FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission Background: ThisMayCongresspassedandPresidentObamasignedtheFraudEnforcementandRecovery Actof2009(FERA).Amongotherthings,theActestablishedaFinancialCrisisInquiry Commission(FCIC)andchargeditwith“examin[ing]thecauses,domesticandglobal,ofthe currentfinancialandeconomiccrisisintheUnitedStates.”ThelawinstructstheCommissionto investigatetheroleof22specifiedfactorsinprecipitatingthecrisisandlookintothecollapseof eachmajorfinancialfirmthatfailedorwouldhavefailedwithoutextraordinarygovernment assistancebetweenAugust2007andApril2009.TheCommissionreceivedbroadsubpoena power,anopen-endedmandatetogatherinformationfromgovernmentagenciesandprivate entitiesandtheauthoritytorefercasesforfederalorstateprosecution.(seeAttachmentA) TheCommissionconsistsofsixmembersappointedbyDemocraticcongressionalleadersand fourmembersappointedbytheirRepublicancounterparts.(AttachmentB)FormerCalifornia statetreasurerPhilAngelidesservesaschairmanoftheFCIC(AttachmentC);formerHouse WaysandMeansCommitteechairmanBillThomas(R-CA)wasnamedvicechairman.The CommissionwillholditsfirstpublicmeetingonSeptember17andisrequiredunderFERAto reportitsfindingsinDecember2010. TheCommission’sOpportunities: • Deepenandsustainthedemandforreformbyshapingpublicunderstandingofthedoctrines, policiesandpracticesthatledtothecollapse • Buildafoundationalrecordforsubsequenthistoricalaccountsoftheeventsunder investigation • Advancetheprocessofbringingindividualandinstitutionalwrongdoerstojustice • Indicatethescopeandkeycharacteristicsofreformsneededtorestorestability,accountability andpublicpurposetothefinancialsector OptionsforSAFERandAllies: • Identifyspecificstory-richissueswithintheCommission’sfieldofinquirythatwarrantin- depthexaminationandprovideevidentiaryleadsand/oraframeworkforinvestigatingthese issues • PresstheCommissiontoexaminesignificantcausesofthecrisisthatanarrowlyliteralreading ofitsremitmightexclude(forexample,thelistof22factorsdoesnotincludethefailureof lawmakersandregulatorstomodernizeorstrengtheninadequaterules) • Insistonproceduralmechanismsthatprotecttheinquiryfromexternalandinternalpressures intendedtocompromiseitseffectiveness(oneexample:requireddisclosureofallnon- whistleblowingcontactsinitiatedwithFCICmembers,staffandcontractors)(seealso AttachmentD) • MaintaindirectcontactwithFCICmembersandstaff • Influencetheechochamber(media,electedofficials,relevantorganizations,etc.) • Conductgeneraland/ortargetedpubliceducationactivities Products: • Serialorcollectedbriefsoutliningissuesforfurtherinvestigation(seeAttachmentE) • Periodiccommentariesand/orreportcardsontheprogressoftheinquiry • Periodicproposalsforlegislative,administrativeorlaw-enforcementinitiativesthatare responsivetotheCommission’sfindings AttachmentA IntheHouseofRepresentatives,U.S., May6,2009. Resolved, ThatthebillfromtheSenate(S.386)entitled“AnActtoimproveenforcementofmortgage fraud,securitiesfraud,financialinstitutionfraud,andotherfraudsrelatedtofederalassistanceandrelief programs,fortherecoveryoffundslosttothesefrauds,andforotherpurposes”,dopasswiththefollowing AMENDMENTS: SEC.5.FINANCIALCRISISINQUIRYCOMMISSION. (a)ESTABLISHMENTOF COMMISSION .—ThereisestablishedinthelegislativebranchtheFinancial CrisisInquiryCommission(inthissectionreferredtoasthe“Commission”)toexaminethecauses, domesticandglobal,ofthecurrentfinancialandeconomiccrisisintheUnitedStates. *** (c)FUNCTIONSOFTHE COMMISSION .—ThefunctionsoftheCommissionare— (1)toexaminethecausesofthecurrentfinancialandeconomiccrisisintheUnitedStates,specificallythe roleof— (A)fraudandabuseinthefinancialsector,includingfraudandabusetowardsconsumersinthemortgage sector; (B)FederalandStatefinancialregulators,includingtheextenttowhichtheyenforced,orfailedtoenforce statutory,regulatory,orsupervisoryrequirements; (C) the global imbalance of savings, international capital flows, and fiscal imbalances of various governments; (D)monetarypolicyandtheavailabilityandtermsofcredit; (E) accounting practices, including, mark-to-market and fair value rules, and treatment of off-balance sheetvehicles; (F)taxtreatmentoffinancialproductsandinvestments; (G) capital requirements and regulations on leverage and liquidity, including the capital structures of regulatedandnon-regulatedfinancialentities; (H) credit rating agencies in the financial system, including, reliance on credit ratings by financial institutionsandFederalfinancialregulators,theuseofcreditratingsinfinancialregulation,andtheuseof creditratingsinthesecuritizationmarkets; (I)lendingpracticesandsecuritization,includingtheoriginate-to-distributemodelforextendingcreditand transferringrisk; (J) affiliations between insured depository institutions and securities, insurance, and other types of