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Disclaimer 국제학석사학위논문 Venezuela's Political Development Examined through the Framework of the Curse of Oil 석유의 저주를 통해 살펴본 베네수엘라의 정치발전 2016년 2월 서울대학교 국제대학원 국제학과 국제지역학전공 김 경 민 Venezuela's Political Development Examined through the Framework of the Curse of Oil Thesis by Kyeongmin Kim Graduate Program in International Area Studies In Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Mater of International Studies February 2016 Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National University Seoul, Republic of Korea © Copyright by Kyeongmin Kim 2016 All Rights Reserved Abstract Venezuela's Political Development Examined through the Framework of the Curse of Oil Kyeongmin Kim International Area Studies Graduate School of International Studies Seoul National University The ‘Curse of Oil’ is applied to the oil-rich countries that were once expected to develop more rapidly than others, but rather have found themselves stuck in their political and economic development. In terms of political development especially, they are characterized as authoritarian regimes. Venezuela is perceived as one of the representative cases of the curse, but this country shows two paradoxes along their political changes. The first contradiction is that although the particracy period could be maintained based on exclusive political pacts and informal patron-client relationships, Venezuela was appraised as a sound democratic country. However, accumulated social problems led to an eruption of civil strife by the furious general public which in turn allowed Chavez to achieve political superiority over the past elite. His ruling process was criticized as autocratic and categorized as competitive authoritarian, but he was able to significantly improve social indicators. At the root of these two ironies has been the presence of oil. To understand more clearly within the framework of the ‘Curse of Oil,’ three causal i mechanisms of the oil curse organized by Michael Ross were utilized to scrutinize Venezuelan political change. First of all, Venezuela showed evidence of being a rentier state, expanding its reliance on oil income as a source of state revenue. Secondly, it showed militarized governmental practices and informal linkages between the armed forces and politicians. Lastly, due to the results of common oil-led development, the Venezuelan social base for democracy was predicted to be weak. But ironically, investment in social programs that was in fact implemented for the sake of Chavez’s power maintenance showed high levels of HDI index indicators and popular support for democracy. Based on this analysis, it is too hasty a conclusion to define Venezuela simply as another case of the oil curse. Previously, studies focused on the presence of the curse in oil-rich countries rather than the curse itself. Therefore this study attempts to delve into the features of the curse in two periods of Venezuelan history to point out the fact that the characteristics of the curse itself can be diverse even within one country. In the case of Venezuela, these characteristics have moved from being monopolistic to being distributive in nature. Keywords: Curse of Oil, Venezuela, Democracy, Punto Fijo, Chavez Student No.: 2014-24226 ii Table of Contents Abstract Table of Contents List of Tables List of Figures I Introduction ............................................................................................................ 1 II Literature Review ................................................................................................... 4 1 Curse of Oil ......................................................................................................... 4 1) Curse of Oil .................................................................................................. 4 2) The Curse in Venezuela ............................................................................... 6 2 Venezuelan Democracy ...................................................................................... 7 1) After Democratization: From 1958 to 1998 ................................................. 7 2) Chavez: From 1998 to 2013 ......................................................................... 9 3 Research Questions ........................................................................................... 12 1) Shortcomings of Previous Studies ............................................................. 13 2) Research Questions .................................................................................... 13 III The Curse of Oil ................................................................................................... 15 1 Curse of Oil ....................................................................................................... 15 2 Causal Mechanism ............................................................................................ 18 1) The Rentier Effect ...................................................................................... 18 iii 2) The Repression Effect ................................................................................ 19 3) The Modernization Effect .......................................................................... 20 IV Case Study: Venezuela ......................................................................................... 22 1 Political Changes in Venezuela ......................................................................... 22 1) Pacted Democracy: Punto Fijo Pact and Particracy ................................... 22 2) Competitive Authoritarianism: Political Reform and Social Policy .......... 28 2 Causal Mechanism in Venezuela ...................................................................... 33 1) The Rentier Effect ...................................................................................... 33 2) The Repression Effect ................................................................................ 38 3) The Modernization Effect .......................................................................... 44 V Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 54 References Appendix Abstract (Korean) iv List of Tables Table I-1. 2015 Crude Oil Proved Reserves .................................................... 1 Table I-2. 2013 GDP in Latin America ............................................................ 1 Table IV-1. Government Share of Net Oil Revenue ...................................... 34 Table IV-2. HDI Index of Venezuela ............................................................. 45 Table IV-3. Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking and Average Annual Growth Rate ........................................................................................... 45 Table IV-4. School Enrollment ...................................................................... 47 Table IV-5. Support for Democracy, 1996-2010 in Venezuela ...................... 50 Table IV-6. Support for Democracy, Average 1996-2010 ............................. 50 Table IV-7. Satisfaction with Democracy for 1995-2010 in Venezuela......... 51 Table IV-8. Average Satisfaction with Democracy for 1995-2010 by each country .................................................................................................... 51 Table IV-9. Governmental Approval in Venezuela(2002- 2013) ................... 52 Table IV-10. Governmental approval for each country in 2013 .................... 53 v List of Figures Figure IV-1. Crude Oil Price (1971~1990) .................................................... 25 Figure IV-2. GDP growth rate ....................................................................... 26 Figure IV-3. Voice and Accountability .......................................................... 34 Figure IV-4. Source of Revenues, Average 2004-2009 ................................. 35 Figure IV-5. Oil Price and Military Expenditures ......................................... 40 Figure IV-6. Military Expenditure by country ............................................... 41 Figure IV-7. Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP ............................. 41 Figure IV-8. Social Investment Expansion .................................................... 42 Figure IV-9. School Enrollment..................................................................... 47 Figure IV-10. Life Expectancy at Birth, total ................................................ 47 Figure IV-11. GDP per capita ........................................................................ 48 Figure IV-12. Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines ................... 48 Figure IV-13.GINI index (World Bank) ........................................................ 49 Figure IV-14. GINI index (INE) .................................................................... 49 vi I . Introduction Venezuela has the largest amount of oil reserves in the world. According to data from U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), this country owns about 298 billion barrels of oil, which accounts for 90% of proven oil deposits in Central and South America. Its GDP is