Metarepresentational Versus Control Theories of Metacognition Santiago Arango Muñoz Werner Reichardt Center for Integrative Neuroscience Tuebingen Universität Paul-Ehrlich-str. 17, 72076, Tuebingen [email protected] Abstract The discussion will proceed as follows: section 1 It is still unclear what metacognition is. Two main theories introduces the two main theories of metacognition together about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to with the empirical data that they cite in their favor. Section provide a better explanation of the phenomenon, while 2 develops the idea of two levels of metacognition and discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. My claim is characterizes each level according to the dual-process that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of theories of cognition. Finally, section 3 considers some metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this interactions between the two levels and the question of capacity. It can be shown that each of these theories has how to individuate the levels. been trying to explain only one of the two levels and that, consequently, the conflict between them can be dissolved. Finally, I characterize each level and explain some of their interactions. 1. Two Theories of Metacognition 1.1 Metarepresentational Theory of Metacognition Introduction From the point of view of the metarepresentational theory, Current discussions of metacognition have focused on metacognition refers literally to “thinking about thinking”, questions like the following: What is the nature of i.e., to the self-ascription of mental states carried out by metacognition? What is the function of this mental forming a second order thought about a first order one, and capacity? What is the content and epistemic status of more generally forming an n+1-order thought about an n- metacognitive assessments? Which living beings are order thought. Such self-ascription depends on a more endowed with it? At the present stage of the discussion, general mindreading capacity consisting in an inferential two main theories have been proposed concerning the capacity to attribute mental states in order to interpret and proper set of answers to these questions. One claims that rationalize other people's behavior. Thus metacognition in metacognition is a metarepresentational capacity to self- this sense is no more than “turning our mindreading ascribe mental states, whereas the other claims that it is capacities upon ourselves” (Carruthers 2009, 2006; Larkin mainly a capacity to evaluate our cognitive processes via a 2010; Gopnik 1993; Bogdan 2001, 2005; Flavell 2004). mental simulation of them. Mindreading requires the possession of mental My suggestion is that our metacognitive capacity concepts by the subject in order to apply them to other people and interpret their behavior. Mental concepts are can be understood as involving two different levels of 1 complexity (as is also suggested by Koriat (2000)), each concepts referring to propositional attitudes such as having a different structure, a different content and a perceptions, feelings, intentions, knowledge, beliefs and different function within the cognitive architecture, and expectations, among others. Therefore, the necessary that each of the competing theories has been addressing a structure of metacognitive judgments is composed by: 1) a different level. Thus, in the end, the two theories can be proposition (e.g. “it rains”), 2) a first-order attitude shown to be compatible since they provide explanations of directed to that representation, such as believing or different levels of metacognition. Moreover, my argument also shows that any theory that aims to explain human 1 It is still a matter of hot debate whether all these mental attitudes are metacognition should be able to account for both levels propositional; especially in the cases of perception, emotion and feeling. And it is also unclear if all the metarepresentational theorists hold a and their interactions. propositional view of attitudes. To my knowledge, within the group of metarepresentational theorists, at least Carruthers (2009c) is committed to this view. My own view is that the content of perception, emotion and Copyright © 2010, Association for the Advancement of Artificial feelings is nonconceptual and non-propositional, though I am not going to Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. claim so here. 42 intending, denoted by a mental concept, and 3) a second- 1.2 Control Theory of Metacognition order attitude, namely a metacognitive judgment, directed The control view on metacognition claims that it is mainly to the first order attitude (2) and its proposition (1) (Proust a capacity to evaluate and control our cognitive processes 2007). In other words, the content of a second-order and mental dispositions by means of mental simulation. In representation is necessarily constituted by the self- Joëlle Proust’s words: “The aim is, rather, to evaluate attribution of a mental concept together with a first-order one’s present mental