Consolidate and Conquer: A Model for Assessing the Prospects of the Islamic State Jesse Michael Bannister Charlottesville, Virginia BLS International Affairs, University of Mary Washington, 2007 A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts in Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Languages and Cultures University of Virginia May, 2018 Introduction In the nearly two decades that have passed since the attacks of September 11, 2001, western scholars have devoted considerable attention to the phenomenon of militant Islamist movements. The intense focus on these movements has continued to grow with the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria as a so called “pseudo-state” (hereinafter referred to as the Islamic State) in 2014. The stunning, success of the Islamic State in the modern era, raises a serious question about the long-term viability of the movement and what actions will it need to take to survive in the long term. In the study that follows, I will conduct a cross-case comparison to compare two movements very similar to the Islamic State: The Wahābīs and the Almohads, in order to develop a theoretical trajectory for what is required of a militant Islamist movement to establish an enduring state-like entity. The selection of the Wahābīs and the Almohads provides a basis for comparing the Islamic State to movements which have a large number of factors in common so as to ensure that the cross-case comparison generates a trajectory that can be reasonably applied to the Islamic State. As such, I have only included movements which have sought to impose an expressly Islamic form of government on its subjects and which have relied on the use of force as a key element in its attempt to establish a state-like political entity. Therefore, I have purposefully omitted certain groups, such as the Ottomans, which were indeed militant, but not Islamist in the sense that the form of government they established was not originally based on Islamic principles to the exclusion of other religions, at least not in the beginning. Similarly, I have excluded political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which although Islamist, does 2 not advocate the application of force as a pillar of its strategy, seeking instead to work within the existing governmental structures in the countries where it operates. After establishing a theoretical trajectory for a successful militant Islamist movement, I will then compare the trajectory of the Islamic State to that theoretical trajectory to assess the likely durability of the Islamic State in the coming years. Through this process I will demonstrate that socio-political cohesion is the factor most crucial to the success of militant Islamist movements. This socio-political cohesion is something that successful movements can only achieve through sustained, purposeful efforts to consolidate their socio-political base. Thus, the socio-political cohesion of a movement is a result of socio-political consolidation - a process by which a movement’s leaders seek to create a uniform understanding among the movement’s members of the movement’s mission and its objectives, along with the required motivation to achieve those objectives. An analysis of the Islamic State through this lens suggests that the movement has made several critical errors in neglecting the political consolidation of their movement in their quest to achieve military victories over external opponents. Despite these early failures, the Islamic State appears to have belatedly recognized their failures in this regard and have taken measures to rectify their lack of socio-political cohesion through a concerted program of consolidation in the form of outreach and education. In light of the recent military defeats the movement has sustained in both Iraq and Syria, the question remains open as to whether their socio-political consolidation efforts will result in a level of cohesion necessary to achieve long- term success. A nuanced understanding of the strengths and limitations found in the Islamic State’s political trajectory of development may provide clues to scholars, policy-makers, 3 activists, and government entities seeking to defeat the Islamic State in its current manifestation, as well as for dealing with similar groups that may emerge in the coming years. Theory In considering the available theoretical models on which to base a study of militant Islamist movements, Paul Kennedy’s theory for the development of great powers offers a useful point of departure. In his book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers Kennedy proposes that economic success provides the foundation for later development and sustainment of military might, which can then be translated into material and territorial gains against disadvantaged opponents, thereby fueling even greater growth. However, Kennedy warns that excessive emphasis on the military components of empire can bring about detrimental effects, such as stagnating economic growth, strategic overreach, and the formation of opposing coalitions.1 A somewhat simplified graphic representation of Kennedy’s theory could be rendered as follows: Figure 1: Graphic Summary of Kennedy’s Theory Economic Growth National Power, National Power + Military Conquests Great Power Status, Great Power Status + Overreach Decline/Collapse 1 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Vintage: New York, 1987, pp. xv-xxv. 4 Throughout his lengthy book, Kennedy focuses much of his discussion on the development of primarily European powers throughout the modern period, beginning in 1500 and ending immediately prior to the end of the Cold War era. While the use of this model seems appropriate for a grand study of empires, coalitions, and nation states, it does not seem to provide an adequate model for explaining the trajectory of political entities, such as nation- states or empires that begin as weak and economically inferior insurgent movements, that nevertheless succeed in forming stable forms of government. If Kennedy’s theory were universally applicable to all movements that aspired to political power, we would expect that only those movements which succeeded in attaining economic superiority over their peers and adversaries would achieve political success. However, history is replete with counter examples, particularly in the realm of insurgent movements, that have obtained political power in the form of a state-like political entity despite their economic inferiority vis-à-vis their adversaries. Consequently, it bears consideration that some modification to Kennedy’s theory may be necessary to develop a model with sufficient explanatory power to assess the insurgent movements that find success in building governments. Drawing on the writings of the prominent 14th century Arab historian, Ibn Khaldun, we find that his theories on the stages of a dynasty and the factors central to building a successful political entity, such as an empire or a state are relevant to our study of militant Islamist insurgent movements that aspire to political power. Ibn Khaldun begins the third chapter of his Muqaddimah with the following quote: 5 “Royal authority and large dynastic (power) are attained only through a group and group feeling.”2 Here, the term “group feeling” could perhaps be better understood in the modern context as “group cohesion” or, more technically, “socio-political cohesion”. In contrast to Kennedy, who determined that economic power was the pathway to political power, Ibn Khaldun regards socio-political cohesion as the surer path to achieving political success. Although it was formulated in the latter half of the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun’s theory retains its relevance into the present era. Indeed, notable guerrilla leaders of the 20th century, including Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevarra, considered that the unity and cohesion of an insurgent movement across the various levels of participation was essential to success of the movement.3 I therefore propose to eliminate the economic component of Kennedy’s model and to replace it with socio-political cohesion as a necessary precursor to sustained strategic growth. My reasons for this modification are three-fold. Firstly, both Mao and Guevara emphasize the necessity of unity among all components of a guerrilla movement as a key element in achieving victory over an incumbent government force. However, similar to Ibn Khaldun, neither Mao nor Guevarra devote a similar amount of attention in their respective works to the economic status of the insurgent force, thereby suggesting that, at least in the universe of insurgencies, the role of economic development is secondary to that of socio- political cohesion. 2 Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, translated by Franz Rosenthal, Public Domain, published online at: https://asadullahali.files.wordpress.com/2012/10/ibn_khaldun-al_muqaddimah.pdf. Accessed April 7, 2018 3 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith, Praeger: New York, 1961 pp. 88-89 and Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998, pp. 106, 110, 114-122 6 Since our study will be limited in scope to assess the political trajectories of militant Islamist movements, namely the Almohads, the Wahābī movement, and the Islamic State, we will focus on their ability to actively consolidate their respective socio-political bases. This consolidation, when used as a means for achieving unity in the movement, is