nonbankingcompanies; (K)theconceptthatcertaininstitutionsare“too-big-to-fail”anditsimpactonmarketexpectations; (L)corporategovernance,includingtheimpactofcompanyconversionsfrompartnershipstocorporations; (M)compensationstructures; (N) changes in compensation for employees of financial companies, as compared to compensation for otherswithsimilarskillsetsinthelabormarket; (O)thelegalandregulatorystructureoftheUnitedStateshousingmarket; (P)derivativesandunregulatedfinancialproductsandpractices,includingcreditdefaultswaps; (Q)short-selling; (R)financialinstitutionrelianceonnumericalmodels,includingriskmodelsandcreditratings; (S) the legal and regulatory structure governing financial institutions, including the extent to which the structurecreatestheopportunityforfinancialinstitutionstoengageinregulatoryarbitrage; (T)thelegalandregulatorystructuregoverninginvestorandmortrgagorprotection; (U)financialinstitutionsandgovernment-sponsoredenterprises;and (V)thequalityofduediligenceundertakenbyfinancialinstitutions; (2) to examine the causes of the collapse of each major financial institution that failed (including institutionsthatwereacquiredtopreventtheirfailure)orwaslikelytohavefailedifnotforthereceiptof exceptional Government assistance from the Secretary of the Treasury during the period beginning in August2007throughApril2009; (3)tosubmitareportundersubsection(h); (4)torefertotheAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStatesandanyappropriateStateattorneygeneralany personthattheCommissionfindsmayhaveviolatedthelawsoftheUnitedStatesinrelationtosuchcrisis; and (5)tobuildupontheworkofotherentities,andavoidunnecessaryduplication,byreviewingtherecordof theCommitteeonBanking,Housing,andUrbanAffairsoftheSenate,theCommitteeonFinancialServices oftheHouseofRepresentatives,othercongressionalcommittees,theGovernmentAccountabilityOffice, otherlegislativepanels,andanyotherdepartment,agency,bureau,board,commission,office,independent establishment,orinstrumentalityoftheUnitedStates(tothefullestextentpermittedbylaw)withrespectto thecurrentfinancialandeconomiccrisis. (d)POWERSOFTHE COMMISSION .— (1)HEARINGSANDEVIDENCE.—TheCommissionmay,forpurposesofcarryingoutthissection— (A)holdhearings,sitandactattimesandplaces,taketestimony,receiveevidence,andadministeroaths; and (B)require,bysubpoenaorotherwise,theattendanceandtestimonyofwitnessesandtheproductionof books,records,correspondence,memoranda,papers,anddocuments. *** (4)INFORMATIONFROMFEDERALAGENCIESANDOTHERENTITIES.— (A)INGENERAL.—TheCommissionmaysecuredirectly fromanydepartment,agency,bureau,board, commission, office, independent establishment, or instrumentality of the United States any information related to any inquiry of the Commission conducted under this section, including information of a confidential nature (which the Commission shall maintaininasecure manner).Each suchdepartment, agency,bureau,board,commission,office,independentestablishment,orinstrumentalityshallfurnishsuch informationdirectlytotheCommissionuponrequest. (B) OTHERENTITIES.—ItisthesenseoftheCongress that the Commission should seek testimony or information from principals and other representatives of government agencies and private entities that weresignificantparticipantsintheUnitedStatesandglobalfinancialandhousingmarketsduringthetime periodexaminedbytheCommission. *** (h)REPORTOFTHE COMMISSION ;APPEARANCEBEFOREANDCONSULTATIONSWITHCONGRESS .— (1)REPORT.—OnDecember15,2010,theCommissionshallsubmittothePresidentandtotheCongress areportcontainingthefindingsandconclusionsoftheCommissiononthecausesofthecurrentfinancial andeconomiccrisisintheUnitedStates. (2) INSTITUTION-SPECIFIC REPORTS AUTHORIZED.—At the discretion of the chairperson of the Commission, the report under paragraph (1) may include reports or specific findings on any financial institutionexaminedbytheCommissionundersubsection(c)(2). (3)APPEARANCEBEFORETHECONGRESS.—ThechairpersonoftheCommissionshall,notlaterthan 120 days after the date of submission of the final reports under paragraph (1), appear before the CommitteeonBanking,Housing,andUrbanAffairsoftheSenateandtheCommitteeonFinancialServices oftheHouseofRepresentativesregardingsuchreportsandthefindingsoftheCommission. http://thomas.loc.gov/home/gpoxmlc111/s386_eah.xml AttachmentB MembersoftheFinancialCrisisInquiryCommission AppointedbySpeakerofHouseandSenateMajorityLeader PhilAngelides,Chairman PhilAngelides…waselectedasCalifornia’sStateTreasurerandservedfrom1999-2007...During histenureasTreasurer,Mr.AngelidesservedasatrusteeforCalifornia’stwomajorpension funds[and]managedtheState’s$57billioninvestmentfund…Heservedfrom1975to1983in Californiagovernment..Heenteredtheprivatesectorin1984and,in1986,formedhisownreal estateinvestmentbusiness,whichpioneeredtheplanningandbuildingofsmartgrowth communities…Mr.AngelidesiscurrentlyChairmanoftheCanyon-JohnsonUrbanCommunities Fund,apartnershipofEarvin“Magic”JohnsonandCanyonCapitalRealtyAdvisorsbeingformed