dispositions, endorse them, and form representation: epistemic and conative commitments” (Proust 2009b). The main point is that this evaluative capacity does not follow [3] I believe that [2] I KNOW (or PERCEIVE, BELIEVE, from a theoretical capacity to meta-represent attitudes FEEL, ETC) that [1] it rains. (mindreading), i.e., subjects do not need to form a second- order representation about their first order attitudes in order It should be highlighted then that a necessary to evaluate and control them. As Pamela Hieronymi puts it: condition to form thoughts with this structure is to possess “The forming and revising of beliefs and intentions is not and be able to apply mental concepts. Thus, from an voluntary nor does it require the same kind of reflective evolutionary point of view, only beings endowed with the distance or awareness” (Hieronymi 2009).3 Thus, it does capacity for mindreading would be able to form not require the possession of mental concepts, a theory of metacognitive judgments. However, empirical studies mind or mindreading. Control theorists speculate that such using the ‘false belief test’ have suggested that non-human evaluative capacity derives from an off-line simulation of animals lack the mindreading capacity since they are not the cognitive process in question which permits predicting able to attribute false beliefs to others (Bermúdez 2009; and adjusting future cognitive performance on a given task Povinelli 2000; Hare et al. 2000, 2001; Povinelli and Vonk (Proust 2007, 2008, 2009a; Peacocke 2007, 2008, 2009), as 2003) and thus are also incapable of metacognition in this happens in the case of bodily actions where the subject sense. From a developmental point of view, infants are runs an off-line motor program to predict her future only capable of self-ascriptions of mental attitudes after performance (Grush 2004). they have acquired a theory of mind that provides them Inspired by the psychological literature on human with mastery of the relevant mental concepts (Wellman and non-human metacognition, the control theory holds 1990; Baron-Cohen 1995; Gopnik and Melzoff 1997). that the postulated evaluative capacity can be understood Most of these theorists acknowledge that metacognition in as a capacity to monitor and control cognitive activities, this sense starts between the ages of 3 and 4, but others such as remembering or perceiving, which is more hold that it does not occur until the age of 5 or even later primitive than mindreading. Empirical data supporting (see Bodgan 2001, 2005). control theories come from the domains of experimental From an epistemological point of view, there should and animal psychology: 1) Different behavioral paradigms be almost no difference between the knowledge that a support the claim that very often humans do not rely on subject has about herself and her knowledge about others 2 metarepresentations to control their cognitive activities because both are based on the similar behavioral cues, use (Koriat 2000, Reder 1996; Paynter, Reder, and Kieffaber the same conceptual resources to make inferences and are 2009; Walsh and Anderson 2009). For example, Reder and produced by the same cognitive mechanism. Both kinds of Schunn (1996) have shown that subjects are able to assess knowledge derive from mindreading and thus have the and decide among possible cognitive strategies, e.g., same epistemic status. For example, the following whether they will be able either to remember or calculate a judgments: “He intends to listen to the teacher” and “I math problem, based on a feeling of knowing produced by intend to listen to the teacher” are based on the observation the properties of the retrieval process and not by the of some bodily behavior (as turning the head in some content of the solution. And 2) some non-human animals direction) together with contextual factors and other cues, that lack mental concepts and mindreading seem and are produced by the mindreading capacity using the nonetheless to be endowed with the capacity to monitor same concepts and therefore have the same epistemic and control their cognitive performance in memory and status. perception tasks, allowing them to have an accurate performance similar to human behavior in perception and memory (see Smith 2009 for a review). These findings seem to support a distinction between mindreading and metacognition and also suggest the idea that metacognition is a function exerted by means of a different 2 I say “almost” because Carruthers’ later account of mindreading acknowledges that first person mindreading has access to some cues (such as visual, auditory and motor imagery and inner speech) that the third 3 Even if Hieronymi never speaks of metacognition as such, it seems to person mindreading does not have access to. This creates a quantitative me that her theory of metal control can be understood as a control theory difference but not a qualitative one: access in both cases is interpretative of metacognition, regardless of whether or not she uses the term and of and thus its epistemic status remains the same.