UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Club model politics and global financial governance: the case of the Group of Thirty Tsingou, E. Publication date 2012 Document Version Final published version Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Tsingou, E. (2012). Club model politics and global financial governance: the case of the Group of Thirty. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:30 Sep 2021 Club model politics and global financial governance: governance: Club financial and global politics model Club model politics and global financial governance: The case of the group of thirty The case of the group of thirtyThe the group of of case Eleni Tsingou Eleni Eleni Tsingou CLUB MODEL POLITICS AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF THE GROUP OF THIRTY ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT Ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op woensdag 30 mei 2012, 14.00 uur door Eleni Tsingou geboren te Athene, Griekenland i Promotiecommissie: Promotor: Prof. dr. G.R.D. Underhill Overige leden: Prof. dr. E.R. Engelen dr. A. Freyberg Inan Prof. dr. G.C.A. Junne Prof. dr. S. Lütz Prof. dr. S. Quack Faculteit der Maatschappij- en Gedragswetenschappen ii Table of Contents Acknowledgments iv Note on Interviewees’ Anonymity vi Abbreviations vii Chapter 1 Club Model Politics, Financial Elites and 1 Transnational Policy Communities in Global Financial Governance Chapter 2 Exercising Authority in Global Financial 38 Governance Chapter 3 Club Model Politics and the Transnational Policy 70 Community: An Examination of The Group of Thirty Chapter 4 The ‘Nuts and Bolts’ of Financial Governance: 99 Securities Clearance and Settlement Chapter 5 Regulation as Risk Management: The Non- 126 Regulation of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Chapter 6 Self-Regulation and Self-Supervision in the Making 155 of Basel II Chapter 7 Conclusion: Club Model Politics, Transnational 177 Policy Communities and Authority in Global Finance Appendices 202 References 223 Summary 248 Overzicht 252 iii Acknowledgements As with most such projects, the work undertaken, and its completion, was only made possible thanks to the support, intellectual and otherwise, of a number of colleagues and friends. That this project took longer than most only means that my gratitude is greater. First and foremost, I wish to thank Geoffrey Underhill, my doctoral supervisor, for his consistent professional and personal encouragement, his guidance, his patience, his unwavering enthusiasm for the project and his inspiration in thinking through these political economy questions in the first place. I received considerable feedback and intellectual stimulation from a number of other members of the University of Amsterdam and Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR) community, most notably Brian Burgoon, who invariably helped me to ask the right questions and move beyond the narrow confines of my empirical project. The project benefited from extensive empirical research and I wish to acknowledge the priceless contribution of all those people in the financial community who happily gave up some of their time and agreed to be interviewed and offer most useful insights into the workings of financial governance. Many of those interviewed requested anonymity, I am thus not in a position to thank them personally. I do, however, wish to note that my gratitude is immense. I learned a lot and it would be no exaggeration to say that those interactions were a great source of motivation in moving the project forward. The empirical work greatly benefited from generous financial support from the AISSR (then ASSR) and subsequently, the UK Economic and Social Research Council, for which I am grateful. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform; the experience was most valuable and assisted me greatly in putting my work in context. iv Parts and segments of this dissertation, and concepts and work linked to it, have appeared in articles in International Politics, International Political Sociology, the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, and the Review of International Political Economy. Double that number have appeared in various edited collections. This dissertation remains original and is not a replication of these articles or chapters. Many thanks are also owed to a number of colleagues who over the years have provided invaluable advice and have been the kind of interlocutors that make this profession such a privilege. The list is not exhaustive but includes: Andrew Baker, Mark Blyth, James Brassett, Shaun Breslin, André Broome, Randall Germain, Eric Helleiner, Richard Higgott, Daniel Mügge, Jens Mortensen, Jude Murison, Stefano Pagliari, James Perry, Tony Porter, Elliot Posner, Marieke Riethof, Paola Robotti, Leonard Seabrooke, Diane Stone, Antje Vetterlein, Brigitte Young, Wesley Widmaier and Xiaoke Zhang. I think myself fortunate to count many of them as friends following years in the workshop and conference circuit. For early inspiration and continuing friendship, I wish to especially thank Susan Sell. Special mention goes to my colleagues at the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. In particular, I wish to thank my GARNET ‘family’, Richard Higgott and Denise Hewlett, who made running a large European project actually fun, and beyond the Midlands, Petra Roter and Karine Zufferey. Enormous gratitude, of course, goes to those closest to me, and I wish to thank above all Paul Merrey for simply being a wonderful person and taking such good care of me, as well as long-time friends Annie Malama and Christianna Nicolaou. Last but not least, I wish to thank my family for their love and support. My ‘Greek’ family have been patient, provided comfort and remained remarkably enthusiastic about this project and what it means to me. My ‘Danish’ family are life, and for that, I cannot thank them enough. Copenhagen October 2011 v Note on Interviewees’ Anonymity Research for this project relies heavily on information provided during some eighty interviews conducted between 1998 and 2010. As this dissertation can attest, many in the cast of characters that populates the world of financial reform have remained the same, while new actors have also been introduced. Interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s place of work, with the exception of a handful following policy workshops, specialist conferences, or in ‘private clubs’ (as will be clarified in the dissertation). An additional fifteen interviews were conducted by telephone. The interviews typically lasted an hour. Anonymity was, of course, offered to all interviewees. Many were happy to go on the public record. Where I have drawn on direct quotes from interviewees in the text of the dissertation, and where interviewees are named, this can be considered ‘on record’ and an official part of the story of the transnational policy community involved in the construction of global finance. vi Abbreviations AEI American Enterprise Institute BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International BIS Bank for International Settlements CDO Collateralised Debt Obligation CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission CPSS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems CRMPG Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group CSD Central Securities Depository DBL Drexel Burnham Lambert DBLT Drexel Burnham Lambert Trading DPG Derivatives Policy Group DTCC Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (US) DVP delivery versus payment EC European Commission ERT European Roundtable of Industrialists EU European Union FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FIBV Fédération Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs FRB Federal Reserve Board FSA Financial Services Authority FSB Financial Stability Board FSF Financial Stability Forum G-20 Group of Twenty G-30 Group of Thirty GAO (US) General Accounting Office GDSG Global Derivatives Study Group IAIS International Association of Insurers Supervisors vii IIF Institute of International Finance IMF International Monetary Fund IOSCO International Organisation of Securities Commissions IPE International Political Economy ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association ISSA International Securities Services Association LIBA London Investment Banking Association LTCM Long-Term Capital Management OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development