REPORT Nº 19 — June 2014 Re-mapping the Sahel: transnational security challenges and international responses EDITED BY Cristina Barrios Tobias Koepf Reports European Union Institute for Security Studies EU Institute for Security Studies 100, avenue de Suffren 75015 Paris http://www.iss.europa.eu Director: Antonio Missiroli © EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014. Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, save where otherwise stated. ISBN 978-92-9198-239-4 ISSN 1830-9747 QN-AF-14-002-EN-C Doi:10.2815/39205 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Metropolis, Lisbon. Cover photograph: EUTM Mali – Cérémonie de fin de formation GTIA Balanzan © European Union European Union Institute for Security Studies European Union Institute for Security Studies 100, avenue de Suffren | 75015 Paris | France | www.iss.europa.eu CONTENTS Introduction and summary 3 Cristina Barrios and Tobias Koepf Part One: Mapping challenges in the Sahel region 9 1. The ‘new’ Sahelian terrorist landscape – actors and challenges 11 Tobias Koepf 2. Terrorism in the Sahel in a global context: dismantling the narrative of ‘Afrighanistan’ 19 Kacper Rekawek 3. Narcoterrorism: beyond the myth 25 Mathieu Pellerin 4. Food security and poverty reduction 32 Paul Melly Part Two: Mapping regional and international responses 43 5. The Sahel states – part of the problem, part of the solution 45 Aline Leboeuf 6. Maghreb–Sahel security cooperation: from mirage to reality? 51 Julien Daemers 7. ECOWAS and The Sahel Action Plan (PCAR): a tool for regional integration in the Sahel? 59 Amandine Gnanguênon 8. The UN in the Sahel: managing expectations in the quest for a ‘hybrid peace’ 67 Thierry Tardy Annexes 75 Abbreviations 75 Notes on the contributors 77 Re-mapping the Sahel: transnational security challenges and international responses INTRODUCTION AND SummarY States – whether classified as strong or fragile – and nations still matter in the Sahel, but local and country dynamics are better understood in the broader regional context. This report goes to print in the early summer of 2014, roughly 18 months after the French-led intervention Serval halted the takeover of Malian territory by jihadist terrorists, and jump-started the process to regain national state control and restore order and stability in the vast area of northern Mali and its borders. Unfortunately, Mali continues to attract international media attention due to the difficulties en- countered in the ongoing deployment of the international force MINUSMA, and with the national negotiations initiated after the Ouagadougou Agreement having run into stalemate. One of the latest violent incidents, in the northern city of Kidal, saw bloody clashes between Malian state forces and Tuareg rebels (notably members of the MNLA) during a visit by the Malian prime minister. The Malian government, which assumed power following the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections, is determined to enforce territorial unity and state authority. Yet the Malian armed forces have limited strength – as the events in Kidal showed – and the international community is encouraging local actors to resume negotiations, perceived as the only viable basis for a long-term resolution of the crisis. The population remains hopeful that the country will definitely turn the page after years of institutional crisis, but President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta’s legitimacy is eroding fast. One year after the in- ternational community gathered in Brussels and committed the sum of €3.25 billion to foster economic development in Mali, progress on big infrastructure projects and major state reforms is frustratingly slow. In the meantime, Algeria and Niger and, further afield, Nigeria and Cameroon, have suffered terrorist attacks on their territory; other countries (such as Mauritania) claim they have averted planned attacks, and increasingly monitor Islamist radicalisation among their populations. The Central African Republic faces a dramatic humanitar- ian situation and a deep security crisis, with violence there having taken on an alarm- ing religious and sectarian dimension that is not completely isolated from broader trends in the region. Every country features a complex – and often dangerous – mix of poverty, poor governance, and armed threats emanating from undemocratic domes- tic political systems. Furthermore, the governments in power are often opposed by armed groups (broadly labelled as ‘rebels’) that have gained control over part of their territory. These may sometimes be connected to jihadists and their global quest for radical Islam, in a volatile landscape of shifting alliances, enmities and resistance. However, while it is important to understand the distinctive circumstances of each Sahelian country, the pertinence of a regional approach to the ‘Sahel’, the ‘Maurita- nia-Somalia arc’ or the ‘Sahelo-Saharan space’ is increasingly confirmed by security 3 ISSReportNo.19 threats that do not stop where state borders are drawn. Humanitarian crises generate chaos and massive