WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN: AMERICA’S STRATEGIC SHORTCOMINGS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE by Troy H. Thomas A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Masters of Government Baltimore, Maryland August 2020 Abstract How does America improve its Irregular Warfare (IW) capability? Academia defines IW as encompassing insurgency and terrorism. It is used to counter and defeat Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) such as Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State. 2018 saw 9,600 terrorist attacks and 49 of the 52 conflicts tracked by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program were non-state against state actors.1 IW remains an immediate ongoing concern for America. This paper is a historical evaluative dissertation. Chapter one addresses the difficult task of studying IW and the differing definitions of IW (or lack of same) and their history. It addresses the American military’s relationship with the concept historically and its current status. It includes a discussion of how this affects the Special Operations Forces (SOF) that are the primary practitioners of IW for the American military. Chapter two discusses VEOs, one of the five major threats outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Case studies assess how terrorists and insurgents seek to shape public opinion. The first is a classic insurgency campaign, the Algerian Revolution and the second 1 Barnett S. Koven, Re-evaluating Special Operations Forces-led Counterterrorism Efforts, (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, 2019), 1. ii covers the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) ground-breaking terror campaign. There is also a discussion of ideology and strategy. Chapter three analyzes the remaining four threats identified by the NDS: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Their use of activities and operations that remain below the threshold of traditional warfare are examined. IW is examined through the lens of the national instruments of power to discuss policy impacts, ramifications, and countermeasures. This thesis finds that IW is the primary venue of modern combat, while traditional warfare is brinksmanship similar to the Cold War. IW will remain operationally prominent for the foreseeable future. The Department of Defense (DOD) refers to GPC as the ‘new normal,’ but American dominance in traditional warfare is unquestioned globally. Likewise, American IW capabilities are a known liability, particularly as America has blunted perhaps her sharpest blade, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). American military chiefs and policymakers have only twice in history prompted efforts to professionalize IW within the military, thus it is unlikely that change is coming. History, doctrine, academia, and career soldiers agree on this. iii Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... ii List of Tables ................................................................................................................................ vi List of Figures ............................................................................................................................. vii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 A Touch of Gray ........................................................................................................... 6 I. Academia, Context and History ...................................................................................... 7 a. Academia............................................................................................................. 7 b. Context: How IW Fits in the Picture ................................................................ 10 c. America’s IW History ...................................................................................... 18 II. America’s IW Policy and Policymakers ..................................................................... 22 a. Post-WWII ........................................................................................................ 22 b. Post-Vietnam..................................................................................................... 25 c. Policymakers Take the Lead ............................................................................ 28 III. Effects on American Special Operations ................................................................... 35 IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 40 Chapter 2 – Be the Change You Wish to See in the World ......................................................... 45 I. Insurgency: Algeria ...................................................................................................... 46 a. Tactical Shifts: All Warfare is Hybrid .............................................................. 51 b. Policy Overreach Without the Full Intent to Execute the Mission ................... 53 II. Terrorism: Palestine Liberation Organization ............................................................. 55 a. The PLO’s Effect on Global Military Operations ............................................. 60 b. The Enemy of my Enemy ................................................................................. 65 III. Ideology and Doctrine ................................................................................................ 68 iv IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 76 Chapter 3 – It’s a Small World After All ................................................................................... 80 I. China ............................................................................................................................. 81 a. Remote IW: Hacking & Blended Approaches .................................................. 82 b. IW via Lawfare and Business Proxy ................................................................. 86 II. Iran ............................................................................................................................... 90 a. Hezbollah ......................................................................................................... 91 b. Hamas ............................................................................................................... 94 III. Russia ......................................................................................................................... 97 a. Reverse Engineering ........................................................................................ 97 b. Typology Failure .............................................................................................. 98 c. Proxies and PMCs .......................................................................................... 101 IV. North Korea ............................................................................................................. 107 V. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 112 Conclusions – ............................................................................................................................. 115 I. American Popular Buy-In ........................................................................................... 116 II. Realistic Policy, Doctrine & Defined End-States ...................................................... 118 III. Ideology .................................................................................................................... 121 IV. Civilian Oversight .................................................................................................... 123 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 126 Glossary ......................................................................................................................................147 Appendix A – SOF Truths .......................................................................................................... 150 CV ............................................................................................................................................... 151 v List of Tables Table 1 A short outline of ‘war-winning approaches’ in the history of strategic thought .............9 vi List of Figures Figure 1 Joint force irregular warfare activities ..........................................................................15 Figure 2 Yemeni soldier looks at graffiti protesting U.S. drone strike in Sanaa, Yemen .............17 Figure 3 Typology of conflict: the reality of war ..........................................................................21 Figure 4 JFK and Brigadier General Yarborough, Fort Bragg, NC ............................................24 Figure 5 The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem salutes the 13th Waffen SS Division ..............................73 Figure 6 Joint force operational phases by military activity ........................................................78 Figure 7 East Ghouta, Syria ........................................................................................................102 Figure 8 PMCs deployed by Russia ............................................................................................104