Mediterranean Politics | Maghreb Reorganisation of the Moroccan Political Landscape a m a r Mohamed Tozy of certain elite networks and finally, the faintness of o n Professor a the reformist discourse. These phenomena are expe- P University of Provence, Aix-en-Provence rienced as a failure by the government, which aimed at restructuring the political landscape and renew- In this paper, I will attempt to provide an overview of ing the elite. the reorganisation underway in the Moroccan politi- 9 cal system. The latter seems to be unable to break One Moroccan in Five Cast a Blank Vote 0 0 2 out of a sequence of transition, both the monarchy . d e and the elite limiting themselves to dealing with the The wager of lending the electoral process credibil- M present in a context of a loose consensus; a con- ity was certainly successful. The majority of national sensus which settles for the mediocrity of political life observers showed their satisfaction at the conditions and focuses on economic transformation by means under which the 2007 elections took place. However, of major construction projects run by a techno-struc- with a participation rate of 37% and 19% null votes 0 ture operating at best in a defused political landscape –that is, a million voters went to the elections to cast 9 1 that does not involve taking any political risks. This a blank vote (by comparison, the blank votes did not consolidates a duality, a two-speed Morocco where surpass 15% in 2002)–, a shadow hangs over these politics cannot be the object of appropriation by elections. The method of counting the votes does not new forces. In any case, this sweet siesta poorly con- allow a distinction between the blank ballots and the ceals a degree of anxiety amplified by certain indica- spoilt ones. The illegibility of the political structure tors that relate as much to the dwindling of reformist dominated by the King is not the only factor involved. enthusiasm as to popular demands, less and less The fact that 19% of the electorate made the effort controlled by political organisations. The incidents of going to the polling stations and casting a blank at Séfrou and later Sidi Ifni, as well as transport sec- vote can also be ascribed to indecision in the face tor strikes, announce the emergence of local figures of a weak political offer where the national issues of a mafia type or radicals free of all political control. were secondary to local issues, and above all, the fact that the issue of societal divisions was not includ- ed among the campaign topics. The task of decon- Elements of Political Stalemate structing the ambivalent social project proposed by the monarchy was not carried out. The fact that the The political scene over the past two years allows partisan elite balk at choosing or at least making its certain significant conclusions to be drawn which commitment explicit has contributed to draining the are perceived as a major risk, including by the monar- elections of meaning. chy. Indeed, signs of this concern can be found in different speeches made by the King before parlia- The Failure of the Left ment or during the Feast of the Throne. They con- sist of the discrediting of politics revealed by low This statement, which could seem exaggerated, needs voter participation rate, the failure of the Left, the to be qualified. When I speak of failure, I am not call- advance, though timid, of the Islamists and their inabil- ing into question the importance of the experience ity to handle the Salafist challenge, the persistence of the change-over in government. It marks a turning point on the symbolic level insofar as it has largely urban areas, namely Médiouna (8.5%) and Nouaceur contributed to normalisation of political life and, by (7.9%) and nearly mediocre ones in certain provinces the same token, has gotten the country out of the rela- where the State had been putting all efforts for some tions of defiance that characterised relations among ten years into what is commonly called participative parties of the national movement and the monarchy. development projects: Al Haouz (5.6%), Figuig (1.4%), Its importance resides as well in the level of exem- Al Hoceima (2.4%) and the Sahara area, where a pol- plarity of the experience, which has demonstrated icy of aid is organised through the intervention of local that the narrow margins of political action and the elite endorsed by the administration. The PJD also imbalance of powers between the monarchy and has a hard time penetrating into rural regions with a the parties do not prevent a political force with a vision strong elite structure where certain individuals have of its own from marking its passage in government cultivated their fiefs for many years (Taza, Boulmane, by lending public policy implementation a specific ori- Azilal, Taroudant – Mountain Zone). a m a entation. It is hard to deny that the first and second r o n terms of the Abderrahman Youssoufi administration