Seasprite to Sea King: The Royal Canadian Navy’s Ship-borne Antisubmarine Helicopter Capability ne of the better-known achievements of the post-war Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is the Ointegration of the large Sikorsky Sea King antisubmarine helicopter into small surface escorts. Of this, “radical and entirely Canadian development,” Tony German writes that it was, “hugely admired” by other navies and that, “[a]fter eight years’ development Canada’s navy on its own brought a whole new dimension in anti-submarine [sic] warfare to the navies of the world,”1 yet the remainder of his publication, The Sea Is at Our Gates, pays little deference to this accomplishment. By Lieutenant(N) Jason Delaney 18 THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 2 | NO. 4 FALL 2013 Understandably, there is very little mention The Politics of Procurement using the Sea of it in the final chapter of A History of King acquisition and the New Ship-borne Canadian Naval Aviation because Kealy and Helicopter Project as the basis for a case study. Russell were still writing while the helicopter/ Undoubtedly, however, the seminal work on destroyer concept was being developed. What this topic was done by Sean Cafferky, who is is more curious is that the proceedings of largely responsible for opening a great deal successive naval history conferences do not of the classified material. As a result, his cover the topic sufficiently or at all. Both publication, Uncharted Waters, is the first full RCN in Retrospect and RCN in Transition treatment of the development of the ship-borne barely cover the development of helicopter antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopter in destroyers while A Nation’s Navy and People, Canada.4 Although the above mentioned work Policy and Programmes have no historians pays considerable attention to the development addressing this supposed great Canadian of the concept in the mid-1950s and the achievement.2 integration of the Sea King into the fleet, it does not take it as far as the first operational tour at The centennial history published in sea when the capability was ultimately proven. 2010 has three authors who briefly discuss This is the goal that will be pursued herein, the subject within the context of challenges and it will be explained within the context of faced during the early-cold-war period, while the larger allied ASW effort.5 In the end, it Marc Milner provides one of the best, albeit will be shown that the marriage of the large short, descriptions in Canada’s Navy: The ASW helicopter and the small surface escort, First Century.3 The fact remains, however, although a significant contribution to maritime that despite the Sea King becoming an warfare, was neither a radical development nor iconic workhorse serving on board Canadian a dramatic change in antisubmarine warfare; warships for over half a century, only a few it was simply a matter of necessity and only authors have contributed significant research one example of many in which a limited to this development. Part of the reason ASW Navy struggled to keep up with the fast lies in the fact that the Sea King came into pace of technological advancements during service just as the naval-records system the cold war. collapsed during the tumultuous period of headquarters integration and reorganization First, it must be understood that in 1964. Another part of the reason is because, developments in submarine and missile until recently, many of the official records technology during the 1950s contributed were classified. to significant changes in maritime warfare. Over a relatively short period of time, The few authors who have managed to contemporary weapons, sensors and tactics piece together significant material on the were considered inadequate, causing what subject include: Peter Charlton, a former has been referred to as the ASW crisis of naval officer and aviation engineer with the the mid-1950s.6 The world’s first nuclear- experimental test squadron, Experimental powered submarine, USS (United States Ship) Squadron 10 (VX 10), who contributed to Nautilus, demonstrated that it could operate Certified Serviceable with Michael Whitby with relative immunity against the best and who wrote Nobody Told Us It Couldn’t Be efforts of modern ASW forces. The unique Done: The VX10 Story; Stuart Soward, author propulsion system, although noisy, allowed and former naval aviator, who produced a Nautilus to operate independent of the surface two-volume recollective history of Canadian as well as run fast and deep to avoid detection. naval aviation titled Hands to When discovered, Nautilus was difficult Flying Stations; and Aaron to track and most surface forces could not Plamondon who wrote close the distance to launch their weapons; if 19 THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 2 | NO. 4 FALL 2013 in “blue-water” instead of defensive coastal “[O]ur confidence in the operations—was disconcerting.9 ability of the surface ship to protect a Around this same time, the RCN screened body against established the Naval Warfare Study Group