67 Quality of Detective’s Investigations ................................... 69 East County Major Crimes Task Force .............................. 70 Quality and Timeliness of IA Investigations ........................ 70 Delays in the Review Process ............................................ 72 Quality of Training Division Reviews .................................. 72 Tactical Communications Problems ................................... 75 Post-Shooting Rescue of Downed Suspects ...................... 77 Police Review Board .......................................................... 78 Role of IPR ......................................................................... 78 SECTION THREE Recommendations ....................................................... 81 Foreword n March 28, 2004, a Portland Police officer shot and killed James Jahar Perez, an unarmed motorist, after he reached into his pocket and began to O withdraw his hand. The shooting generated significant community interest and concern about the use of deadly force by the police, and raised questions about how an unarmed man who may have been attempting to comply with officers’ commands ended up being shot and killed. Almost six years later, on January 29, 2010, another Portland officer shot and killed Aaron Campbell, a reportedly distraught suicidal man who had first been struck by beanbag rounds fired by another officer and who also turned out to be unarmed. As with the shooting of Mr. Perez, the incident roiled the Portland community and reopened deep-rooted concerns about the use of deadly force by the Portland Police Bureau. After an extensive investigation, the Bureau determined that the decision to use deadly force violated policy and Chief Mike Reese moved to fire the officer. The officer appealed, and on March 30, 2012, an arbitrator issued her opinion overruling the termination decision and ordering the Bureau to reinstate the officer. Both the Perez and Campbell shootings are notable examples of the understandable interest raised in the Portland community when a Portland Police Bureau officer uses deadly force. While law enforcement must be authorized to use deadly force in the appropriate circumstances, it is incumbent upon any progressive law enforcement agency to conduct a thorough investigation and review of these incidents because the consequences for the person shot, his family, and the community at large are so great. This report analyzes seven Portland Police Bureau officer-involved shootings spanning the time between March, 2004 and March, 2010, each with its own issues and each eliciting different degrees of community response. Almost all share the common element of having been precipitated by the actions of an individual in mental health or emotional crisis. The commonalities do not end there, however. Many of these events raise questions about officers’ ability to communicate with each other at the scene of critical incidents, to consider alternative plans, and to respond quickly and effectively when a subject has been downed by police gunfire. The benefit of reviewing multiple incidents occurring over time is that it provides a snapshot of the Portland Police Bureau’s (PPB) policies and training as they evolved in response to each incident. In some cases, this evolution is notable and commendable. Others lead us – and members of the public – to question why the Bureau had not learned more from its prior shooting incidents. Each of these shootings also provides the opportunity to evaluate the PPB’s mechanisms for investigating and reviewing critical incidents, and to observe how those have changed over time. The Bureau’s development in this regard has been remarkable. Quite unlike many municipalities where we have seen significant reports commissioned and then subsequently buried, the PPB has been responsive to the reports from the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) dating from 2003. PARC’s recommendations regarding the quality of internal investigations did not go unheeded, and the result is that today the PPB conducts thorough, professional investigations into its officer-involved shootings. The PPB’s ability to use a critical incident as a springboard toward systemic reforms likewise has evolved over time. As we discuss fully with respect to each shooting, these incidents show varying degrees of internal critique and review leading to changes in policies and training. While we note deficiencies in the timeliness and quality of the internal analysis and review process throughout this report, we nonetheless find the PPB to be superior to most comparable law 2 enforcement agencies in the way it which it reviews critical incidents. The use of exacting Training Division analyses, Commanders’ Review memos that do not shy away from difficult issues, and a Police Review Board that includes peer officers and members of the public are evidence of a Bureau willing to learn from its mistakes and to account to its public in a way that is counter to the instincts of most police agencies. The Bureau’s history of opening itself to outside review and acceptance of recommendations from independent sources likewise sets it apart from many agencies. Nonetheless, there is still room for improvement. With respect to each individual shooting, we note issues relating to the tactics employed, as well as the quality of the investigation and review process. We also identify issues common to many shootings, including delays in the interviews of involved officers, delays in the review process, inconsistent quality of the Training Division Reviews, tactical communications issues, and insufficient efforts to rescue downed suspects quickly. The investigation and review of many of these shootings happened with little real-time independent oversight, as the City Auditor’s Independent Police Review division (IPR) was originally circumscribed to play a minimal role in such critical incidents. Recent modifications to the City’s ordinance have strengthened IPR’s responsibilities, and we believe this increased authority will add an important component to the investigative and review processes. This report