DEVELOPING THE RULE OF LAW IN UKRAINE: ACHIEVEMENTS, IMPACTS, AND CHALLENGES A Retrospective of Lessons Learned for the Donor Community Ten Years after Independence Prepared for the E&E Bureau USAID by Mark Dietrich Richard Blue Management Systems International Draft June 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................................................................................ii I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................1 A. Goals, Scope, and Methodology ................................................................................1 B. Historical and Political Context .................................................................................2 II. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ................................................................................5 A. Current Status............................................................................................................5 B. Donor Interventions and Impact.................................................................................9 III. JUDICIAL REFORM .......................................................................................................12 A. Current Status..........................................................................................................12 B. Donor Interventions and Impact...............................................................................21 IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE.....................................................................................................26 A. Developments since Independence...........................................................................26 B. Donor Interventions and Impact...............................................................................28 V. LEGAL EDUCATION......................................................................................................34 A. Current Status..........................................................................................................34 B. Donor Interventions and Impact...............................................................................37 VI. LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE DONOR COMMUNITY .............................................38 A. Sequencing and Targeting........................................................................................39 B. Modalities ...............................................................................................................41 C. Donor Coordination.................................................................................................43 D. Other Lessons Learned ............................................................................................43 E. Conclusions: Catalysts and “Political Will” .............................................................44 Annex A: Assistance Providers..............................................................................................46 Annex B: Ukraine Rule of Law Assessment – Persons Interviewed .......................................51 Annex C: Ukraine Rule of Law Assessment – Documents Reviewed.....................................58 Annex D: Judiciary in Ukraine...............................................................................................62 Annex E: Budget Allocations ................................................................................................67 i H:\INCOMING\Jan20\01-23-USAID-WestNIS\ROL_draft--8-02.doc EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I. INTRODUCTION Most western observers anticipated that the newly independent Ukraine would rapidly develop into an open, democratic society based on a free market economy and the rule of law. Ten years later it is clear that, while some important progress has been made, the expectations of a quick and easy transition to western style democracy have not generally been met. USAID has been providing assistance to the development of the rule of law since 1993. In the early years, that assistance was largely of a top-down nature: helping to draft the necessary legislative framework, providing support to the judiciary, etc. Frustration with the slow pace of reform emerged in the mid-1990s, and by 1999 USAID and others had largely shifted their emphasis, and began providing more support to grassroots and advocacy programs. The following report summarizes these and other efforts to support legal and judicial reform in Ukraine and seeks to provide some lessons learned to be applied in the design of future programs. II. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK Ukraine has largely re-vamped its legislative framework, having adopted a new constitution in 1996, and enacted a new criminal code, a new election law, and a new land code, amongst others. Even after the passage of ten years, however, much important work remains, including the need to adopt a new civil code, a modern administrative code, and revisions to the various procedural codes. In addition, the vast array of new legislation needs to be harmonized and streamlined. Legislative drafting skills remain poor, and the process of drafting laws is still largely non-transparent. USAID, through the Parliamentary Development Project (PDP) of Indiana University, has worked to enhance the capacity of the parliament since 1994. PDP’s efforts at parliamentary and legislative reform, however, were largely constrained by Communist Party control of the leadership until early 2000. Since that time, PDP has shown some greater impact, including helping to increase the openness and accessibility of the leadership, and increasing transparency. USAID, through its rule of law contractor ARD/Checchi, has also provided advice on specific pieces of legislation, as well as the constitution. USAID played a particularly important role in facilitating the adoption of the constitution, more by acting as a disinterested broker than by providing substantive advice. It also supported extensive work on the civil code, which has had a less fruitful result. The assistance provided to a drafting commission was valued, a good draft law emerged, but the draft was extensively amended by the Rada, and then vetoed by the president. One frequently noted weakness in American assistance in this area is a perceived attitude that “we know better” when in fact we do not. Ukrainians and longtime American experts in the country point to the bankruptcy law as an example. During the drafting process, USAID brought in many specialists and a law was prepared, but according to one professor, it is rarely used because it is too complex. Similarly, an American expert with little knowledge of the civil law had a major role in writing a law on secured transactions. The law was considered “beautiful,” but it was never passed. Clearly, drafting projects need to be closely tied to Ukrainian partners, with an eye not to American law but to civil law and European integration. Facilitating a reform process, serving as a neutral broker, offering choices and providing information may all be more successful strategies for legal reform than drafting the perfect law ii H:\INCOMING\Jan20\01-23-USAID-WestNIS\ROL_draft--8-02.doc that does not then get passed or that gets passed and is never implemented. USAID’s role in facilitating consensus on a new constitution is one testament to potential of this approach. III. JUDICIAL REFORM The Ukrainian judiciary is in a state of flux, given the passage of a new law on the judiciary on February 7, 2002 that will go into effect on June 1, 2002. Much will depend on how this new law is implemented. In the meantime, the judiciary in Ukraine is up against some serious challenges. The most important one is that while society has continued to place increased demands on the judiciary, the government has not commensurately increased the resources at its disposal. Citizens are turning to the courts more frequently to assert both civil and property rights, crime rates have increased, and the courts are now adjudicating matters (such as administrative and labor disputes) that were previously handled by other state agencies. While caseloads have grown tremendously, financial support has remained essential static. The consequences of the failure of the state to sufficiently support the judiciary include: judicial reliance on local authorities for support, with the concomitant lessening of judicial independence in matters in which the local authorities have an interest; an increase in corrupt practices; poor working conditions; slower processing of cases; and insufficient training and access to information, resulting in poor decision-making. Despite these problems, there have been some important changes, including a shift in the balance of power among the judges, lawyers, and prosecutors. Now, only judges, not prosecutors, can issue arrest warrants. Defense attorneys reported that in general the playing field is more level. Previously, the prosecutor was 99.9 % sure that he would win, but now, lawyers say, judges are feeling freer to come up with not guilty verdicts, and are also now ordering the release of illegally detained defendants. The higher level courts are taking decisions that run counter to the interests of the state. The Constitutional Court, for example, has invalidated the propiska (internal registration) requirement, enabling people to move freely about the country and live where they choose. In another case, the Constitutional Court ruled that the president did not have the power to appoint deputy heads of local