Chapter 2 Equality. Towards globalrelationalegalitarianism Acommitment to the ideal of equality, as explained by an account of global rela- tional egalitarianism, is the second constitutive elementofthe cosmopolitan ethos. Generally, the ideal of equality is central for both moral and political phi- losophy, for both theories of ethics and of justice. Iwill contrast two different understandingsofequalityand favour arelational interpretation over adistrib- utive one. On this interpretation, equality is understood primarilyassomething agents do (and not primarilyasafeature of persons or apattern of distributions); afirm commitment to relational equality will shape the disposition of individual agents to feel and think, talk and act about global issues, making it acorner- stone of the cosmopolitan ethos and an important elementofanswering the question about the role and responsibilities of individuals in the face of injustice. Thus, the following pages take up the question What is the pointofglobal equality? and, givenits importance for the project of developing atheory of cos- mopolitan responsibility,discuss it at length. Today, manypeople tend to agree with the statement thatall human beingshaveequal moral worth, astatement also enshrinedinmanyconstitutions and human rights documents. Neverthe- less, extreme global inequalities persist in the living conditions of people around the globe, in how much accesstoresources they have,orinhow welltheir basic needs are met,and in how much influencethey have on decisions that matter most to their livesand well-being. Questioning the point of global equality calls for spellingout this widelyheld (but grosslyunderdetermined) view. How exactlyisthis notion of equality an issue of moral concern?Answering the question demands, in turn, acareful specification of just which inequalities between people matter, and why. My attempt to answer this question turns primarily on—and ultimatelypro- motes—aview that Icall global relational egalitarianism that has not yetreceived much attention in the scholarlyliterature. Idiscuss whether and how this view provides aplausible and useful approach for spelling out the moral importance and implications of an ideal of global equality.Global relational egalitarianism is an extension of atheory of egalitarianism initiallydevelopedwith anational set- ting in mind. Relationalegalitarianism, bothinits domestic and globalvariants, stresses that the crucial first implication of moral equality is that people should stand in relations of social equality to one another and interact with one another as moral equals. Equalitythen is alived practice, something we do,not astatic state of affairs. This view has implications not onlyfor interpersonal relation- ships, but also for relations between groups.Here, aprimary concern is with OpenAccess. ©2020 Jan-Christoph Heilinger,published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the CreativeCommons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110612271-004 66 Equality the domination, oppression, or exclusion of some within unjust structures that are instantiated or upheld also through individual behaviour.While domestic re- lational egalitarianism has been explicated in detail in the works of Anderson, Scheffler,and others, the idea of a global version of relational egalitarianism has not yetreceivedmuch attention. Thus Iundertake to explore whether such an extension is feasible, as well as plausible and helpful. Icontrastglobal relational egalitarianism with global luck egalitarianism (or global distributive egalitarianism), which is itself aglobal extension of domestic luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism, as Iwill present it here, is fundamen- tallyconcernedwith attempts to counteract unjustified inequalities in the distri- bution of goods between people.⁶⁷ The assumption thatthe crucial first implica- tion of moralequalityisthatpeople are (with some qualifications) entitled to distributive equality, lies at the coreofluck egalitarianism, in both its domestic and globalforms. Iultimatelyargue that the egalitarian coreofcosmopolitan responsibility should be spelled out in terms of global relationalegalitarianism, since that view is both theoreticallymore plausible and practicallymorerelevant than global luck egalitarianism. One important argument for this claim is thatsome degree of economic inequality,ifitoccurs aboveacertain threshold of sufficien- cy,isnot intrinsicallymorallyproblematic, even if it results from processes and factors beyond one’scontrol. This holds true, Iargue, because some distributive inequality in non-relational goods (with bothalowerand an upperlimit of how much of the relevant goods people have access to) does not necessarilyconflict with the equal moral worth of people and still allows for social and relational equalityunderstood as the possibilityand reality of interactions among equals on afooting of equality. However,extreme forms of distributive inequality—ab- solutedeprivation and extreme luxury—quite clearly conflict with the equal moral value of all, and undermineall possibilities for social equality. Generally, however,Idonot contend that concern for globalequality is based on ajustified claim or entitlement to equal distributive shares or an equalising compensation of inequalities that result from brutebad luck. Instead, concern for global equal- ity is acorollary of ajustified moralobligation to see every person equallyasde- serving moral concern, and thus to take the interests of all—as moral equals— Iamawareofthe fact that,infollowingAnderson’scritique,Isomewhat selectively focus on resourcist and distributive variants of luck egalitarianism. (For acritical discussion of Ander- son’spresentation of luck egalitarian claims cf. Lippert-Rasmussen (2012,2015).) This,however, will allow me to carveout the relevant contrast between both approaches in aclearer way, even though this inevitablycomes at the price of not givingfull justice to some of the morenuanced versions of luck egalitarianism. Towards global relational egalitarianism 67 into account.Thisinturn argues for the establishment of relationships of equality among all. These obligations, which can be said to be universalist or cosmopol- itan in spirit and constitutive of the ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility,corre- spond with the entitlement of all to be treated with equal respect and to have access to what is necessary to function as equals in aglobal society. Within this argument,sufficientarianism is not acompetitor to egalitarian- ism.⁶⁸ Quite the contrary,the sufficientarian idea thatall are equallyentitled to live asufficientlygood life, even if some distributive inequalities persist abovethis (possiblyambitious) lower threshold of sufficiency,should be consid- ered as strongly egalitarian. Moreover,itcan be understood as avariant of rela- tional egalitarianism, because the entitlement to have enough is not onlyjusti- fied by the equal moral standing or the basic needsofall, but alsobythe importance of being able to interact with one another on afooting of equality. While my account thus includes anon-comparative component of equality (the ambition to securesufficiency for all), comparative inequalities abovethe threshold of sufficiency do matter as well, namelywhen they start to negatively affect the possibilityofrelationships of equality.The lower threshold of having enough must thus be complemented by an upper threshold of having too much. Thus, my account calls for a ‘corridor’ of justifiable distributiveinequality compatible with relationalequality: it demands that thosethose who have less are put in asituation in which they have enough;and that thosewho have more do not have too much (where ‘too much’ would be the amount of relevant advan- tages that would undermine relational equality). The chapter consists of six sections. The first section introduces the reader to luck egalitarianism and relationalegalitarianism as they were initiallycon- ceived, which is to sayintheiroriginal domesticcontexts. In the second section, Iraise and animate the question What is the point of global equality? Global luck egalitarianism willbeintroducedinsection three, while section four begins the argument establishingglobal relational egalitarianism as the appropriate answer to the question. Ideal with some objections against global relational egalitarian- ism in section five,before offering areconciliatoryconclusion in section six. Thus, the chapter explores and analyses the notion of “equality” as an es- sentialnormative concept in understanding the role and responsibilities of indi- vidual agents in the context of global (in‐)justiceand in determiningthe content of the ethos of cosmopolitan responsibility thatcan shape how indvidual agents feel, think, talk and act about globalissues. However,itopposes adistinctive form of distributive equality which Iintroduce in the form of distributive and resource-centred luck egalitarianism. 68 Equality 1Domestic luck vs.relational egalitarianism Domestic egalitarians can broadlybeseparated into twoschools: luck egalitar- ians and relationalegalitarians. All egalitarian doctrines “tend to rest on aback- ground idea that all human persons are equal in fundamental worth or moral status” (Arneson 2013,1). The decisive and divisive question then is: What fol- lows from the assumption thatall human beingshaveequal moral status? Luck egalitarians deducefrom this assumption ajustified claim to distributive equalityofthe relevant goods; justice, on this