AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF ANDRE JEAN WEIERICH for the DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Name) (Degree) in GENERAL SCIENCE presented on r),, j/ (7 7 (Major) (Date) Title: THE RELATIONSHIP OF TEILHARD DECHARDIN'S LAW OF COMPLEXITY/CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE MECHANISM/ VITALISM DEBATE IN BIOLOGY Abstract approved:Redacted for Privacy Dr. DoniArdlexi Hump //The vitalism/mechanism debatjas it is exemplified in the writings of Loeb, Bergson and Teilhard"isA a central theme in the his- tory and philosophy of biology.This debate focuses on how we are to understand the relationship between the living and non-living.The discussions of the vitalists and mechanists attempt toshow how the ostensibly living and non-living things of the world arerelated.For Loeb, this issue is a purely scientific one which can beresolved by the techniques of a mechanistic experimental science.On the other hand, for Bergson and Teilhard this issue is a metaphysical onewhich can be resolved by an evolutionaryvitalism which is a world hypothe- sis.Bergson presents a dualistic vitalism which is acontextualistic world hypothesis whereas Teilhard presents a monistic andtheological vitalism which is an organicist world hypothesis. A major part of this thesis presents a description and criticism of Teilhard's vitalism.The description of his views shows that the ultimate foundation of his system of thought is his fundamental cate- gory of synthesis (integration) and itsembodiment in his adoption of the human personality as the model of the universe.The criticism centers on his arguments for his law ofcomplexity/consciousness and the notion of conscious matter which it presupposes.Indeed, these are the key elements of his vitalism.Teilhard claims that he has established them in a scientific manner. The main conclusion of this paper is that his claim is not justified. The Relationship of Teilhard de Chardin's Law of Complexity/Consciousness to the Mechanism/Vitalism Debate in Biology by Andre Jean Weierich A THESIS submitted to Oregon State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June 1971 APPROVED: Redacted for Privacy Professor of Biologt Gerneral S Redacted for Privacy Head of Department of General Science Redacted for Privacy Dean of Graduate School / 4.77(,<-; Date thesis is presented (1C1,1',_ -,( , 19 t'-,:k 'i / 0'' --kr -I CYc2 ) / Typed by Donna L. Olson forAndre Jean Weierich ACKNEYWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my sincerest appreciation to my major professor, Dr. Donald G. Humphrey, whose suggestions and di- rection made this work possible. Also, I wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Margaret Os ler whose courses in the history and philosophy of science provided a con- ceptual framework which was incorperated in many of the discussions of this thesis. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my loving wife, Mary, without whose encouragement this work would never have been attempted, nor completed. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I.INTRODUCTION II.JACQUES LOEB (1858-1924) AND MECHANISM 8 Introduction 8 Living (Teleological) as Opposed to Non-Living (Non-Teleological) Systems are Those Whose Components Cause Them to Realize Either Fixed or Changing Goals 8 In Loeb's Biology, the Individual Organism is the Teleological System and Its Principle Goal Which Differentiates It From Non-Teleological Systems is its Chemical Synthesis of Macromolecules From Lower Molecular Weight Compounds 10 Biological Behavior and Consciousness are Explainable in Terms of the Laws of Physical Science and Hence These Characteristics Cannot be Used to Differentiate Teleological From Non- Teleological Systems 11 A Clarification of the Vitalism/Mechanism Debate Requires the Identification of a Central Question and the Criteria for an Adequate Answer to It 14 Loeb's Central Question in the Vitalism/ Mechanism Debate is:What is the Integrator of the Vast Mosaic of Individual Physiological and Morphological Processes that Occur in the Developing Embryo? 15 Driesch's Vitalistic Answer to Loeb's Central Question is that there Exists a Non-Physical Agent, an Enfelechy, Which Integrates the Vast Mosaic of Individual Physiological and Morphological Processes that Occur in the Developing Embryo 16 Loeb's Mechanistic Answer to His Central Question is that the Cytoplasm of the Unfertilized Egg Contains a Preformed Embryo Which is a Physical Integrator of the Vast Mosaic of Indi- vidual Physiological and Morphological Processes that Occur in the Developing Embryo 17 Chapter Page Loeb Rejected Driesch's Vitalistic Answer to the Central Question of the Vitalism/ Mechanism Debate Because It Failed to Fulfill His Three Criteria for an Adequate Answer to This Question 19 Loeb's Three