SEND LAWYERS, GUNS, AND MONEY: THE POLITICS OF MILITIA SURVIVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST ORA BEACH SZEKELY DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE MCGILL UNIVERSITY JUNE, 2011 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) © Ora Beach Szekely, 2011 Abstract This dissertation considers the sources of variation in the ability of nonstate military actors to both resist and recover from – in short, to survive – confrontations with much stronger conventional militaries. While much of the existing literature on civil war focuses on structural variables, such as initial material or social endowments, this dissertation argues that these resources are less important in determining a non-state actor’s resilience than the relationships it builds in order to acquire them and the means it uses to do so. “Resources” may be either material, (e.g., money and arms) or non-material (e.g., legitimacy and influence) and are acquired (from the civilian population and/or a foreign sponsor) through three possible strategies: coercion, service-provision, and marketing. I argue that the first is least effective, as coercion tends to provide only short-term access to material resources, while marketing is the most effective, as it produces the most durable access to both material and non-material resources. Service provision produces a mid-range outcome. Moreover, all three can have significant unintended consequences. I test the argument by comparing the performances of the PLO, Hizbullah and Hamas in their confrontations with Israel over the past four decades. I conclude by considering the implications of my conclusions both for the study of nonstate actors more broadly, and for the dynamics of 21st century Iraq and Afghanistan. Résumé Cette thèse considère les facteurs de variation de l’habileté des acteurs militaires non-étatiques à résister à et à se remettre- en bref, à survivre à- des confrontations avec des militaires conventionnels comparativement beaucoup plus forts. Alors que la plus grande partie de la littérature sur les guerres civiles se concentre sur les variables structurelles telles que le matériel initial ou les atouts sociaux, cette thèse soutient que ces ressources sont moins importantes pour déterminer la résilience d’un acteur non-étatique que les relations qu’elles construisent afin de les acquérir ainsi que les moyens qu’elle utilise pour le faire. Les « ressources » peuvent être soit matérielles (par exemple, de l’argent et des armes) ou non-matérielles (par exemple, la légitimité et l’influence) et sont acquises (de la population civile et/ou d’un soutien étranger) à travers trois stratégies possibles : la coercition, la prestation de services, et le marketing. Nous soutenons que le premier est le moyen le moins efficace, puisque la coercition tend à donner seulement un accès à court terme aux ressources matérielles, alors que le marketing est le moyen plus efficace, puisqu’il donne l’accès le plus durable à la fois aux ressources matérielles et non-matérielles. La prestation de service aboutit à un résultat intermédiaire. Qui plus est, les trois peuvent avoir des conséquences inattendues. Nous testons ces arguments en comparant la performance de l’OLP, du Hezbollah et du Hamas dans leur confrontation avec Israël au cours des quatre dernières décennies. Nous concluons en considérant la portée de nos conclusions pour l’étude des acteurs non-étatiques en général, ainsi que pour les dynamiques du 21ième siècle en Iraq et en Afghanistan. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... vii Maps, Tables and Figures………………………….………………………………..…xii Acronyms and Initializations ........................................................................................ xiii Chapter One: Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 The Conventional Wisdom: Material and Social Endowments ................................ 2 The Theory .................................................................................................................... 6 The Dependent Variable: Nonstate Actor Survival ........................................................ 7 The Intervening Variable: Resources ............................................................................. 9 Potential critiques ......................................................................................................... 11 Sources of Resources .................................................................................................... 13 The Independent Variable: Strategy Choice ................................................................. 16 Coercion .................................................................................................................... 16 Service Provision ...................................................................................................... 20 Marketing .................................................................................................................. 26 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................... 37 Methodology ................................................................................................................ 38 Research Design and Case Selection ........................................................................ 38 Data Collection ......................................................................................................... 41 Next Steps .................................................................................................................... 43 Chapter Two: Black September .................................................................................... 45 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 45 Background: the Origins of the PLO ........................................................................ 47 Regional relationships ................................................................................................ 49 Jordan ....................................................................................................................... 49 The Rest: The PLO’s approach to the other Arab states .......................................... 58 Syria .......................................................................................................................... 60 Costs and Benefits of the PLO’s Foreign Relations ................................................. 63 The PLO and Civilians in Jordan: A failure of public relations ............................ 67 Marketing .................................................................................................................. 70 Service provision ....................................................................................................... 72 Costs and Benefits: The Jordanians circle the wagons ............................................ 77 iii An Overview of PLO Resources ................................................................................ 79 Outcome: Black September ....................................................................................... 80 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 93 Chapter Three: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon ........................................................ 97 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 97 Some Background on the PLO in Lebanon .............................................................. 99 State Sponsorship ...................................................................................................... 106 The Lebanese State ................................................................................................ 106 Costs and Benefits: Sanctuary and conflict ............................................................ 114 The Arab States ....................................................................................................... 116 Resources Gained, Resources Lost: Weapons, funding and fragmentation ........... 119 The Communist States ............................................................................................. 123 Civilians in Lebanon ................................................................................................. 124 Palestinian Civilians ............................................................................................... 124 Costs and Benefits: A new kind of recruit ............................................................... 128 Relations with Lebanese Civilians .......................................................................... 131 Resources Gained, Resources Lost: Coercion backfires ........................................ 138 Outcome: The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon ............................................................ 139 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 147 Chapter Four: Hizbullah, the Civil War Years ......................................................... 151 Introduction ..............................................................................................................