History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty Xuezhi Zhang History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty 123 Xuezhi Zhang Department of Philosophy Peking University Beijing, China Translated by Benjamin Michael Coles Huaqiao University Xiamen, China Supported by Chinese Fund for the Humanities and Social Sciences (本书获中华社会科学 基金资助) ISBN 978-981-15-8962-1 ISBN 978-981-15-8963-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8963-8 Jointly published with Higher Education Press The print edition is not for sale in China Mainland. Customers from China Mainland please order the print book from: Higher Education Press. © Higher Education Press 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publishers, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publishers remain neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Introduction The Ming Dynasty [1368–1644] was a unique period in Chinese history. For most of the period, the imperial state was relatively weak, and towards the end of the Ming, the country fell into a very desperate situation. However, the Ming was also a period when the whole society began to modernize at a high speed in a wide range of aspects. Due to advances in productive technology, development of industry and commerce, expansion of the scale of cities, and a continued rise in the class status of city residents, the life of city residents became a central focus of attention for the whole society. Of key importance is the imperial examination (keju 科举) system of the Ming Dynasty, which promoted the influence of Neo-Confucianism in all aspects of social life with an unprecedented depth and breadth. Since Buddhism and Daoism were already in decline, they had no choice but to attempt to ride the coattails of Confucianism in order to survive. Within Buddhism and Daoism themselves, the tendency towards a syncretic unification of the Three Teachings (sanjiao 三教 [i.e. Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism]) was very strong. All of these trends influenced the situation of philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, giving it a distinct quality different from that of earlier periods. The mainstream academic thought of the Ming Dynasty was Neo-Confucianism (lixue 理学 [lit. Learning of Principle]). A distinctive quality of Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucianism was the fading of interest in theories of principle (li 理) and qi 气 (material force), and the rise of theories of mind (xin 心) and inherent nature (xing 性) to become the central focus of thought. An important reason for this is that with the efforts of promotion of great Confucians in the Song and Yuan dynasties, Neo-Confucianism had been thoroughly developed, and increasingly became a doctrine concerned with value, such that exploring the ultimate reality of the myriad things had already become a question of empirical demonstration, and thus grad- ually fell into a place of secondary importance in the view of many people. There was thus little space remaining in which to continue to pursue questions of principle and qi. Questions of mind and inherent nature, however, represent the fundamental understanding of philosophers concerning the essence of humanity and its relation with the wider cosmos. In particular, after a prolonged period of absorption, con- flict, and synthesis between Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, the Three v vi Introduction Teachings had come into a state of harmonious integration, which gave questions of mind and inherent nature a unique importance and depth. Furthermore, in the Ming Dynasty [Confucian] Classical Learning (jingxue 经学) had become very worn-out and took a separate path from Neo-Confucianism. In the absence of new methodologies and social demands, it was very difficult for the Study of Classics to develop further. The influence of the imperial examination system meant that the study of meanings and principles (yili 义理) became firmly fixed at the center of the intellectual world, and innovation and development in meanings and principles required personal experience of mind and inherent nature. Theories of mind and inherent nature were best able to express a thinker’s level of fundamental knowl- edge. From the perspective of methodologies of thought, theories of principle and qi took their described objects as systems existing outside the mind, using a method of separation between subject and object; the laws of objects themselves, as well as the relationships between their various parts, were still taken as existing outside the self. Theories of mind and inherent nature, however, were aimed at the relationship between subject and object, with objects as projections of the subjective plane, already imprinted with the stamp of subjectivity. For Neo-Confucians, “mind” generally referred not to a rational subject, but to a complex synthesis of rationality, intuition, individual experience, and awareness, in which the subjective and objective worlds were inseparably connected together. “Inherent nature” generally referred not to external principles obtained rationally, but rather to a self-positing set within the frame of the unity of Heaven and humanity (tian ren he yi 天人合一). It represented the basic view of Neo-Confucians concerning the essential nature of the cosmos, the position of humanity within this cosmos, and relationships between people. Understanding these questions through grasping the myriad phe- nomena of the cosmos in terms of their meaning and value was not something that could be achieved through rational analysis alone. Reason is always an important aspect of thought, and regardless of which method was used to grasp an object, in expressing their thoughts and communicating this information to others, scholars could not leave rationality behind. However, for Neo-Confucians, especially the Ming Dynasty Neo-Confucians focused on mind and inherent nature, simply relying on the instrument of rationality was insufficient. The method used in this book is first to establish the field of problems of the particular thinker under consideration based on a thorough reading of original texts, and then to uncover all the concepts and categories related to this field of problems; using the principle of the unification of logic and history, and taking key concepts as a guide, to construct conceptual and categorical framework; and sorting out the logical relations within this framework, then laying these out according to their logical order. In this process, the emphasis is placed on explaining the formation of the main concepts in this framework, and their relationship with other concepts. However, it is relatively difficult to precisely define the problems a particular thinker was attempting to solve. Influenced by their tradition, the works of thinkers in the Song and Ming dynasties are mostly not systematic or consistent from beginning to end, with their key concepts often diffused throughout records of sayings (yulu 语录) or scholarly letters, and their arguments often fragmented, requiring that one Introduction vii summarize through delving into the depths of a great quantity of material. Once a field of problems has been defined, it is then necessary to analyze the concepts used. Most of the concepts used by Ming Dynasty thinkers were taken up from their predecessors, and [Huang Zongxi’s 黄宗羲] Case Studies of MingConfucians (Mingru xue’an 明儒学案) generally already uncovered the core concepts of the important thinkers, however, the difficulty of differentiating between the various meanings expressed in identical words and phrases remains. This book expends a lot of effort in this regard, as it is only by first clarifying the concrete, singular meanings of a particular concept that the threads of a philosopher’s thought can be uncovered. The method of dealing with a philosopher’s thought by arranging it in a logical structure has been frequently questioned in recent years, being viewed as having the deficiency of forcing ancient figures into a fixed schema. However, if a thinker’s thought is systematic, if its different parts are clearly logically related, it can be dealt with according to a framework. In researching the history of thought, one should aim to make a thinker fresh and alive, rich and full, possessing clear levels and stages, and set out through main points, rather than careless and scattered, fragmented and various, with no main points; ideally, one should make the object of one’s study into a reconstruction in one’s own thought. Researchers do not remold ancient figures or force them to fit into fixed schemas, but rather attempt to represent the structural form of the thought-processes of a thinker based on a full grasp of his material, such that even if the thought of the figure being studied does not have a strict systematic form, one can still find the structural relations between the various parts of his thought.