The Persistence of Notables in Turbans a weighed upon the country’s political orientations and P contributed to establishing the idea of a bicephalous The dilemma of Moroccan power is that it elicits polit- aspect within the bloc in power. This qualification ical vocation, a form of leadership which partici- being made, nothing prevents us from pointing out pates in the administration of public affairs without that among the governmental majority, the Socialist being certain of durably changing its orientation. This 9 0 0 Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which is the party is the competence of the monarchic branch of power, 2 . d that embodied the changeover via the former oppo- and by extension, the court. In order to fully compre- e M sition’s accession to power in 1999, is also the only hend the issues at stake at the 2007 elections, it is party for which the sanction of the ballot has func- a good idea to take a detour back in history in order tioned normally. The conduct of the Finance Depart- to draw up the profiles of the political configurations ment, whose political choice was diametrically and pertinent structures arising therefrom. Since inde- opposed to the ideological identity, and of budget- pendence, Morocco has experienced three types of 1 9 devouring ministers that would be very difficult to configurations: one favouring the emergence of the 1 reform (national education, justice, social affairs), traditional elite (1956-1983), a second one accom- and the party’s inability to assume government results panying the development of the administration and and provide information about reforms, partially explain the birth of a position-based elite (1983-1999), and the discrepancy between the USFP’s performance finally, as of 1999, the choice of new forms of gov- and the political sanction that facilitated its removal ernance, including formal governance, has fostered from the Prime Minister’s office. the emergence of new profiles essentially produced by civil society and the political ‘equerry’ of the left. The Justice and Development Party: The traditional elite correspond to an ethnically homog- The Media Bubble Bursts enous configuration, with a predominance of capi- talising on lineage as a form of political mobilisation The Islamists of the Justice and Development Party with little intervention from the State. The needs of (PJD), who were slated to win the elections accord- power in this configuration, with its weak institution- ing to all surveys, did not manage to surpass the al regulation, point to a leadership with an arbitra- threshold of 10.9% in votes and 14% in seats, where- tional function. Recruitment is carried out through the as the Istiqlal Party took first place with 10.7% in consolidation of an extant leadership. It could be con- votes and 15.9% in seats thanks to the effect of sidered, to a certain extent, the same type as the fel- proportionality and the electoral apportionment. The lah who defends the throne. The second type of lead- PJD, however, confirmed its strong presence in pop- ership had its moment of glory after the 1983 elections, ulous, relatively dynamic coastal urban areas from with the creation of new parties that came to repre- Tangiers to Casablanca, where it attained 23 seats sent a new political elite including technocrats, busi- out of 40. It reached shares of nearly 30% in Fez, nesspeople gaining their wealth through the policy of Rabat/Océan, Kenitra-Ville, Casablanca - Hay Hassani, ‘Moroccanisation’, or profiting from the largesse of a Casablanca - Hay Mohammadi and Derb Sultan. It planned economy, compensation policies and the obtained poorer results, on the other hand, in peri- quota system. The 2007 elections were presumably to respond to Thus, Morocco has apparently chosen to substitute this new demand by putting new political personnel the idea of ‘democratic transition’ by the formula ‘con- in parliament. This objective was not attained, how- solidation of the democratic process’, based on the ever, the party leaderships attempting to control the principle that the monarchic nature of the regime is changeover that was underway by controlling the not in contradiction with this option. It has also, accord- process of drawing up the election lists of the com- ing to these documents, opted for the model of a peting parties. Apart from the PJD, parties with a liberal economy by prioritising the role of regulator strong ideological connotation capable of holding of the State. On the geopolitical level, Morocco seems political opinions different from those of the monar- to be opting for an allegiance to the West, the gate- chy chose to minimise the risks and regulate the pres- way being more southern Europe (Spain and France) sure from their rank-and-file members through scis- than Algeria or the Arabic countries, which are seen a sions or by bringing them into line and preferred to at best as a heritage to be administered.