Criteria for an Adequate Answer to His Central Question of the Vitalism/ Mechanism Debate are Derived from His Mechanistic General Conceptual System 19 Summary of Loeb 22 Footnotes for Chapter II 24 III.HENRI BERGSON (1859-1941) AND VITALISM 34 Introduction 34 The Main Characteristic Which Differentiates a Living (Teleological) System From a Non-Living (Non- Teleological) One is the Possession of Real Time or Duration 35 Real Time or Duration is the Fundamental Reality of the World and It has the Properties of Simplicity, Indivisibility and Creativity 36 Bergson's Central Question in the Vitalism/ Mechanism Debate is: What is the Nature of the Evolving Life of the Universe? His Defense of His Vitalistic Answer to this Question is Found in His Description and Criticism of Mechanism and Certain Forms of Vitalism 37 The Underlying Premise in a Mechanistic Understanding of Life is the Metaphysical Assumption that What is Most Real in the World is Eternal and Unchangeable and Hence Real Time (Duration) Must be Eliminated From Any Mechanistic Explanation of Life 37 Bergson Rejects Mechanism as a Metaphysical Explanation of the Nature of Life Because of Its Elimination of Real Time (Duration) From Its Explanations 38 Chapter Page Bergson's Rejection of Mechanism as a Meta- physical Explanation is Ultimately Based on His View that There are Two Distinct, But Complementary Ways of Knowing, Metaphysical and Intellectual, the Two Kinds of Reality in the World, Life (Duration) and Matter 39 Intellectual Knowing Must Eliminate Duration (Real Time) Because It Provides Us with the Pragmatic and Rational Knowledge We Need in Order to Manipulate the Physical World 41 Metaphysical Knowing Produces an Intuitive (Non-Rational) and Non-Pragmatic Knowledge of the Fundamental Reality of the World, Dura- tion (Life) 41 Metaphysical and Intellectual Knowing Comple- ment Each Other Because the Former Attains an Absolute Knowledge of Life (Duration) Whereas the Latter Can Attain an Absolute Knowledge of Matter; Matter and Life are the Two Kinds of Reality in the World 43 The Basic Error of Mechanism as a Meta- physical Explanation is Its Illegitimate Attempt to Understand Life (Duration) Through the Rational Concepts of Intellectual Knowing 43 Bergson Rejects Leibnizian Vitalism Because of Its Logical Inconsistencies 44 Bergson Rejects the Vitalism of Ends Because of Its Attempt to Understand the Nature of Life Through the Concepts of Intellectual Knowing 46 A Premise Which is Common to Both Mechanism and the Vitalism of Ends is that the Real Process of Change Which Occurs in the Evolving Tree of Life Resembles the Process of Manufacturing 47 Bergson Rejects the Preceding Common Premise of Mechanism and the Vitalism of Ends Because It is Based Upon Intellectual Conceptions Which do not Present What is Most Real in the Biologi- cal World 48 Chapter Page The Perceptions and Conceptions of Intel- lectual Knowing do not Enable Us to Know What is Most Real in the Biological World 48 Even Though Intellectual Knowing Fails to Understand What is Most Real in the World of Life It is a Mode of Knowing Which is, Nevertheless, Necessary for The Sciences of Life which Successfully Manipulate the World of Living Things 49 When the Intellectual and Metaphysical Ways of Knowing Life are Compared We Find that the Former Presents us with a Static and Complex Symbolic Represen- tation of Life Whereas the Latter Enables us to Feel the Simplicity and Indivisibility of What is Most Real in Life 50 The Real Process of Change Which Occurs in the Biological World Cannot Resemble the Process of Manufacturing Because the Latter is Highly Complex Whereas the Real Process of Change, Duration, Which Can Only be Known in a Metaphysical In- tuition is Simple and Indivisible 52 The Real Process of Nature Which is the Underlying Cause of the Evolution of the Biological World Re- sembles the Thrust of a Moving Hand into a Bucket of Sand.The Vital Impetus is Analogous to the Thrust of the Moving Hand Whereas the Resistance of Inert Matter to the Thrust of the Vital Impetus is Analogous to the Resistance Which Sand Exerts on the Moving Hand 53 The Vitalism/Mechanism Controversy is Generated by the Attempt to Understand the Nature of Evolving Life in Terms of the Concepts Which are Generated by Intellectual Knowing and this Issue can only be Resolved when Intellectual Understanding is Re- placed by the Metaphysical Intuition of Life (Duration) 57 Summary of Bergson's Vitalism 59 A Comparison of Bergson and Loeb 61 Chapter Page A Comparison of Bergson and Loeb on the Contral Question of the Vitalism/Mechanism Debate 61 A Comparison of the General Conceptual Sys- tems (g.c.s.) of Bergson and Loeb 62 A Comparison of Bergson and Loeb on the Problem of Consciousness 63 The Limitations of Loeb and Bergson 65 A Valid Internal Criticism of Loeb and