to investigate ways to better align defence attack...was sadly planning with the North Atlantic Treaty misplaced.” Organization’s (NATOs) new Military Committee (MC) 48 strategy that identified Capt A. B. F. Fraser-Harris extensive Soviet submarine operations in they did, then they were at risk of a deadly the Atlantic as the “principle [sic] naval counter-attack. This innovation in propulsion threat.”10 This study group was one of many systems—along with other advancements influences recommending a shift in defence such as new hull designs, sensors, fire control planning that would bring forces closer to systems and noise reduction techniques— the continent, along with a change in focus allowed the submarine to evolve as a weapons toward new antisubmarine concepts.11 This platform, making them faster, quieter and paralleled much of the thinking within the more deadly. Conventional submarines also United States Navy (USN), and joint exercise had certain advantages. Although dependent scenarios between the RCN and USN began on the surface for air, they could run slowly to encompass both contemporary convoy and silently or simply lie and wait, making protection as well as the defence of North them very difficult to detect with anything America against missile-firing submarines. other than active sonar. Combined with advances in missile technology and the Although the RCN was considered one of inevitable integration of these weapons into the best ASW navies at the time, it struggled submarines, cold-war maritime warfare took to keep up with these advances. Michael on a whole new challenge during this period. Whitby identifies the problem perfectly in his biographical article on one of the more Then, in January 1956, the Chief of colourful senior officers in the RCN at the the Soviet Directorate of Naval Education time—Captain A. B. F. Fraser-Harris. As the Institutions, Admiral L. Vladimirsky, openly commanding officer of the aircraft carrier discussed the potential of the guided missile- Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) firing submarine within the Soviet press.7 MAGNIFICENT, he wrote a report after This was followed by the First Secretary, a series of exercises in early 1956 that was Nikita Khrushchev, announcing to the world ECCO II that his navy would focus their future development on guided-missile submarines because they were the most suitable naval weapons for attacks against the United States.8 The idea that the Soviets had this capability—combined with indications that their submarines would increasingly be engaged 20 Seasprite to Sea King: The Royal Canadian Navy’s Ship-borne Antisubmarine Helicopter Capability THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE JOURNAL VOL. 2 | NO. 4 FALL 2013 critical of the state of the fleet with respect to Subsequently, the helicopter was seen as antisubmarine warfare. In it he remarks that having a large potential in the fighting role, “our confidence in the ability of the surface and its value only increased when considering ship to protect a screened body against attack, its relative invulnerability to counter-attack even from a contemporary submarine under from a submarine. With this understood, the controlled conditions, was sadly misplaced.”12 Naval Warfare Study Group recommended an Fraser-Harris goes on to conclude that it was increase in the RCN’s ASW helicopter force unrealistic to use the ships either in the hunter- to 40 aircraft by 1960.16 killer role or in defence against missile-firing submarines. Notwithstanding relative success The problem was that ASW helicopters against German U-boats during the latter needed support facilities at sea, such as part of the Second World War, the age of those found on-board aircraft carriers. The the surface escort seemed at an end unless RCN could only afford the one carrier, and a way could be found to reduce the tactical its replacement, HMCS BONAVENTURE, advantage of the modern submarine. The was due to be commissioned in 1957. Since small escort-type ships of the RCN needed a there was little chance of obtaining a second system that could range out with great speed carrier and there was a need to improve the and not only detect and localize but also ASW capability of the surface escorts, the destroy a submerged contact.13 idea of integrating ASW helicopters into the fleet merged, naturally, with the helicopter/ By this time, many of those concerned destroyer concept. Some, however, urged with maritime defence began to acknowledge caution, and Fraser-Harris warned that the that the ASW helicopter was becoming concept should not hinder the development increasingly more important to the future of of the helicopter as a self-sufficient antisubmarine warfare.14 A respected defence ASW platform.17 scientist at the time went so far as to say that: The RCN experimented with helicopters With the advent of nuclear-powered landing on a makeshift platform on small submarines, the anti-submarine warships in September 1956 and November [sic] helicopter assumes an added 1957.18 From these initial experiments, several importance.