VERIFICATIONMATTERS VERTIC RESEARCH REPORTS • NUMBER 12 • NOVEMBER 2015 Exploring Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Scenarios, Modelling and Simulations Exploring Multilateral Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Scenarios, Modelling and Simulations 2 MATTERSVERTIC RESEARCH REPORTS NUMBER 12 • NOVEMBER 2015 About VERTIC This report was prepared by VERTIC’s Verification and Monitoring Pro- gramme: Hugh Chalmers, David Keir, Larry MacFaul, Russell Moul, and The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre is an independent, Alberto Muti, with the contribution of VERTIC Executive Director Andreas not-for-profit non-governmental organization. Our mission is to support the Persbo and Deputy Executive Director Angela Woodward. development, implementation and effectiveness of international agreements and related regional and national initiatives. We focus on agreements and VERTIC wishes to acknowledge with grateful thanks the support and expertise initiatives in the areas of arms control, disarmament and the environment, it has received from those who have contributed to the multilateral verification with particular attention to issues of monitoring, review and verification. project. Notwithstanding this valuable assistance, responsibility for this docu- VERTIC conducts research and analysis and provides expert advice and ment rests with VERTIC. Although every care has been taken to prepare this information to governments and other stakeholders. We also provide support report, VERTIC would be grateful for any errors or omissions that are brought through capacity building, training, legislative assistance and cooperation. to our attention. We engage closely with governments, policy-makers and international All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or trans- organizations, as well as with the private sector and technical, academic and mitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including non-governmental communities worldwide. photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries Board of Directors to the publishers. Mr Peter Alvey (Honorary Treasurer), Gen Sir Hugh Beach (President), Professor Wyn Bowen, Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton, Mr Oliver Colvile First published in November 2015. MP, Dr Owen Greene, Mr Sverre Lodgaard, Dr Edwina Moreton (Chair), Mr Nicholas A. Sims and Ms Lisa Tabassi. Editor: Larry MacFaul Design & Layout: Rick Jones, Studioexile International Verification Consultants Network Ms Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Ambassador Richard Butler, Mr John Carlson, Ms Joy VERTIC Development House Hyvarinen, Dr Edward Ifft, Mr Robert Kelley, Dr Patricia Lewis, Dr Robert 56–64 Leonard Street J. Mathews, Professor Colin McInnes, Professor Graham Pearson, Dr Arian L. London EC2A 4LT Pregenzer, Dr Rosalind Reeve, Dr Neil Selby, Minister Victor S. Slipchenko, United Kingdom and Professor David Wolfe. Phone: +44 (0)20 7065 0880 Fax: +44 (0)20 7065 0890 Current funders E-mail: [email protected] Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Earth Innovation Institute, Network for Website: www.vertic.org Social Change, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rufford Foundation, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and US Department of State. Printed in the United Kingdom by 3G Evolution Ltd This report is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.VERTIC’s ISSN: 1474–8045 views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the funder. © VERTIC 2015 3 About the report There is growing demand for a more inclusive approach to exploring nuclear disarmament verification. At the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, states parties to the NPT have agreed on the importance of supporting cooperation ‘aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient veri- fication capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.’ This report aims to support such cooperation by describing a means of: developing and testing multilateral approaches to verifying a wide range of possible nuclear disarmament situations, and; building the capacity of stakeholders to engage with the development and implementation of such approaches in a cost-effective and structured manner. The report provides a guide for developing simulation exercises to consider the technical, legal and political challenges involved in verifying nuclear disarmament. It explains how creating nuclear disarmament ‘scenarios’ and technical models of nuclear programmes can provide detailed and holistic environments in which to run these simulations. It also discusses questions that need to be addressed while exploring disarmament verifica- tion options to ensure that any proposed solutions are reliable, coherent, trusted and accessible. This publication is aimed at officials and experts concerned with arms control and disarmament verification issues in general, and nuclear disarmament and multilateral verification approaches in particular. It seeks to be a useful resource for officials both from governments and international organisations, as well as for independ- ent experts, and research and capacity-building organisations. The introduction to the report discusses how verification of nuclear disarmament has been explored to date, and outlines the demand for a wider scope and a more multilateral approach. The report then lays out the aims and methods of verification arrangements in general, and establishes the importance of context in determining suitable verification systems. Next, it provides an outline of two key components of verification systems in the nuclear field, the role of equipment in verification, and the manner in which common under- standings of verification systems can be developed. The report then proposes an approach to carrying out 4 simulations that can develop and test multilateral approaches to nuclear disarmament verification. It discusses how these simulations can inform policy toward nuclear disarmament verification, explore the application of verification technologies, and build shared understandings of verification for an array of disarmament situations. It then explains how to develop hypothetical disarmament scenarios and state-wide nuclear fuel cycle models to support these simulations. This report forms part of an ongoing project run by VERTIC to support multilateral verification of nuclear disarmament, and to examine the role that international organisations can play in a multilateral approach. The project involves exploring technical, policy and legal verification issues with assistance from a range of experts. It also aims to increase capacity across countries, but in particular in non-nuclear-weapon states, to engage in nuclear disarmament verification. It seeks to achieve these aims through running educational seminars, regional meetings, expert workshops, surveys, exercises and through producing a series of technical resources includ- ing guides and reference volumes, among other activities. 5 Contents List of illustrations .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9 List of acronyms .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 The role of verification in nuclear disarmament research initiatives 14 A cooperative, multilateral approach to verification 15 Expanding the research agenda 16 A comprehensive, modular approach 17 Section 1 endnotes 19 2. Verification in Context............................................................................................................................... ............................................................................................. 20 What is being verified? 20 Understanding ‘effective’ verification 21 Who is involved in verification and why? 24 The importance of examining verification in context 25 Section 2 endnotes 26 3. Monitoring Equipment and Verification ........................................................................................................................................................................ 28 3.1 Equipment for confirming the identity of declared items 29 Treaty Accountable Items (TAIs) 29 Identifying characteristics 30 Equipment requirements and operational parameters 30 3.2 Equipment for confirming the nature of disarmament processes 32 Verifying processes 32 Identifying characteristics 33 Equipment requirements and constraints 33 3.3 Equipment for maintaining continuity of knowledge on items and processes 35 Keeping track of items and processes 35 6 Identifying characteristics 36 Equipment requirements and constraints 36 3.4 Equipment for detecting undeclared items and processes 38 Detecting hidden items or processes 38 Identifying characteristics 38 Equipment requirements and constraints 39 3.5 Developing equipment for nuclear disarmament verification 41 Equipment development for nuclear disarmament