Volume VIII, Issue 7 15 April 2018 The ASC History Newsletter 100th Anniversary of World War I: Battle of Tannenberg 26 after several days of hard march- This ing, the German XVII Corps and the I Reserve Corps attacked the right MONTH in flank of the Russian Second Army. The defeat was so thorough that the military Russian commander would need 8 hours just to tell his superiors of the history … defeat. The next day, the Germans 1607: Jamestown caved in the Russian left flank. Pre- sented with the possibility of a dou- Colony founded ble envelopment, the Russian com- mander should have immediately 1689: King Wil- called for a retreat. Instead, he con- liam’s War began tinued the advance. When the retreat was finally called, most of the Rus- 1756: French and sian Second Army had virtually no Indian War began escape. By any name, Tannenberg seemed 1775: Fort Ticon- victory enough: 50,000 Russians deroga captured dead or wounded, another 90,000 by Americans prisoners, and the equipment of an entire army captured, including 500 1812: The Ord- The Battle of Tannenberg was the and sent eastward as reinforcements. guns. German losses were fewer than nance Dept. was first major World War I battle be- Additionally, German field com- 15,000. Though the German rein- tween the German Army and the manders were replaced with Colonel forcements from Belgium arrived too established by act Russian Army. Fought between Au- General Paul von Hindenburg, who late to share the glory, they played a of Congress gust 26-31, 1914, the Battle of Tan- had returned to active service from critical role in the subsequent battle nenberg was a major tactical victory retirement and who had a reputation at the Masurian Lakes, which sent the 1848: Mexico rati- for the Germans but arguably had for being level-headed, and Major Russian 1st Army reeling back over fied the Treaty of greater mythic significance than mili- General Erich Ludendorff, a brilliant the border by September 14. In the Guadalupe Hidal- tary importance. but abrasive and high strung General second battle the Russian commander With the possibility of a two front Staff officer. called retreat before the Germans go war with France and Russia, German As this new leadership team trav- could encircle and annihilate his for- 1863: General war plans called for a holding opera- eled east to the front, they were not mation. tion against Russia by minimum forc- only developing the plans for the de- Five centuries earlier a Grant surrounded es concentrated in the vulnerable fense of East Prussia, but also an Polish/Lithuanian army had smashed Vicksburg province of East Prussia, until victory eventual offensive operation. The the forces of the Teutonic Knights at over France would allow the transfer defense of East Prussia had for years Tannenberg, in a battle symbolizing 1915: Lusitania of large forces to the eastern theater. been the subject of staff rides and the end of Germany’s eastward ex- sunk Russia’s war plan against Germany maneuvers. In almost every hypothet- pansion. Now that ancient defeat was involved sending two armies against ical situation where the Russian army eradicated by a modern victory. 1917: General the East Prussia salient. The first attacked from multiple directions, Tannenberg became an instant Pershing appoint- would advance west across the Nie- striking one of their armies before myth in a Germany hungry for victo- ed commander of men River, and the second would they could unite was a favored solu- ries, and it set Hindenburg and Lu- the American Ex- move northwest from Russian Po- tion for the German leadership. The dendorff on a road to supreme power land. Russian did their best to oblige. in the Second Empire. The German peditionary Force Problems arose with implementa- The Germans took advantage of the Army’s pre-war organization and tion of the Russian plan because of well-developed East Prussian rail training had proven themselves, bol- 1943: The Mem- the hostility between the two Russian network and the march discipline of stering German morale while at the phis Belle com- army commanders, inadequate com- their infantry to concentrate virtually same time severely shaking Russian pleted 25 missions munications, poor staff work and re- undisturbed against the Russian Sec- confidence. over Europe strictive geographic barriers. Never- ond Army marching from Russian theless, the Russian plan of using Poland to the southeast. On August 1954: French de- their significantly superior numbers feated at Dien to envelop the German Eighth Army had good prospects of success. Bien Phu The Russian First Army had 9 divi- 1960: U-2 spy sions, and the Second Army had 10 divisions; all of which were first-line plane shot down formations. The Germans had alto- over the Soviet gether 9 divisions, and 3 of them Union were reservists. Even if the German Eighth Army managed to concentrate 1988: Soviet its full strength against one of its op- Troops began ponents, even odds were a poor pre- withdrawal from dictor of victory in any attack. Apart from the political conse- Afghanistan quences of abandoning the entire province of East Prussia, the German 2011: Osama bin high command considered it vital to Laden killed by maintain a presence east of the Vistu- Seal Team Six in la River as a springboard for the Pakistan eventual full-scale counter-attack against Russia. To ensure this, two corps were withdrawn from Belgium ASC Poster 870-1 Brought to you by your friendly ASC History Office. 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