Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 8 11-2018 Aggression or Desperation: Reevaluating the Soviet Motivations for Invading Afghanistan Kyle Sallee Portland State University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh Part of the History Commons Recommended Citation Sallee, Kyle (2018) "Aggression or Desperation: Reevaluating the Soviet Motivations for Invading Afghanistan," Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 8. DOI: 10.20429/aujh.2018.080208 Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol8/iss2/8 This article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sallee: Aggression or Desperation Aggression or Desperation: Reevaluating the Soviet Motivations for Invading Afghanistan Kyle Sallee Portland State University (Portland, Oregon) In the historiography of the Cold War, the pervading viewpoint has settled to resemble that of George Kennan’s 1947 “X” article in Foreign Affairs, chiefly, that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power which sought to erode Western influence wherever it saw the opportunity. Soviet expansionism, it was thought, evolved from the fundamental characteristics of the Russian national character, reinforced by Marxist ideology and Soviet propaganda. But, beyond its contributions to the historical narrative of the Cold War, Kennan’s article would provide the foundation for the Truman Doctrine and the subsequent policies pursued by the United States throughout the Cold War period; including American presuppositions about the motives behind the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. A reading of declassified Soviet and American documents, however, reveals that in the case of Afghanistan, much of what was assumed about the invasion was wrong. Indeed, the invasion of Afghanistan was neither a threat to Western security, nor was it a part of a grand Soviet plan to sway the balance of power in the Middle East. Alternatively, the Russo-Afghan War was a snare-trap set by the United States. The following dissertation aims to understand the political motivations of the Published by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern, 2018 113 Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History, Vol. 8 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8 Soviet Union for its invasion into Afghanistan by analyzing declassified Soviet and American documents, while offering a historical critique of prior interpretations of the invasion. At the time of the Soviet invasion, and for the decades which have followed it, analysts have posited that the invasion of Afghanistan was a major strategic advance by the Soviet Union as well as a setback to the United States and its Western allies. In 1988, Roseanne Klass of Freedom House expressed the following viewpoints in Foreign Affairs: On April 27, 1978, after two centuries of Russian efforts to gain a foothold, the Soviet Union seized virtual control of Afghanistan through a bloody coup carried out by its agents in the Afghan air force and tank corps under the guidance of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul…The Soviet Union then dug in for a long-term war of subjugation along lines developed in its century-long conquest of Central Asia; in addition to the military action, the Soviets began the systematic creation of an infrastructure for permanent political and economic control.1 Klass’ point is straightforward: the 1979 intervention was the culmination of a longstanding plan, whereby the Soviet Union sought to use its conquest of Afghanistan as a way to dominate the Near East region and to threaten Western interests in that region. Similarly, Michael Cox, a British international relations scholar and professor emeritus at the London School of Economics, wrote “The Soviet threat was real enough. That much is obvious from any reading of the new primary sources.”2 While Cox is writing generally about the Soviet threat throughout the Cold War period, this notion remains unsupported in the specific case of Afghanistan. While innumerable interpretations of the causative factors of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have been put forward, the thematic undertones to the majority of interpretations are characterized by the notion of a “big-bad” Soviet Union hoping to disrupt the status quo. In 1 Roseanne Klass, “Afghanistan: The Accords,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5 (1988): 925-926. 