The Russia Factor in Transatlantic Relations and Foreign Policy New Opportunities for at BROOKINGS U.S.-EU-Russia Cooperation Manfred Huterer May 2010 WORKING PAPER Number 4 Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS WORKING PAPER Number 4 May 2010 The Russia Factor in Transatlantic Relations and New Opportunities for U.S.-EU-Russia Cooperation Manfred Huterer ACKNOWLEDGMENTS am grateful to Fiona Hill, head of the Center on me as a visiting fellow from July to October 2009. I I the United States and Europe, Steven Pifer, An- am aware that this has been too short a time. But my gela Stent, Ted Piccone and Jeremy Shapiro for their exposure gave me an appreciation for Brookings, its comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this human resources, its great influence in policy mak- paper. I would also like to express my appreciation ing, and its role as a catalyst in intellectual debate. to Andrew Moffatt and Johanna Peet for their as- The views expressed in this paper are attributable sistance. Finally, I would like to thank the Center on only to the author and not to the Federal Foreign the United States and Europe at the Foreign Policy Office of Germany or the Brookings Institution. Program of the Brookings Institution which hosted FOREIGN POLICY A T B ROOKINGS T HE R USSI A FA CTOR IN TR A NS A TL A NTIC R EL A TIONS A ND N EW O pp ORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-EU-R USSI A COO P ER A TION ii Tab LE O F CONTENTS Introduction and Summary . 1 The Changing International Environment . .4 Russia’s Place in the Foreign Policy Strategies of the United States and European Union . .6 Who Are We Dealing With? . 8 Forging a Common Transatlantic Approach towards Russia . 10 New Opportunities for U.S.-EU-Russian Cooperation . .13 Conclusions . 29 FOREIGN POLICY A T B ROOKINGS T HE R USSI A FA CTOR IN TR A NS A TL A NTIC R EL A TIONS A ND N EW O pp ORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-EU-R USSI A COO P ER A TION iii I NTRODUCTION A ND S UMM A RY n November 2009, Germany celebrated the 20th fuelled by a lack of coordination and growing dis- Ianniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall. Ger- agreements on Russia or Russian related issues (e.g. many’s reunification and the collapse of the Soviet about the pace of NATO enlargement and missile Union ended the Cold War. And yet two major defense) between the U.S. administration of George pieces of unfinished cold war business remain, two W. Bush and big EU member states such as Ger- decades after the fall of communism: Fitting Russia many, France and Italy. into a pan-European security framework and find- ing a place for the other post-Soviet states. The chances for a new start in the West’s relations with Russia are now better than they have been These tasks have turned out to be much more dif- since 9/11. As U.S. Undersecretary of State Wil- ficult than expected. The assumption that a democ- liam Burns recently put it in a remarkable speech, ratizing Russia would quickly integrate into Western the reset approach by the Obama administration has structures has proven wrong. And the post-Soviet moved U.S.-Russian relations beyond past tensions space has evolved into a space of geopolitical rivalry and grievances, and has produced tangible results. between the West and Russia. While reasserting it- The New START agreement is the “most fittingly self as a great power, an ever more authoritarian Rus- named example”.3 The crucial question is whether sia has made it clear that it is not willing to join the the new spirit of cooperation can translate into a re- West unless “it is given something like co-chairman- newed impetus to anchor Russia more closely into ship of the Western club.”1 Indeed, Russian Foreign European security structures. Minister Lavrov once remarked that cooperation on an equal footing between Russia, the European This paper attempts to explore the opportunities for Union (EU) and the United States was only feasi- increased cooperation between the United States, the ble within “a system of collective security in which European Union and Russia in the Euro-Atlantic national strategic concepts are denationalized.”2 area. It focuses on priority topics, where interaction As neither an expanding NATO nor an expanding between the United States, the European Union and European Union has been willing to grant Russia Russia is critical: European security including arms membership or the role of a co-decision maker in control; the joint EU-Russia neighborhood, includ- matters of European security, Russia has remained ing Central Asia; and energy security. True, the qual- outside the club. ity of the relationship between the United States and the EU with Russia will also be determined by many The difficulty of anchoring Russia into Euroatlan- other issues outside the Euro-Atlantic area such as