CHAPTER 1 7 THE END OF THE ROA D OUT mid-December when the 18th Australian Brigade was takin g Bover from the Americans of Warren Force to sweep the coast as fa r as Giropa Point; when the Americans of Urbana Force were trying to clear the Triangle preparatory to closing in on the Buna Governmen t Station; and when the Australian 21st Brigade and 39th Battalion, havin g just taken Gona, were cleaning up towards the mouth of the Ambog a River, there began a new phase of the slow struggle among the swamp s bordering the Sanananda Track in which first the 16th Australian Brigade , then the 126th American Infantry, and then the Australian 49th an d 55/53rd Battalions had drained out their strength . Lieut-General Herrin g then possessed few infantry units which had not been committed at som e stage of the New Guinea fighting. At Port Moresby there were the 2/ 1s t Pioneers, the 36th Battalion and the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment (servin g as infantry) ; at Milne Bay was the 17th Brigade . The pioneers had made a brief foray from Port Moresby along the Kokoda Track, but, for most of their time, had been labouring in the gravel quarry and on the road s at Port Moresby. General Blarney considered it necessary to hold th e recently-arrived 17th Brigade at Milne Bay in case the Japanese attacke d again. The 36th Battalion and the 2/7th Cavalry were the last Australia n infantry to join the coastal forces . The 36th, a militia unit from New South Wales, had arrived at Port Moresby late in May as part of the 14th Brigade . The 2/7th Cavalry was part of the 7th Division and had been formed in May 1940 . Though the regiment had left Australia in that year, battle had so far eluded it . It trained in Palestine and Egypt, went to Cyprus in May 1941 to augmen t the slender garrison when that island was threatened with airborne in- vasion, and then rejoined its division in Syria . After their return to Aus- tralia with other units of the 6th and 7th Divisions early in 1942 th e cavalrymen spent a period in south Queensland training in infantry tactic s before they set out for New Guinea in September. Their work and trainin g at Port Moresby continued into December and, when orders to move for- ward arrived, their spirits rose high . Some 350 of them were flown acros s the range. On the 15th December, immediately before the concentration at Soput a of these two fresh units, Brigadier Porter considered the situation existing along the Sanananda Track . Excluding service troops, mortarmen an d signallers, he had 22 officers and 505 men in the 49th and 55th/53rd Battalions; 9 officers and 110 men of the 2/3rd Battalion ; 22 officers and 523 men of the 126th American Regiment. He noted, however, that the two last-named could be used only in a positional role, the 2/3rd becaus e its men were sick and exhausted, the Americans "for various reasons" 498 THE END OF THE ROAD 15-18 Dec including sickness and fatigue . Of the strength opposed to this force h e wrote : In actual numbers, it is difficult to estimate enemy strength but his state is such that he has undertaken locality defence with every available man and, as such, doe s not require personnel for the maintenance of a mobile force . All his strength appears to be devoted to occupying fixed positions, in which there are numerous alternativ e defences, for the purpose of staying indefinitely to impede our advance. His positions are in depth from our present position to a distance of 2,500 yards along the road— this information from our patrols—and probably all the distance to Sanananda . His strength in fighting personnel is probably 1,500 to 2,000 in the forward areas . A policy of encirclement will enable us to capture and occupy localities further to the north and even on the road itself, at the expense of strength i n hand and protection of our axis and vulnerable L of C installations. I am prepared to seize more ground, as such, but this will not reduce enemy localities other tha n by a slow policy of stalking and starving him. He must be attacked jointly and severally and this requires manpower. Since our first assault ; we have used a "stalk and consolidate" type of tactics, combined with fire concentrations on enem y positions, as discovered. We have patrolled deeply and over wide areas . Several raids have had the effect of killing some enemy but his well-constructed MG posi- tions defy our fire power and present a barrier of fire through