2 Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation – Again,” Journal of International Studies 32, no.1 (2003): 10. https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol8/iss2/8 114 DOI: 10.20429/aujh.2018.080208 Sallee: Aggression or Desperation 1983, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, a Pakistani political scientist, summarized the pervading viewpoints on the invasion. By his account, there were nine total factors which had been attributed to the Soviet invasion; seven of which could be directly tied to notions of Soviet aggression.3 Amongst the factors listed, Cheema underscored the repeated use of the Russian quest for a warm-water port on the Arabian Sea nearer to the Gulf as a misunderstood justification for the Soviet invasion. By Cheema’s account, the Soviet invasion could be attributed to the culmination of all nine of his points and not, simply, one primary factor. While Cheema’s review of scholarly work on Afghanistan offers great insight into the early discourse of analysts on the invasion, access to declassified Soviet documents has disproven many of his points. On December 28, 1979, Soviet combat troops moved into Afghanistan on a massive scale, killing President Hafiz Ullah Amin, and replacing him with Babrak Karmal. Since the Marxist Coup in 1978, this was the first occasion on which Soviet troops were directly engaged in deposing an incumbent Marxist leader of a country.4 The invasion had global implications, including a major shift in U.S. policy away from the restrained attitudes of détente toward a more forward and aggressive set of policies. As David N. Gibbs notes in Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan that on a global level “the invasion was a watershed event, delegitimizing Soviet policy, and communism more generally, in the eyes of world public opinion.”5 The invasion was the largest Soviet military action since 1945, but 3 Pervaiz Cheema’s causes of the Soviet invasion are listed as: 1. The lack of structure to detente which forced the Soviets to be more active in the Third World, 2. The fear of Islamic fundamentalism which had arisen in Iran, 3. Soviet sensitivity about its borders, 4. Soviet compensation for its poor response to the 1979 Sino-Vietnam war, 5. The acquisition of a warm-water port on the Arabian Sea, 6. The emergence of hardliners within the Kremlin who pushed for war, 7. Anxieties about the loss of Marxist leadership within Afghanistan, 8. Afghanistan could serve as a staging area for future Soviet engagements, and 9. To block American attempts at seizing Pakistan. 4 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan’s Security Dilemma,” Asian Survey 23, no. 3 (1983): 228. 5 David N. Gibbs, “Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2006): Published by Digital Commons@Georgia Southern, 2018 115 Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History, Vol. 8 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8 also marked the third change-over in Afghan leadership since the death of President Mohammed Daoud Khan. The Rise of Mohammed Daoud Khan Afghanistan had been in political turmoil since July 17, 1973, when Mohammed Daoud Khan seized power from his cousin, King Zahir Shah. The background to the coup went back several years, when Daoud and left-wing elements came together. Soon after July 1973, Daoud explained, “for more than a year the subject of a coup was being considered by some friends, and various plans discussed. Only when anarchy and anti-national attitude of the regime reached its peak was the decision for action taken.”6 It was Daoud’s allies in the coup who raised speculation in the Western press that the July coup in Kabul was pro-Soviet, communist-directed or planned within the Soviet embassy. The meetings which Daoud referred to in his public statement were with liberals and left-wing officers and civil servants, but the coup itself was performed mainly by young army officers trained in the Soviet Union. Less than a month after the coup, Bernard Weinraub of The New York Times reported that “speculation abounds about the role of the army, once considered loyal to the monarchy. Virtually the entire officer corps was trained in the Soviet Union.”7 During his term as Prime Minister from 1953 to 1964, Daoud had ruled with an iron fist. Had he allowed the process of a constitutional monarchy to develop, it is probable that the Communists would have been swept away by the fast currents of liberalism. This, 239. 6 Anthony Hyman, Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination 1964-1983. (Macmillan Press: London) 1982: 64. 7 Bernard Weinraub, “Two Weeks After Coup, Afghan Government Remains Paralyzed and Public Seems Mostly Apathetic,” New York Times, August 1, 1973. https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/aujh/vol8/iss2/8 116 DOI: 10.20429/aujh.2018.080208 Sallee: Aggression or Desperation however, did not happen as Daoud regarded liberals as much a threat to monarchy as he feared communism.8 Although he tried in his early tenure to crush both, Daoud simultaneously acted to improve ties with the Soviet Union. In his second term, 1973-1979, both as Prime Minister and President, Daoud tried the reverse; he was soft on the Moscow Parcham party at home and relatively tough with Moscow. Following Daoud’s coup, the Iranian government took special interest in Afghanistan and began to exert influence over its politics.