population movements (with people either internally displaced or displaced across borders); agriculture, cattle, markets, etc. are also interdependent in the region and are equally affected by conflict, public health crises, or drought. Policies to address all of these threats and challenges have been marked by increasing coop- eration among countries in the region, through the different institutions – notably ECOWAS – and ad hoc groupings, such as the ‘Sahel G-5’ initiated in Nouakchott in 2014. In 2011, the European Union formulated a broad approach in its EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, setting out specific aspects of a ‘comprehensive approach’ where security and development are both necessary and complementary objectives, and where military and civilian tools may be of use. In its Conclusions of March 2014, the Council of the EU invited the European External Action Service, the EU Special Repre- sentative for the Sahel and the Commission to further extend their implementation of the Sahel Strategy from Mauritania, Niger and Mali to Burkina Faso and Chad. The importance of state structures and country plans notwithstanding, a regional ap- proach has thus been confirmed to improve security and to foster resilience and eco- nomic integration in West Africa. In the international community, ‘Sahel Strategies’ have proliferated: the United Nations, the World Bank and France each have their own, the African Union is set to approve the AU Sahel Strategy before the end of June, and ECOWAS is in the throes of finalising a document, known by its French acronym PCAR (Programme de cohérence et d’action regionales de l’Afrique de l’Ouest pour la stabilité et le développement des espaces saharo-sahéliens), in which a common strategy will also be elaborated. Each of the Sahel Strategies must be understood as an internal policy document, prop- er to the institution or country that signs it. In that sense, the documents reflect each of the actors’ own institutional perspectives and procedures regarding development and security policy in this region of Africa. In addition, each Sahel Strategy involves a specific understanding of the Sahel, which is a way for stakeholders to ‘map’ the Sahel region to fit their own purposes and policies. In the course of this ongoing ‘re- mapping’ exercise, the meaning of the term ‘Sahel’ has undergone interpretations and adaptations, which may vary in terms of geographical scope, actors involved or areas for cooperation (food security, the fight against terrorism, trade, transport, etc.). This reflects a flexibility and a pragmatism in adapting responses that is much needed, although there is a concomitant risk of redundancy, dispersion, and lack of coordina- tion of the international community. For the time being there is only a platform for technical coordination led by the United Nations and currently co-presided by Mali, but it is not yet fully operative. It remains unclear whether this panoply of frameworks and policies will be able to to help provide security and economic development for the approximate 145 million deprived people in the Sahel. 4 Re-mapping the Sahel: transnational security challenges and international responses Mapping challenges and responses: chapter summaries The present report is based upon the monitoring exercise and discussions the EUISS held within the framework of its Sahel Task Force. In a series of seminars over the course of eight months (September 2013 until April 2014), a small group of experts from academia (mainly think tanks), as well as from various EU institutions and EU member states, met regularly to discuss the security situation in the Sahel region. Among the themes discussed were the issues of terrorism and other forms of organ- ised crime in the region, the link between security and development challenges, as well as the efforts to increase regional cooperation to tackle the challenges in the Sahel. The report by no means gives an exhaustive account of all the topics that fuelled the lively discussions that took place during the various Sahel Task Force meetings. But it seeks to address in further depth some of the issues that are of particular impor- tance and to provide food for thought for further discussions. This ‘re-mapping’ of the Sahel is thus by definition not definitive but we hope that it will contribute to an enhanced understanding of the current key questions in the region through the entry-points addressed in each of the chapters and that it will help frame policy op- tions and build bridges between different research approaches. In the first part of the report, the contributors focus on some of the various chal- lenges that the regional actors as well as the international community are faced with in the region. Particular attention is devoted here to the challenge of radical Islamist terrorism, which is the main reason why events in the Sahel have made the interna- tional headlines over the last couple of years. Tobias Koepf starts by giving an overview of the various terrorist actors that are cur- rently active in the Sahel.