which our troop s must pass. We have attempted to seize these in the failing light but they are too numerous to deal with by other than an attack in great strength . Against this background Major-General Vasey planned an attack fo r the 19th December by the newly-arrived cavalry and the 30th Brigade , his orders, issued on the 17th, based on this summing-up of the Japanese situation. Our immediate enemy has been in position without reinforcement of personnel , material and supplies since 21-22 November . During the intervening period the enemy has been continually harassed by air, artillery or mortar bombardments and sub- ject to infantry attacks and offensive patrols . From information obtained from prisoners of war and captured natives it would appear that he is now short o f supplies. The enemy, therefore, should now be considerably weaker although his strengt h in automatic weapons has NOT been greatly reduced in the areas which he is stil l holding. However, in spite of great tenacity, past experience has shown he has a breaking point and it is felt that this is now close. Adverse local conditions an d the ever present possibility of him receiving reinforcements makes it imperative tha t the complete and utter destruction of the enemy in the Sanananda area should be carried out at the earliest possible moment . He said that the 2/7th Cavalry, skirting the most forward Japanes e positions and starting from Huggins' road-block, were to push quickl y along the track to Sanananda Point and seize the beach area there ; while the 30th Brigade, moving initially in the cavalry's wake and destroyin g first the forces between themselves and the road-block, were to eliminate all the Japanese then remaining in the area from Giruwa to Garara . In preparation for the 30th Brigade's part in this synchronised move- ment, Porter sent the 36th Battalion (Lieut-Colonel Isaachsen 1 ) to take over on the 18th the positions astride the road which the other two militia battalions had been holding . Lieut-Colonel Kessels then swung the main I Lt-Col O . C . Isaachsen, DSO, ED, SX2915. 2/27 Bn; CO 36 Bn 1942-45 . Barrister and solicitor; of Malvern, SA; b . Mannum, SA, 5 Jun 1911 . (Australian War ,Memorial ) Strengthening a 25-pounder gun emplacement of the 2/5th Field Regiment at Buna . Known as "Carson ' s Gun " it was sited between the two strips and west of the bridge across Simem i Creek . Left to right : Gunner Mick Williams (on loan from the 2/1st Field Regiment) ; Gunners J . Webster, A . S . Meecham, Sergeant R . G . Carson, and WO2 J . Puxty (with binoculars) of the 2/5th . (Australian War Memorial ) Major W . H . Hall, the commander of the 2/5th Field Regiment battery at Buna, observin g from Captain T . J . Handran-Smith' s O .P . in a 70-foot banyan tree sited about 1,300 yard s forward of "Carson's Gun" and in the bush off the southern side of Old Strip . ter.-►~i►~ (Australian War Memorial ) (Australian War Memorial ) Gona, during a lull in the fighting. A variety of mess equipmen t Christmas Day at Buna 1942 . A wounded soldier, Pte G . C. Whit- was used by the Australians. The Australian standing is holding tington of the 2/10th Battalion, gropes his way to an aid station , the bottom portion of a Japanese mess kit; another is scooping guided by a Papuan boy. An emergency field dressing covers water from the creek in a blackened tin probably used also as a Whittington's wounds, from which he died later . billy-can ; the soldier on the right is drinking from the corner o f an Australian dixic. 18-19 Dec MILITIA ATTACKS 499 part of his 49th Battalion away to the right and Lieut-Colonel Lovell too k his 55th/53rd to the left. Porter's plans for the 19th were that Kessel s should clear a way north-west to the road from the vicinity of the are a which Major Hutchison was holding with a handful of weary men o f the 2/3rd Battalion and establish himself at a point about 500 yard s north of the Cape Killerton track junction; that the 55th/53rd shoul d thrust almost due east from the position Captain Herwig was mannin g with the remainder of the 2/3rd to clear the major part of the road u p to the Killerton Track; the 36th Battalion, in brigade reserve, was to b e prepared to exploit the success of either of the other two battalions . Mortars and Major Hanson' s four guns of the 2/1st Field Regiment would support the attack . The guns opened at 7 .22 a.m. on the 19th and the mortars joined in four minutes later.