tic structures has been affected by the fact that Rus- cooperation on Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East, sia has proved to be one of the most divisive issues North Korea, global governance and climate change.4 within the EU 27. Until the beginning of 2009 the But if disagreement and conflict between Russia and lack of a coherent EU policy towards Russia was the West in the Euro-Atlantic area prevails it would FOREIGN POLICY A T B ROOKINGS T HE R USSI A FA CTOR IN TR A NS A TL A NTIC R EL A TIONS A ND N EW O pp ORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-EU-R USSI A COO P ER A TION 1 reduce confidence and trust necessary for the solu- control including revisiting the Treaty on the tions of other problems. Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) is essen- tial in this regard. This paper reaches the following conclusions: • The Obama administration’s ‘delinking poli- • The impact of the global financial crisis on cy’ will be impossible to maintain if the joint Russia and the Obama administration’s “reset” EU-Russia neighborhood develops into a policy create favorable conditions for a new conflict-prone space. Therefore, the United and sustained phase of cooperation between States and the EU should demonstrate their the West and Russia. But Russia still needs resolve to prevent Russia from overplaying its its own reset to transform itself from a spoiler hand in this area. At the same time, the EU state reaping windfall energy profits to a con- (through and beyond its “Eastern Partnership” structive force seeking common solutions to approach) should more actively try to shape common problems. the region, and contribute to the prevention of conflicts by creating win-win solutions for • To achieve U.S. and EU goals towards Rus- the EU, the “Eastern Partnership” countries sia, closer transatlantic coordination is needed. and Russia. The United States and the EU should devise new mechanisms to coordinate their policies • In Central Asia, the EU together with the on Russia. For example, Russia-related issues United States should try to engage Russia on should feature prominently on the agenda of preventing regional countries from becoming EU-U.S. summits. The United States and Ger- failed states and addressing the most burning many, in particular, should move forward with issues such as poverty, low education rates, food the creation of a joint working group on Russia security and conflicts over water resources. at the governmental level. • Energy will remain one of most divisive issues • Given the fact that relations with Russia are in relations between Russia and its European still one of the most divisive issues within the neighbors. While stepping up efforts to create EU, Brussels must think of practical steps to an internal energy market, and strengthening create greater coherence in its policy towards solidarity mechanisms as well as diversifica- Russia. Careful consideration of Central Euro- tion, the EU should try to engage Russia on pean EU member states interests in joint EU/ the concept of cooperative energy relations, German policies towards Russia will be espe- encompassing producers, transit countries and cially important. The key point of leverage the consumers. The EU—in close coordination EU can bring to bear is its unity. with the United States—should also try to en- gage Russia in a dialogue on energy governance • Russian President Medvedev’s proposal for a with a view to commit Russia to legally bind- pan-European security treaty and the Corfu ing rules and procedures. Connecting the EU- process within the OSCE create opportuni- Russia and U.S.-Russia dialogues on energy ties for added value in European security. In would be one mechanism. this vein, the United States, the EU and Russia should explore the potential building blocks for • To further a common agenda and coordinate an overarching pan-European security system. views, the United States, the EU and Russia These could be developed within the existing should explore ways to develop new trilateral NATO-Russia and EU-Russia, including Eu- formats for dialogue and cooperation. These ropean Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)- could include: core group meetings with- Russia contexts. Progress on conventional arms in the OSCE (tripartite EU-U.S.-Russia); FOREIGN POLICY A T B ROOKINGS T HE R USSI A FA CTOR IN TR A NS A TL A NTIC R EL A TIONS A ND N EW O pp ORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-EU-R USSI A COO P ER A TION 2 pre-coordination before G-20 summits; the Weizsaecker, Helmut Schmidt, Egon Bahr); establishment of a trilateral group of “wise the gradual elevation of existing trilateral men” on arms control and pan-European talks among government policy planners to security: a “Russia 4” complementing the a higher level, e.g., to include political direc- “U.S.